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Abstract 
Social psychological research into adjustment and adaptation to brain injury has 
revealed "unrealistic" self-appraisal as problematic for people with brain injuries and 
the people in their social environments. This unrealistic self-appraisal can be 
expressed as reduced awareness of physical, cognitive and/or emotional difficulties, 
which occur following neurological damage. However, the development of a realistic 
self-appraisal is seen as important if people with brain injuries are to engage in 
rehabilitation and live fulfilling and meaningful lives. 
In this thesis this point of view will be challenged. Instead, awareness of difficulties 
will be linked to social interaction. It will be suggested that the discursive 
environments of people with brain injuries may be beneficial for the development of 
awareness of difficulties after a brain injury. A concept of self-knowledge is 
introduced to guide the collection and interpretation of the data. The concept derives 
from an integration of a social symbolic interactionist theory (Mead, 1934) and a 
social constructionist theory of consciousness (Burns and Engdahl, 1998). It 
emphasises that self-knowledge is constructed during social interaction and that the 
information exchanged during this interaction is assimilated, internalised and used in 
self reflection. In addition, the concept also recognises that self-knowledge involves 
selection from multiple sources of information used to form a united sense of self. 
The empirical work includes three studies. Study One consists of two parts. Part One 
of the first study examined the salience of the brain injury and the difficulties that 
follow the brain injury in the narratives of people with brain injuries. It was found that 
people with brain injuries referred equally to their brain injuries and to their physical 
difficulties. Cognitive and emotional difficulties were referred to in second and third 
place. The results gave little indication that the participants understood the 
implications of their difficulties for their everyday lives. In Part Two of the same 
study, significant others were interviewed and asked to talk about their knowledge of 
the difficulties experienced by the people with brain injuries they supported. The 
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significant others were also asked about the ways these difficulties were explained by 
them to the people with brain injuries. It was found in this part of the study that 
significant others made more complaints about difficulties than people with brain 
injuries did but were reluctant to talk about these difficulties to the people with brain 
injuries. This was due to the physicality of some of the difficulties, in favour of 
protecting the person they supported and as a caring practice. Study Two examined 
the construction of knowledge of their difficulties by people with brain injuries. It was 
found in this study that people with brain injuries equated the acquisition of 
knowledge about their difficulties to a process of discovery which was the product of 
actor, social and physical environment. Study Three explored the discursive practices 
of non-expert health professionals and the ways in which this discursive environment 
was involved in the constructions found in the second study. The third study showed 
that some of the non-expert health professionals' lay theories of brain injury mirrored 
those of people with brain injuries. 
The findings are discussed in relation to the integrative social constructivist theory of 
consciousness introduced in this thesis. Research into awareness of difficulties in 
brain injury cannot assume that any particular difficulty is problematic for any given 
individual or that a particular level of awareness should be imposed on people with 
brain injuries. Such an assumption, erroneous in some cases, would imply that people 
with brain injuries should construct their worlds in the same manner as the researcher. 
It is concluded that awareness of difficulties following a brain injury is too complex a 
phenomenon to be investigated from only one perspective. 
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Chapter One - Introduction to the thesis 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Social psychological research into adjustment and adaptation to brain injury has 
revealed "unrealistic" self-appraisal as problematic for people with brain injuries and 
the people in their social environments. This unrealistic self-appraisal can be 
expressed as reduced awareness of physical, cognitive and/or emotional difficulties, 
which occur following neurological damage. However, the development of a realistic 
self-appraisal is understood in the literature to be important if people with brain 
injuries are to engage in rehabilitation and live fulfilling and meaningful lives. This 
thesis challenges this point of view. Instead, it investigates the self-knowledge of 
people who have been affected by a brain injury. It aims to answer questions relevant 
to rehabilitation staff, carers of people with brain injury, families, researchers and 
clinicians in the field of rehabilitation after brain injury. It also aims to introduce a 
new theoretical perspective from social psychology to the study of brain injury. The 
investigation concerns the ways in which people with brain injuries construct 
knowledge of their difficulties and the challenges they have to face following the brain 
injury. Explanations of the findings are presented at an intrapsychic and social level. 
One of the salient features of the process of reviewing the literature on awareness of 
difficulties following a brain injury was the emergent dominance of a research 
paradigm that gave neurological, neuropsychological or psychological interpretations 
of people's behaviour and resultant rehabilitation practices. Apparent deviance from 
the norms of acceptable behaviour came to be constructed as symptomatic of a 
disorder. Memory loss was interpreted not as lapses of concentration or selective 
memorising, but as indicative of a specific syndrome associated with pathological 
defects or injuries. It was noted that despite the absence of any neurological, 
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neuropsychological or psychological research evidence capable of explaining the 
aetiology of lack of awareness of difficulties amongst people with brain injuries, 
contradicting rehabilitation practices were recommended for lack of awareness of 
difficulties in people with brain injuries. The theory or theories which prompted such 
an approach appeared to be derived from a fairly simplistic analysis of individuals as 
part human, part machines amenable to repair once the cause of the problem had been 
isolated. Therefore, one of the main concerns of the thesis is the lack of any robust 
theoretical basis for the research and rehabilitation of people with brain injuries, who 
are assumed to have lack awareness of their difficulties. 
The thesis thus asks whether this lack of awareness can be explained by a 
neuropsychological or neurological or psychological diagnosis only. As human beings 
are not machines many different factors might combine to lead to an apparently 
confused state of mind. In short, an alternative conceptual framework is needed to 
explore the phenomenon of awareness of difficulties following a brain injury. 
This thesis presents such a framework. The research introduced here is moulded 
around a conceptual framework of self-knowledge developed from an integration of 
social interactionist theory and a social constructionist theory of consciousness 
(developed in Chapter Three). Social constructionism asserts that the apparent 
scientific basis on which neurological, neuropsychological and psychological practice 
is founded is only one way of interpreting the world. The paradigm of scientific 
knowledge is one in which reality is depicted as facts waiting to be discovered "out 
there". Yet, some writers argued, these facts are mental constructs that are influenced 
by social and cultural values. What is a hard fact today may be denied tomorrow. The 
portrayal of knowledge as value free is questioned by those who would argue that 
epistemologies gain acceptance and authority only by the merit of their being 
compatible with prevailing beliefs and value systems. 
Thus, this initial foray into social constructivism led to the writing of this thesis, for 
under this umbrella it is understood that self-knowledge is constructed during social 
interaction and that information exchanged during social interaction is assimilated, 
internalised and the basis of self-reflection. In addition, the conceptual framework 
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recognises that self-knowledge involves selection of external and internal sources of 
information which are in turn constructed to give the person a unified sense of self. 
Understanding self-knowledge in this way not only recognises that the self develops 
from complex processes but it allows the research to explore the awareness of the self 
from other perspectives. That is, without assuming for example that people with brain 
injuries are motivated by a desire to protect the self from the negative implications of 
having been affected by a brain injury. 
Integrating these theories of self-knowledge also allows the research to question the 
usefulness of other research paradigms, which quantify awareness of difficulties 
following a brain injury and treat the subject as a static phenomenon. McGlynn and 
Schacter (1989) and other workers in the field, call for more efforts to be devoted to 
the development of theoretical models and conceptualisations of unawareness 
phenomena. A notable feature of the literature is that there has been little attempt to 
make use of relevant concepts from other domains of psychological inquiry. This is 
then, as far as the researcher is aware, the first work on the social construction of 
awareness of difficulties following a brain injury. The introduction of this conceptual 
framework into the area represents therefore, its major theoretical contribution. The 
thesis will argue that awareness of difficulties after brain injury may be socially 
influenced, and that the major players in this construction are the individuals in the 
social environment of the people with brain injuries. 
1.2. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTERS 
Chapter Two defines brain injury and introduces the problem of lack of awareness of 
difficulties as observed during clinical practice, during rehabilitation and in community 
settings. Evidence that lack of awareness of difficulties is observed in people with 
brain injuries is offered in the chapter from clinical, social and health psychology 
observations and research. The chapter reviews the theoretical explanations 
encountered in the literature, and outlines the development of awareness of 
difficulties following a brain injury. It is underlined in the chapter that researchers 
assume denial of difficulties to be a coping mechanism used by people with brain 
injuries leading to problematic rehabilitation. This assumption is questioned in the 
chapter and some methodological issues are discussed. 
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In Chapter Three, a theoretical perspective that allows the thesis to gain a non- 
neuropsychological understanding of lack of awareness of difficulties is established. 
This theoretical background is an integration of symbolic interactionism theories and 
a social constructionist theory of consciousness. The chapter develops the symbolic 
interactionist tenet and discusses questions of agency. Evidence for and limitations of 
the theory are also addressed. A social constructivist theory is introduced to widen 
the scope offered by the symbolic interactionist perspective. This position allows 
awareness to be understood as a defining form of consciousness. It argues that human 
consciousness results from the development of collective naming, classifying, judging, 
reflecting and talking applied to individual members of a collective. Individuals 
acquire the capacity to engage in self-reflectivity not only through the acquisition of 
language and collective representation but through the capabilities of discussing 
conceptions, observations and assessments of the self. It is suggested here that self- 
knowledge is constructed during social interaction through a process of assimilation, 
internalisation and self-reflection. In addition, the theory recognises that self- 
knowledge involves selection from multiple sources of information and that this 
information can be the content of communication. The chapter discusses the different 
ways the body, cognition and emotion can be the object of this communication. 
Reviews of the literature on the self in brain injury follow this discussion and the role 
of the other in brain injury is defined. The end of the chapter outlines the main 
research questions and summarises the studies. The introduction of the theory to the 
study of lack of awareness of difficulties after brain injury is then the main theoretical 
contribution of the thesis and is used to steer the research and the interpretation of the 
data. 
Chapter Four considers the assumptions and implications of some methods commonly 
used to study lack of awareness of difficulties after a brain injury. It then describes the 
philosophical framework within which the research in this thesis has been undertaken. 
The constructivist ontological and epistemological positions are outlined to 
demonstrate the congruency of the methods used during the investigation within the 
chosen paradigm. The choice of exploring awareness of difficulties after brain injury 
by talking to the people affected by it is justified and the analytical procedures are 
explained. 
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The three studies in this thesis are described respectively in chapters five, six and 
seven. These studies investigated knowledge of own difficulties in people with brain 
injuries (Chapter Five), communicative practices in the social, everyday environment 
of the participants (Chapter Five), the constructions of self by people with brain 
injuries (Chapter Six) and communicative practices in the social environment of the 
participants (Chapter Seven). Chapter Five describes the first study of the thesis. The 
study is divided into two parts. Part One is an interview study in which people with 
brain injuries were asked to talk about themselves and their everyday activities. The 
study found brain injury and the physical difficulties of the participants to be 
predominant in the narratives of the participants. Cognitive and emotional difficulties 
were found to be of low salience. Explanations in terms of the visibility of the 
difficulties, the level of abstraction of some difficulties, memory loss and self- 
presentation are offered. 
Part Two of Study One is an interview study with people appointed by the 
participants in Part One as their significant others. Significant others were asked here 
to talk about their knowledge of the difficulties being experienced by the people with 
brain injuries whom they supported. Significant others were also asked about the 
ways these difficulties were explained or talked about between themselves and the 
people with brain injuries. The patterns found in the data are explained in terms of 
lack of communication. 
Chapter Six examines the construction of knowledge of their difficulties by people 
with brain injuries. It describes a second round of interviews in which the difficulties 
mentioned by participants in the first round were addressed directly by the researcher. 
This study found that people with brain injuries construct the knowledge of their 
difficulties in a manner resembling the sorting of a puzzle. The understanding of these 
difficulties is described then as a struggle involving their ability to control their own 
behaviour and their ability to remember. 
Chapter Seven investigates further the discursive environment of the participants and 
the ways in which local discourses are involved in the constructions found in Study 
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Two. Non-expert health professionals were interviewed as to their communicative 
practices in relation to cognitive and emotional difficulties which (coincidentally) 
were found to be of low salience for the people with brain injuries in Part One of 
Study One. This study found that the lay theories about lack of awareness of 
difficulties following a brain injury of non-expert health professional did not 
correspond to the clinical or academic theories of lack of awareness of difficulties 
following a brain injury. Non-expert health professionals' theories attributing 
behaviours to brain injury however, mirrored those of people with brain injuries and 
those held by academics, other health experts and the general population. 
Chapter Eight summarises the findings of the three studies and considers the 
application of the social constructivist theory of consciousness to the study of 
awareness of difficulties after a brain injury. The chapter points to some limitations of 
the research, the implications of the research for rehabilitation practices and 
suggestions for future research. The chapter ends with some concluding remarks. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LACK OF AWARENESS OF DIFFICULTIES FOLLOWING A 
BRAIN INJURY: A REVIEW 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The last few years have witnessed a growing interest in the study of brain injury. The 
literature is replete with studies of its epidemiology, physiology, neuropsychology and 
outcome, together with a large number of comprehensive texts written about it. 
Despite this abundance of literature rehabilitation professionals and families of 
patients remain uncertain about how to deal with the challenges and complex 
problems presented by those who have sustained a brain injury. Further, recent 
studies point to the fact that in spite of rehabilitation and family efforts, people with 
brain injuries remain severely handicapped many years after the injury. The reasons 
for this lie largely in the unique epidemiological, physiological and neuropsychological 
characteristics of this population. 
Before focusing on one of these characteristics though, it is important to remember 
what it is meant by the term "brain injury". The clinical and research literature can be 
very confusing because, all too often, the same word is used to define different 
phenomena and vice-versa. For example, brain injury and brain damage seem to be 
used interchangeably for any kind of insult to the brain or a malfunction of the brain. 
The effects of tumours (or their removal), stroke, haemorrhage, multiple sclerosis and 
other trauma are included in this description. Other descriptions talk about closed- 
head injury, described by Martin (1998) as an insult to the skull or any of the 
meninges. Closed-head injury has primary consequences such as bleeding, or swelling 
of the brain; it has also secondary effects such as cell death. This type of injury 
contrasts with penetrating head injury, which involves penetration of the skull and/or 
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meninges. Traumatic brain injury is a term that is used by some writers 
indistinguishably with the term acquired brain injury. The National Head Injury 
Foundation (NHIF) (1989) has described a traumatic brain injury as an insult to the 
brain caused by an external force that may produce reduced or altered states of 
consciousness, which results in impaired cognitive abilities or physical functioning. 
Traumatic brain injury can also be described according to the degree of severity of the 
injury as: mild, moderate or severe. In some instances, usually amongst carers of 
people with brain injuries and by some authors, the term acquired brain injury has 
been differentiated from that of its twin, traumatic brain injury and has come to refer, 
in their everyday parlance, cases of brain injury referring to stroke, tumours, 
aneurysms, haemorrhages and so on. By the term traumatic brain injury, these carers 
mean any brain injury that is the outcome of "a heavy blow to the head". In this thesis 
however, the term brain injury will be used in a global sense as it is the most widely 
used in the literature and it will refer to any damage to the brain ranging from heavy 
blows to the head, strokes, tumours, aneurysms, haemorrhages to ME and 
Alzheimer's. Distinctions will be made as and when the need will arise. 
Having defined brain injury, the attention turns now to introducing one of the 
problems that affect rehabilitation and reintegration into the community of people 
with brain injuries, namely, lack of awareness of difficulties. The chapter proceeds 
with a review of theoretical explanations and evidence encountered in the literature, 
and outlines the development of awareness of difficulties following a brain injury. It 
then incorporates an alternative explanation to the phenomenon and underlines some 
methodological issues encountered in the research literature. The chapter concludes 
with a summary and limitations encountered in this literature. 
2.2. LACK OF AWARENESS OF DIFFICULTIES FOLLOWING A BRAIN 
INJURY: THE PROBLEM 
Lack of awareness of difficulties following a brain injury or, "unrealistic" self- 
appraisal, has been pointed out by a number of researchers in the field of brain injury 
(Ponsford, 1995, Prigatano and Fordyce, 1986a) as problematic at the time of social 
psychological adjustment and adaptation to brain injury. This problematic self- 
appraisal can be understood as reduced awareness of changes in cognition, behaviour 
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and personality. These changes which, allegedly, occur as a result of neurological 
impairment reduce motivation for rehabilitation, result in unrealistic decisions 
regarding work and produce conflict with family members. In general, however, the 
neuropsychological literature reflects widely on the consequences of brain injury. 
Attentional difficulties, perception, planning, action, memory, spatial orientation and 
language disorders have been analysed and documented. The debilitating and often 
dramatic effects of brain injury are well known and yet, it comes, as a surprise that a 
significant proportion of afflicted people are, unaware of their difficulties. 
Lack of awareness of difficulties has important theoretical and clinical consequences 
(McGlynn and Schacter, 1989). Theoretically, lack of awareness of difficulties 
amongst people with brain injuries poses questions concerning the nature of the 
mechanisms that allow people in normal circumstances to be aware of their own 
overall functioning. Clinically, because unawareness of difficulties poses a difficult 
obstacle for rehabilitation purposes: if the patients are not aware of their difficulties 
they are unlikely to do anything about them. Setting the problem in context and a 
review of the literature will help illustrate the point. 
2.3. THE PROBLEM IN CONTEXT: CLINICAL, REHABILITATION AND 
FAMILY SETTINGS 
Lack of awareness of difficulties is a problem that was first observed and studied in 
clinical settings. Clinical observations such as those of Schilder (1934) and Ota 
(1969) state that brain injured patients are frequently unconcerned about their 
injuries, are unaware of their psychological disturbances and do not spontaneously 
complain of physical disabilities. Patients that seem somewhat aware of their 
difficulties only complain of minor physical problems or vaguely mental difficulties. 
Ford (1976), also in clinical observations, includes lack of insight as a primary change 
following brain damage. 
Similarly, psychological rehabilitation research (e. g. Prigatano, 1986) has found that 
many severely brain injured patients will continue to minimise the severity of residual 
neuropsychological difficulties for several years following trauma. Groswasser, 
Wendelson, Stern, Schechter and Najenson (1977) reported that all the patients that 
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exhibited unawareness of behavioural disturbances when evaluated 6 months post- 
injury continued to do so at a 30 month evaluation. Similarly, Tyerman and Humphry 
(1984) note that although severely head injured patients might exhibit some 
awareness they often lack full insight into their condition and continue to hope that 
they will return to their former past. 
Lack of awareness of social and behavioural changes following brain injury has also 
received the attention of social psychological research. By examining patient's own 
accounts in relation to relatives' accounts, Thomsen (1974) reported that patients did 
not complain about post-traumatic disabilities but close relatives acknowledged the 
changes in personality of the patient. Along these lines, Santos, Castro-Caldas and 
Sausa (1998) investigated the long-term consequences of brain injury for patients and 
families. Their examination of spontaneous complaints in people with brain injuries 
and the comparisons with the impressions of relatives concluded that relatives 
mentioned more complaints about the injured subjects than the injured subjects 
mentioned about themselves. This occurred in several domains: somatic, physical, 
cognitive and behavioural. Memory problems were highly reported by both groups 
but somatic problems were more frequently reported by patients while behavioural 
problems were more often reported by the relatives. 
Memory impairment, attention difficulties and impaired judgement, as well known 
cognitive difficulties that follow head injury, have been investigated as possible 
contributors to the observed discrepancies between patients and relatives. McKinlay 
and Brooks (1984) asked 55 patients and their relatives to assess patients degree of 
impairment on various psychometric tests. The authors concluded that unawareness 
of difficulties appears to be unrelated to cognitive difficulties as measured by the 
tests. Mackinley and Brooks reported that the discrepancies between patients and 
relatives could be attributable to distorted perceptions on the part of relatives. More 
recently, Port, Willmott and Charlton (2002) found that the level of awareness in 
significant others was limited during the early stages of recovery from brain injury. 
However, relatives of patients with brain injury have been shown to learn to accept 
social, behavioural and personality changes in the patients as primary coping strategy. 
Willer, Allen, Durnan and Ferry (1990) described the integration problems faced by 
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13 young men who had experienced traumatic brain injury and the coping strategies 
used by their mothers and siblings. Willer et al. (1990) reported that despite physical 
and cognitive disabilities, these young people identified problems in living as having 
highest concern. Mothers identified acceptance of the change in their sons as the most 
important coping strategy. 
In reference to rehabilitation, lack of awareness of difficulties in people with brain 
injuries represents a problem. The psychological literature acknowledges that 
unaware patients may lack motivation for treatment (Prigatano and Fordyce, 1986a), 
fail to benefit from therapy (Ford, 1976) and make no use of compensation strategies 
(Brooks and Lincoln, 1984). Prigatano and Fordyce (1986b) studied unawareness of 
difficulties in 23 patients who underwent rehabilitation after traumatic brain injury. 
The authors found that patients tended to rate themselves as more competent than did 
family or staff members. Discrepancies between patients and staff members were 
positively correlated with patient's degree of neuropsychological impairment and 
negatively correlated with patient's extent of emotional distress. Furthermore, 
Ranseen and Bohaska (1987) examined the relation between staff-patient rating 
discrepancy on the Patient Competency Rating Scale (used in Prigatano and Fordyce 
study) and lesion site following traumatic brain injury. In this case, 32 patients with 
focal left, focal right and diffuse damage were studied before rehabilitation and one 
month after it. The three groups rated themselves more competent than did 
rehabilitation staff at both periods. Patients showed improvement after one month of 
rehabilitation but continued to overestimate their competency. The staff rating 
discrepancy was significantly greater at both periods of time for the group with focal 
right damage than for the other two groups. The authors concluded that right brain 
damaged patients have a greater unawareness of difficulties because their cognitive 
impairment involves perceptual problems and difficulty organising information in 
relation to one's self. 
Thus, the evidence shows that people with brain injuries can lack awareness of their 
difficulties. Although observed in clinical settings, lack of awareness of difficulties has 
been described as a problem by psychological rehabilitation research and continues to 
be considered a problem by social psychological research by the time the individual 
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affected with the brain injury returns to a family or community environment. 
Therefore, it is to this lack of awareness of difficulties and to the different 
explanations found in the literature that the discussion turns now. 
2.4. THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS 
Lack of awareness of difficulties following brain injury has been conceptualised as a 
failure to gain consciousness or "explicit access to information regarding the state of a 
perceptual, cognitive, or motor function: the patient is not consciously aware that a 
once-intact function is currently impaired" (McGlynn and Schacter, 1989, p. 194). As 
such, most investigations into the phenomenon have tried to provide evidence for this 
loss of consciousness and a few have tried to offer more specialised theoretical 
interpretations and explanations. 
McGlynn and Schacter (1989) in an extensive review of the literature on unawareness 
of difficulties in neuropsychological syndromes classify theories of anosognosia (lack 
of knowledge, awareness or recognition of disease (Babinski, 1914)) into 
neuroanatomically based theories or motivational theories. A more recent 
classification however, proposed by Ownsworth, McFarland and Young (2002), 
divides these theories into neurological, psychological and integrated theories of 
awareness. These theories will be discussed here as to follow this, more recent and 
expansive, categorisation. 
2.4.1. Neurological theories 
Neurological based theories attribute lack of awareness of difficulties to focal brain 
lesion, to diffuse brain damage or to a general disorder of the brain. These will be 
considered in turn. 
Focal brain injury 
Proponents of this theoretical position have suggested that lack of awareness of 
difficulty results from damage to the right hemisphere of the brain (Koehler, Endtz, 
Te Velde, & Hekster, 1986). However, the idea that lack of awareness is exclusively 
the outcome of lesions of the right hemisphere has been questioned by several 
researchers who observed lack of awareness in patients with left hemisphere damage 
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(Cutting, 1978; Prigatano and Altmant, 1990; Grotta and Bratina, 1995). However, 
relative to lack of awareness resulting from right hemisphere lesions these cases are 
rare. 
Advocates of the focal lesion explanation often view lack of awareness as a disorder 
of cognition arising from particular lesion sites. In 1985 for example, Bisiach, 
Meregalli and Berti proposed a model that emphasised the domain-specificity of the 
defect in patients with brain injury. The authors viewed anosognosia and related 
phenomena as "modality-specific disorders of thought" and resulting from disruption 
of specific mechanisms that normally monitor the output of individual perceptual and 
cognitive modules. In applying the model to visual anosognosia patients, Bisiach et al. 
(1985) stated that patients who become blind following peripheral lesions 
acknowledge their deficit and behave in a realistic manner. Patients with more central 
lesions of the visual system resulting in blindness were described as having visuo- 
specific cognitive dysfunction manifesting itself in a disordered monitoring of the 
disability, therefore these patients deny their blindness or act as if they can see. The 
first type of blindness is seen as a failure of the "sensory transducer", which transmits 
impulses from the retina to the brain and the second as a breakdown of a "sensory 
processor" that mediates between the transducer and the neural regions where visual 
input is processed. Messages flowing from modality specific sensory processors travel 
along independent paths in the direction of various "response systems". Thus, Bisiach 
et al. (1985) argue for a modular structure of central processing to account for the 
domain specific nature of anosognosia and reject the notion of a central, higher order 
monitoring system as such a system could not explain the specificity of anosognosia. 
In other words, if a single monitoring system were responsible for lack of awareness, 
it could not be expected of the patients to be aware of one difficulty and unaware of 
another. Lack of awareness of difficulties could then be accounted for by postulating 
disruption of multiple monitoring mechanisms. This model, which according to 
McGlynn and Schacter (1989), is consistent with many clinical and empirical findings 
provides insight into possible mechanisms underlying lack of awareness relating to 
physical, sensory and language difficulties. However, some unawareness phenomena 
are not easily described in terms of disruptions of individual monitors associated with 
specific modular functions. For instance, brain injured patients may lack awareness of 
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personality changes and behavioural difficulties. It is not clear how Bisiach et al. 's 
model would account for lack of awareness of such global functions, which are not 
easily identified with individual modules. 
Another model that defines this position and is perhaps more comprehensive than the 
one postulated by Bisiach et al. (1985) is the anosognosia model of Stuss and Benson 
(1986). These authors argue that regions of the frontal lobe are involved in self- 
awareness and monitoring of one's own cognitive functioning, and as such, view 
anosognosia as a deficit in self-monitoring. Empirical evidence that unawareness of 
memory difficulties is observed in cases of amnesia caused by damage which includes 
the frontal lobes suggests that frontal malfunction contributes to unawareness of 
difficulties. Frontal lobe involvement is further supported by the literature on brain- 
injured patients who also exhibit frontal malfunction as well as unawareness of 
difficulties. For example, Leduc, Herron, Greenberg, Eslinger, Grattan, (1999) 
investigating the relative contribution of different frontal lobe regions in the process 
of social self-awareness demonstrated a crucial role for orbital frontal regions in 
monitoring social self-awareness. These authors compared five patients with focal, 
orbital frontal lobe damage to six patients with restricted posterior ventromedial 
(PVM) frontal lobe damage on a self-awareness measure. Results indicated that the 
orbital frontal group had difficulty estimating their social and emotional competencies 
compared to cognitive or instrumental abilities. In contrast, the PVM group 
demonstrated no alterations in any form of awareness. Thus, on the basis of this type 
of evidence, Stuss and Benson (1986) postulated that lack of awareness of difficulties 
probably results from simultaneous lesions of several cerebral areas, with varying 
degrees and combinations producing different forms of the disorder. The authors 
argue that particular types of lack of awareness may be dependent on a specific 
combination of brain deficits. 
Other investigators have associated anosognosia to an affective disturbance resulting 
from lesions in particular neural regions. Bear (1982) for example, described lack of 
awareness of difficulties as a decline in emotional surveillance. After observing the 
critical involvement of right-hemisphere damage in lack of awareness, especially right 
parietal and dorsal frontal lesions, Bear stated that these patients do not detect a 
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severe threat and therefore, cannot exhibit emotional concern. Heilman, Watson and 
Valenstein, (1993) also proposed that the right hemisphere of the brain is dominant 
for attentional arousal. When the left hemisphere is damaged, the right hemisphere is 
still capable of full attentional focus, whereas when the right hemisphere is damaged 
attention is restricted to the right hemispatial field of the intact left hemisphere. Along 
these same lines, the theory proposed by Gainotti (1997) argues that the right 
hemisphere is dominant for negative emotions. Lack of awareness is explained by 
suggesting that if the right hemisphere is damaged the patient has access to the intact 
positive emotions from the left hemisphere, therefore the victims will have 
inappropriate positive feelings about their condition. This theory however could not 
possibly explain the negative character of some behaviours displayed by some patients 
with a brain injury. In addition, McGlynn and Schacter (1989) have pointed out that 
to view anosognosia as secondary to a neurologically based affective disturbance 
offers more problems than it solves. First, it does not account for the domain specific 
of anosognosia (if lack of awareness is lack of concern then such indifference should 
be displayed for all difficulties). Second, this theory does not explain the persistence 
of lack of awareness of some difficulties: patients that are not concerned about their 
difficulties should acknowledge them upon confrontation. 
Diffuse brain injury 
A second group of neuroanatomically oriented theoretical positions consists of those 
who explain lack of awareness of difficulties as a manifestation of a general mental 
disorder that can be associated with diffused brain pathology. Sandifer (1946) for 
example, argued that severe cases of anosognosia are the consequence of intellectual 
impairment resulting from diffuse brain damage. Weinstein and Kahn (1955) 
considered that a general alteration in brain function is important in order to produce 
lack of awareness of difficulties although the brain itself does not cause anosognosia. 
Weinstein and Kahn (1955) reflected that "the effect of the brain lesion provides a 
milieu of function in which any incapacity or defect may be denied whether it is 
hemiplegia or an unfortunate life situation" (p. 96). 
More recently, Levine (1990) suggested that lack of awareness of physical difficulties 
is not a phenomenon automatically experienced by people with brain injuries. Levine 
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assumes that interruption of a sensory path at any level, from peripheral nerve to 
primary sensory cortex, is not associated with any immediate sensory experience that 
uniquely specifies the difficulty. Instead, Levine argued, these difficulties have to be 
discovered by a process of self-observation and inference. In other words, sensory 
loss is not sufficient to experience lack of awareness. Sensory loss combined with 
general cognitive dysfunction impedes victims of brain injury from discovering their 
difficulties. From a similar perspective, Heilman (1991) argues that a person needs to 
want to move a limb to discover that it is not in working order. If the desire is lost, 
then the belief that the limb is in working order goes unchallenged. 
A number of studies have investigated if indeed lack of awareness of difficulties is 
associated with severity of brain injury or general intellectual decline. The results of 
these studies indicate that although severity of brain injury is not associated with lack 
of awareness of difficulties (Allen and Ruff, 1990) longer duration of PTA (Post- 
traumatic Amnesia) is indeed associated with lack of awareness of difficulties 
(Prigatano, 1999). With respect to general intellectual decline, some studies have 
found an association between general cognitive decline and lack of awareness 
(Prigatano and Fordyce, 1986a). Other studies however, have found that patients 
with intact IQ still exhibit lack of awareness of their difficulties (McGlynn and 
Schacter, 1989). Further, evidence for Levine's theory of discovery of difficulties is 
supportive. Chatterjee and Mennemeier (1996) investigating patients' retrospections 
on their resolution of anosognosia found that patients' reports were compatible with 
Levine's claims that difficulties are not perceived automatically. In general though, the 
empirical evidence offered for the diffuse set of theories suggests that other 
neurological factors such as the nature of the injury and specific aspects of 
neuropsychological impairment play a more significant role than severity of injury or 
general intellectual decline. 
"General disorders" (Internal control) theories 
This group of theories suggest that there is a monitoring or supervisory control 
function (usually attributable to the frontal lobes) providing direction to posterior 
systems or subordinate cognitive skills (Mesulam, 1985). A significant disruption then 
of higher order cognitive control systems such as monitoring and regulation of 
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behaviour may lead to lack of awareness. Empirical evidence has shown some support 
for this theoretical position (Allen and Ruff, 1990) by demonstrating that impairments 
in executive functioning are associated with lack of awareness. However, in general, 
research has failed to develop a specific neuropsychological profile associated with 
lack of awareness of difficulties. Prigatano and Altmant (1990) argue that assessing 
IQ and memory are unlikely to sample the cognitive disturbance underlying lack of 
awareness. 
2.4.2. Psychological theories 
In contrast to neurological based theories, psychological theories of lack of awareness 
of difficulties bring to relevance the psychological defence mechanism of denial, pre- 
morbid personality of people with brain injuries, personality of people with brain 
injuries and cultural factors. 
Weinstein and Kahn (1955), from a psychodynamic point of view and based on their 
clinical observations, argued that unawareness of difficulties following brain injury is 
due to pre-morbid personality factors, not a consequence of brain damage. Patients 
with anosognosia, they explain, have always regarded illness as an imperfection; they 
tend to deny their perceived inadequacies, suffer from compulsive drives and have a 
strong need for prestige and the esteem of others. Therefore, unawareness of 
difficulties following brain injury is interpreted as a manifestation of the patient's drive 
to be well or as a coping mechanism, a way of avoiding anxiety (Goldstein, 1942). 
Similarly, other psychological theories view denial as an adaptive coping mechanism 
in response to trauma and stress (Gainotti, 1993). Brain injury is considered an 
unfamiliar stressful experience, which the patient appraises and copes with in a 
manner similar to previous coping experiences. For example, Godfrey, Partridge, 
Knight, & Bishara (1993) suggest that coping mechanisms such as denial play a role 
in patients' appreciation of the extent of their difficulties. However, a number of 
studies have also demonstrated that the development of awareness of difficulties 
increases levels of emotional distress. Therefore, denial may serve as a buffer from 
emotional reactions. An implication of this view is that the availability of accurate, 
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relevant feedback and other life experiences during rehabilitation would serve to 
promote realistic self-appraisals of the difficulties. 
In addition, some theories have proposed personality characteristics of the individual 
as influencing the degree of awareness of difficulties. On the one hand, patients with 
brain injury come from a predominantly male cohort with a higher than usual 
incidence of drug and alcohol abuse and developmental and psychiatric disabilities 
and lower than usual educational attainment. All of which are given as reasons to 
explain why patients with brain injury show such impairment in awareness (Gruvstad, 
Kebbon and Gruvstad, 1958). On the other hand however, Prigatano (1999) offers 
striking pieces of evidence based on subjective accounts of three experienced 
individuals, a neuroanatomist, a psychiatrist and a neurosurgeon, who had all 
experienced alterations in self-awareness following their brain injuries. These 
individuals were all trained and familiar with the phenomenon of lack of awareness of 
difficulty. Yet when their brain was injured, they could not apply previously learned 
technical knowledge to their own cases. Their memories were just not there. They 
underestimated their impairments in the same manner that their less educated brain 
injured cohorts did. 
Although this evidence is contradictory, it is not considered enough to exclude 
personality characteristics out of the equation of lack of awareness. The tendency to 
underestimate difficulties which appears to be a direct consequence of brain injury is 
still thought of by some workers as influenced by the individuals personalities in their 
self-reports about their neuropsychological disturbances. In fact, Prigatano (1999) 
observes that personality and cultural factors appear to influence brain injured 
individuals' perceptions of their difficulties. For example, Fordyce, Rouche and 
Prigatano (1983) carried out neuropsychological testing on a population of 160 brain 
injured patients and found that emotional functioning of the patients was independent 
of the level of neuropsychological impairment experienced by the patients. With 
respect to the cultural influences in the reports of people with brain injuries cross- 
cultural studies conducted by Prigatano and various other workers add to the view 
that self-awareness is indeed influenced by cultural contexts. In general, Prigatano's 
findings reflect the tendency to underestimate or overestimate difficulties following a 
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brain injury depending on the patients' cultural background. For example, Japanese 
patients underestimated their difficulties and overestimated their abilities to perform 
self-care abilities (Prigatano, Ogano and Amakusa, 1997). Reflecting the fact that in 
Japanese culture, modesty is a virtue and the ability to perform self-care is important 
socially. Another study conducted with a brain injured Maori population showed that 
Maori of English ancestry, like American brain injured underestimated their 
difficulties while Maori patients did not (Prigatano and Leathern, 1993). A further 
study conducted on a Spanish population of brain injured patients showed that 
consistent with other Western cultures many Spanish patients also underestimated 
their difficulties. The findings were similar to those of the American and patients with 
traumatic brain injury of English ancestry from New Zealand (Prigatano, Bruna, 
Mataro, Munoz, Fernandez and Junque, 1998). Thus, personality characteristics and 
cultural factors were found to influence patients' reports of their difficulties and have 
been shown to be independent of the brain injury. 
More recently, Solms (2000) illustrates with clinical examples another psychoanalytic 
contribution. Solms, observing five cases of right hemisphere damage uses the 
psychoanalytical term of resistance to explain that these patients seemed unaware of 
and indifferent to their difficulties not because they cannot attend directly to these 
difficulties but because they do not want to attend to them. Solms claims that the 
attention is not directed at difficulties because it is actively diverted away from them. 
This is to say that the victims of brain injury know very well what has happened to 
their bodies, but "they do not want to know". Soims' account tries to synthesise 
psychoanalytical interpretations with neurobehavioral theories of lack of awareness 
following a brain injury. Arguably this explanation centres only on physical difficulties 
and does not seek to explain the lack of awareness experienced about cognitive and 
emotional deficits which are also experienced and are more problematic following a 
brain injury (Fleming and Strong, 1999). Further, and in more general terms, 
psychodynamic explanations of lack of awareness of difficulties have been criticised 
for not accounting for the specificity of lack of awareness, the relation between lesion 
site and unawareness of difficulties, the short duration of some unawareness 
(McGlynn and Schacter, 1989) and the fact that they do not explain how a defence 
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mechanism that is prevalent amongst the general public becomes a syndrome in 
certain people and not in others (Stuss and Benson, 1986). 
To summarise, psychological explanations seem to suggest that the qualitative 
differences between patients who lack awareness of their difficulties can be attributed 
to psychological factors such as, personality characteristics, cultural context or 
coping styles as opposed to different patterns of neurological impairment. However, 
psychological factors do not seem to provide comprehensive enough answers to 
satisfy all the questions, and hence, the emergence of more integrative approaches 
(below). Arguably, what psychological explanations seem to be hinting at, and some 
of the evidence seems to point this way, is the independence of awareness from purely 
neurological impairment. This point is one of the main concerns of this thesis and will 
be elaborated further in the next chapter. 
2.4.3. Integrated theories of lack of awareness 
As indicated by the above discussion, no single theory provides an entirely 
satisfactory account of lack of awareness of difficulties in neuropsychological 
syndromes. More recently however, researchers have developed theoretical models, 
which suggest that a contribution of both psychological and neuropsychological 
factors influence the manner in which patients adapt and interpret their difficulties. 
These theories recognise the high degree of variability in the clinical presentation of 
awareness of difficulties (Prigatano, 1999) and acknowledge that it is unlikely that a 
single theory can explain the mechanisms underlying lack of awareness of difficulties. 
Therefore, some researchers have identified that the relative contribution of 
psychological and neurological factors may vary according to the levels of processing. 
Allen and Ruff (1990) for example, propose that three levels of processing may 
influence patients' awareness of their difficulties. The first level involves awareness 
per se and requires the ability to attend to, encode and retrieve information relating to 
the self. The second level of this model involves appraisal of the ability of the patient 
to compare information of the present self with that of a pre-morbid self The third 
level of processing involves disclosure, that is, the willingness of the patient to report 
self-perception to another person. 
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The Hierarchy of Brain Injury Model (Stuss, 1991) is a second example of an 
integrated theoretical framework that considers self-awareness as the highest form of 
brain activity that mediates and interacts with other brain processes. This model 
considers psychological processes like attention, language and memory as complex 
functional systems with their own inherent organisation that works at an overlearned, 
automatic level. The systems are fixed in that they are relatively constant across the 
adult population (Stuss, 1991). Such systems are also integrated in the sense that they 
involve various cortical and subcortical regions in both hemispheres in the working of 
one function, different regions participating in their own specialised way. The frontal 
lobes interact with these posterior/basal regions, appearing to play a unique role. 
Furthermore, the model describes two frontal functional systems that provide the 
posterior/basal systems with the capacity to sequence and integrate information; they 
also serve as an integral part of drive or motivation. A second control function is 
hypothesised as depending on frontal brain regions which provides conscious 
direction to the posterior/basal and frontal function systems. Self-awareness is posited 
then as the highest psychological attribute of the frontal lobes. 
Stuss' model is important because it is one of the few that most clearly emphasises 
neurological and psychological processes as interactive functions underlying self- 
awareness. In addition, the notion of interactive processes has also been used to 
redefine other existing models. For example, Schacter and Prigatano (1991) observed 
that different forms of unawareness of difficulties seemed to emerge after different 
types of brain injuries. That is, depending on the part of the brain that is damaged, 
different forms of unawareness may emerge. Prigatano (1999), following this 
observation and following the new anatomical model of Mesulam (1985), suggests 
four syndromes of awareness: frontal heteromodal, temporal heteromodal, parietal 
heteromodal and occipital heteromodal. Prigatano explains that when the frontal 
heteromodal regions are damaged, patients often exhibit unawareness of socially 
inappropriate actions, disorders of planning, initiation and so on. When the parietal 
heteromodal region is damage, patients often are unaware of a limb (like in 
heminneglect) or apraxic disturbances. If the temporal heteromodal region suffers an 
insult, individuals may be unaware of language dysfunction and memory impairments 
while damage to the occipital heteromodal is associated with unawareness of loss of 
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vision. Prigatano adds that when a cerebral dysfunction is bilateral it produces 
syndromes that are "complete" while in unilateral impairment these syndromes are 
"partial". It is during partial unawareness that coping mechanisms begin to emerge 
(Prigatano, 1999). Furthermore, these coping mechanisms can be described as 
defensive or non-defensive. Non-defensive coping mechanisms are those that the 
patient used pre-morbidly to deal with life problems. Defensive mechanisms are 
defensive manoeuvres, including denial and projection, that can lead to substantial 
distortions of reality and development of delusional syndromes years after the original 
brain damage. 
Evidence for this group of theories, although sparse, seems to suggest that 
neuropsychological factors have more direct effect on awareness of difficulties than 
psychological factors. For example, Ownsworth, Mcfarland and Young (2002) 
examining the theoretical models proposed by Allen and Ruff (1990) and Stuss 
(1991) on a population of sixty-one participants with acquired brain injury found that 
the relative contribution of neurological factors to an outcome of difficulties in self- 
awareness and self-regulation was more direct than psychological factors for 
intellectual awareness, anticipatory awareness and strategy behaviour. Furthermore, 
the authors conclude that the use of denial as a coping strategy for individuals with 
impaired executive functioning may disturb successful adjustment to acquired brain 
injury because of interference with the development of emergent and anticipatory 
awareness. 
2.4.4. Summary 
It is clear from the observations discussed in this section that in the recent past there 
has been a good deal of interest in lack of awareness of difficulties following a brain 
injury. It is also clear that no single theory provides a satisfactory account of lack of 
awareness. In other cases, like with the integrated theories, the theories are so recent 
that there is still not enough evidence to support them. It is with this in mind that the 
present work attempts to outline a theoretical framework that, it is believed, can 
integrate a range of relevant phenomena. This framework does not attempt to 
account for defensive denial; although a clinically significant phenomenon, it lies 
outside the grasp of this theoretical discussion. 
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However, and before this approach is introduced, the discussion turns now to how 
awareness of difficulties develops in people with brain injuries. Close attention is paid 
here to research indicating how the phenomenon progresses through various stages 
and to why alternative explanations have been sought. The chapter concludes with a 
brief review of the methodological issues encountered in lack of awareness research. 
A further discussion of these methods can also be found in Chapter Four. 
2.5. DEVELOPING AWARENESS OF DIFFICULTIES FOLLOWING A 
BRAIN INJURY 
Research into lack of awareness of difficulties following a brain injury, regardless of 
its aetiology, recognises the disruption that brain injury causes to the integration of 
thinking and feeling in the individual (Prigatano, 1999). This disruption appears in a 
few cases irreparably truncated due to "bona fide" organic impairment although there 
are a good number of cases where the process of awareness of difficulties develops 
after the trauma of brain injury. For example, and in the words of Prigatano (1999) 
patients go from having "complete" syndromes to "partial" syndromes. To understand 
the development of awareness of difficulties after brain injury it would be helpful to 
explore the different stages of the syndrome as revealed by the literature (Fig. 1) to 
appreciate this development (please note that Figure 1 is entirely speculative). 
In acute stages of brain injury and during hospitalisation, (a) unawareness of 
difficulties or anosognosia is dramatic and transient (Prigatano, 1999; Newman, 
Garmoe, Beatty, and Ziccardi, 2000), it affects awareness of physical injury, cognitive 
and emotional difficulties. In post-acute stages of brain injury, during rehabilitation 
(b), unawareness of difficulties is problematic in that it represents the deciding factor 
between successful rehabilitation or unsuccessful rehabilitation (Schacter and 
Prigatano, 1991; Prigatano, 1999). Concrete deficits (i. e. physical disability, memory 
impairments) are, at this stage, more readily acknowledged than more abstract 
cognitive and emotional disabilities (i. e. information processing difficulties or 
verbosity) (Fleming and Strong, 1999). 
As time goes on, and once the individual is back into the community (c), awareness of 
concrete deficits improves while unawareness of some cognitive and emotional 
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deficits may persist. For example, in a longitudinal study carried out by Fleming and 
Strong (1999) it was found that over the first year post-injury there were gains in self- 
awareness. These gains covered most areas connected with daily living. Other areas 
like judged competence for driving, managing finances and recognising when 
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something one said or done had upset someone else reflected the self-centred 
behaviour and deficits in self-monitoring and self-regulating characteristic of early 
brain injury. Similarly, research carried out on victims of brain injury, and their 
families, years after the patient's injury and after hospitalisation and rehabilitation, 
showed supporting results. That is, once these patients had re-integrated into the 
community, the gains made were towards awareness of cognitive difficulties. Lack of 
awareness of emotional disabilities remained, especially when patients had suffered a 
severe brain injury (Lezak, 1978; Karpman, Wolfe and Fargo, 1985). 
Nevertheless, this time progression seems to indicate that awareness of difficulties is 
connected with normal, everyday, experience. After brain injury and the disruption 
that this represents to the process of awareness, the individual may not commence 
this process until difficulties (d) are experienced in naturalistic environments, and in 
comparison with the person's pre-morbid abilities. Very often it is after the first year 
of injury or later, when the individual tries to return to work or to social activities, 
that awareness of persisting deficits emerges (e) (Prigatano and Fordyce, 1986b; 
Prigatano, 1999; Brown and Vandergoot, 1998). In some cases, this awareness of 
difficulties means that there is also an increase in emotional distress (f). Fordyce, 
Roueche and Prigatano (1983) found that chronic head trauma patients were more 
anxious and depressed than acute patient groups. In other cases, unawareness of 
difficulties persists but the patients also show increased emotional distress (Fordyce 
and Roueche, 1986; Ownsworth, and Oei, 1998). Both these reactions suggest that 
lack of awareness is unrelated to the presence or absence of emotional reactions and 
that defensive (h) and non-defensive mechanisms (g) may come into operation at this 
stage (i. e. when re-integrating into the community) (Prigatano, 1999). 
In addition, if non-defensive coping mechanisms are deployed and acceptance of 
disability is reached rehabilitation methods or strategies to help the patients cope with 
their new challenges can be beneficially implemented. The patients may be able to 
return to productive activity. Melamed, Groswasser and Stern (1992) found, for 
example, that acceptance of disability was significantly associated with work status. If 
on the contrary, defensive mechanisms are used to cope with the brain injury and 
acceptance of disability is not reached, rehabilitation efforts usually go to waste and 
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coping strategies ignored, what could be called the "Yes, but" effect. In other words, 
they appear to listen to rehabilitation efforts but these are not implemented. 
Further, during rehabilitation, unaware patients often lack motivation, display 
uncooperative behaviour and show animosity. In contrast, some patients with more 
self-awareness are more willing to participate actively in the therapeutic process 
(Lam, MacMahon, Priddy and Ghered-Schultz, 1988). The recommendation of some 
researchers in this field is therefore, that self-awareness should be continually assessed 
and be made the target of rehabilitation itself (Kay and Silver, 1989). 
This recommendation however, is one that is not supported by all workers in the 
field. Sohlberg, Mateer, Penkman, Glang and Todis, (1998) in a qualitative study that 
examined a variety of awareness indicators in three individuals with brain damage 
found a disassociation between behavioural and perceptual (caregivers' perceptions of 
the participants' awareness levels) indices of awareness. The authors argued that a 
prerequisite level of awareness is not necessary, as indicated by Kay and Silver 
(1989), to utilise adequate compensatory strategies following a brain injury. Sohlberg 
et al. (1998) suggest that people with brain injuries can be trained to use 
compensatory strategies even in cases where the patients do not understand why or 
believe that they need them. In fact, lack of awareness of deficits may indeed prevent 
them from inquiring why they need to use the strategies. The authors conclude that 
for some victims it may be more productive to tap into implicit learning than into 
declarative knowledge as to why these strategies are important. 
Nevertheless, and although Sohlberg et al. (1998) seem to offer a pragmatic solution 
for patients showing lack of awareness of their difficulties, the authors do not really 
address the problem. If the development of awareness of difficulties, as illustrated 
above and as extrapolated from the research literature, leads patients to either 
adopting defensive (denial) and non-defensive mechanisms (acceptance) the question 
of how patients reach this outcome goes unanswered. Further, suggesting denial, as 
the defensive mechanism adopted by the affected patients does not explain why some 
difficulties are denied and not others. In addition, the interpretation of denial is one 
that cannot be proved wrong. Since denial, by definition, refers to concealed 
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mechanisms, any evidence that people with brain injuries do not show concern for 
their difficulties can be interpreted in this way. Thus, if the interpretation of denial 
creates more questions than can answer, there is a need to seek another interpretation 
to the one already illustrated here. This explanation, given in social constructivist 
terms and which is introduced below and expanded in the next chapter, constitutes 
the core of this thesis. 
To summarise, the latest research into lack of awareness of difficulties following a 
brain injury acknowledges the problem as a disruption to the integration of thinking 
and feeling in the individual caused by a brain injury. People with brain injuries 
experience the acute stages of their injuries in hospitals, they undertake official 
rehabilitation following the acute stage and finally, they reintegrate into the 
community. This reintegration into the community often means either the resolution 
or continuation of the problem. In a majority of cases, lack of awareness of cognitive 
and emotional difficulties continues to be a problem due to the patients adopting what 
the literature calls defensive coping mechanisms. Defensive coping mechanisms, like 
denial, have been seen as inadequate in explaining the problems posed by lack of 
awareness. Therefore, there is a need to find alternative explanations to the ones 
reviewed here. 
2.6. LOOKING FOR THE ALTERNATIVE 
As has been seen, physical difficulties are usually the first difficulties that a brain 
injured person becomes aware of, usually during hospitalisation (Fleming and Strong, 
1999). Cognitive effects include a range of difficulties that often take some time to 
make themselves felt. These can include problems with language and communication 
skills, intellectual difficulties, memory and learning difficulties, attentional difficulties 
and difficulties in executive function (McKinlay & Watkiss, 1999). Emotional effects, 
which have been studied under the term of psychosocial changes, emerge in the 
weeks and months after the injury (McKinlay, Brooks, Bond, Martinage and 
Marshall, 1981). The most frequently reported are irritability and impatience, 
slowness and tiredness, bad temper, verbosity, lack of inhibition and change of 
personality (McKinlay & Watkiss, 1999). The frequency in which these problems 
arise varies according to injury severity and the problems themselves can vary over 
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time (McKinlay, et al., 1981) plus they may be exacerbated by problematic social 
interactions. 
Recognition of physical, cognitive and emotional difficulties tend to emerge during 
rehabilitation and come into focus once the brain injured person reintegrates in the 
community. Prigatano (1995) notes that at this stage the patients want to return to 
work or school or to pre-injury activities. In the cases where they do return to 
previous activities, Prigatano observes, more often than not, they fail. This failure 
may illustrate the difficulties to the patients and to those around them. Reactions to 
this discovery, not surprisingly, are manifest in an increase in emotional and 
behavioural difficulties during the first year post-injury. 
Neurological explanations for this increase could have been suggested here but 
appear unlikely due to the nature of brain injury. Brain injury is not a degenerative 
disorder and recovery, or some recovery, of function is possible (cognitive functions 
in particular). Instead, explanations turn to the role of the family in pointing out these 
difficulties as time goes by and to stop making allowances for the patient, or to the 
secondary nature of these problems, i. e. the patient exhibits these problems as 
secondary reaction to limitations (McKinlay and Brooks, 1984). Empirical evidence 
seems to support these increases in emotional difficulties and emphasises the role of 
awareness of these difficulties, as well as awareness of physical and cognitive 
difficulties, as the necessary ingredient for adjustment to brain injury (Ponsford, 
1995). These findings have led some researchers to point to the role of denial on the 
part of the relatives (Romano, 1974) as a coping mechanism and as part of a process 
in coming to terms with dealing with a brain injured relative (Port, Willmott and 
Charlton, 2002). 
This state of affairs is highlighted further by research into short-term rehabilitation 
(Fordyce and Rouche, 1986; Prigatano, 1991; Port, Willmott and Charlton, 2002) and 
long-term rehabilitation (Kinsella, Ford and Moran, 1989; Krefting, 1989; Willer et 
al., 1991; Gan and Schuller, 2002). The problems encountered by the brain injured 
person and their family, years after the injury, are due to the cognitive and emotional 
sequelae, as opposed to the physical sequelae of the brain injury (Blyth, 1981). Lack 
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of awareness into some cognitive difficulties and lack of awareness into emotional 
problems continue to be a cause of concern. Furthermore, and as already mentioned, 
some researchers have observed that denial may have been adopted as a negative 
defence mechanism by some patients (Prigatano, 1999). However, the adoption of 
this defence mechanism does not explain why not all people with brain injuries react 
to the injury in the same way. An alternative explanation can be offered which does 
not assume that the brain injured person is responding to the difficulties caused by the 
injury in this way. This explanation, extrapolated from studies with people with 
learning disabilities (Todd & Shearn, 1997; Finlay & Lyons, 1999), refers to the 
discursive environments and the ways in which these may affect the understanding of 
difficulties and their implications in the brain injured person. It is this explanation 
which is the focus of this thesis and for which the theoretical framework is provided 
in Chapter Three. Before proceeding however, the review will underline a few 
methodological issues encountered in the literature. A deeper, more comprehensive 
discussion concerning methodological issues in this area is offered in Chapter Four. 
2.7. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN THE RESEARCH 
Most investigations into lack of awareness of difficulties following brain injury to date 
have been based on clinical observations, experimental or psychometric testing. 
Although successful in their different ways as means to research into a difficult 
phenomenon, their failure to offer clear answers or to develop an acceptable 
theoretical framework emphasises the need for new theoretical frameworks and the 
development of new methodology. Crisp (1992) and Fleming, Strong and Ashton 
(1996b), for example, suggest that new methods for assessing self-awareness are 
required to increase the understanding of the phenomenon. These methods would 
then be the point of departure from which to formulate strategies for clinical 
interventions with patients who lack such self-awareness. 
The methodological difficulties encountered in the existing literature start with the 
definition of awareness. Schacter and Prigatano (1991) have highlighted the fact that 
there are no clear definitions of the term awareness. Most research has tended to view 
awareness as a static concept. Herbert and Powell (1989) for example, 
operationalised the construct as the ability to perceive one's present state and its 
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implications, while Malia, Torode and Powell (1993) understood awareness to be the 
ability to predict one's future state. Other authors however, have given definitions of 
awareness that regard the phenomenon as a process. As such, awareness is defined as 
the integration of information from external reality and inner experience, or as 
Schacter and Prigatano (1991) explain, the capacity to perceive the self in objective 
terms whilst maintaining a sense of subjectivity. 
Definitions apart, the strategies used to form a quantitative evaluation of self- 
awareness of difficulties in patients with brain injury have also been found wanting. 
Researchers have used comparisons of patients' self-ratings of their functions with 
another measure that is considered more objective. Deaton (1986) for example, has 
identified three such strategies: comparisons of patients self-ratings and those made 
by their families, patients' self-ratings and those of rehabilitation staff, and patients' 
estimates of their abilities and performance on neuropsychological testing. 
Studies comparing patients' self-ratings and those made by their families have been 
criticised on the grounds that although head injured patients generally tend to under- 
report difficulties compared with their relatives, relatives themselves may demonstrate 
varying levels of denial and decreased awareness (Fleming et al., 1996; Port, Willmott 
and Charlton, 2002). The accuracy of relatives reports has been known to depend on 
factors such as stress levels, fatigue, personality type of the relative and the length of 
time post injury. Cavallo, Kay and Ezrachi (1992) found that families do not always 
respond in the same way and argued against the convention of depending on family 
reports for reliable information about the performance of the person with traumatic 
brain injury. Furthermore, in a study carried out by McKinlay and Brooks in 1984 to 
investigate the possibility that relatives' personality could influence the perception of 
changes in the patients, it was found that relatives' high score in neuroticism in the 
Eysenck personality scale was correlated with their report of emotional/behavioural 
changes in the patients. 
Similarly, comparisons of patients' self-ratings with ratings made by health 
professionals have also been criticised. Fleming et al. (1996) argue that the judgement 
of health professionals can be coloured by interpersonal factors, and may be limited 
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by the fact that health professionals may not have first hand knowledge of patients 
pre-morbid personalities. Furthermore, mood, attitude towards the patient, 
expectations of the patient's performance and interpretation of poorly defined items 
on scales (Ponsford, 1988) can also distort rehabilitation staff judgements. 
The third approach, comparisons of patients' reports of abilities on certain tasks with 
actual task performance on neuropsychological tests, eliminate the problems 
associated with relying on relatives or rehabilitation staff accounts but are costly and 
time consuming (Fleming et al., 1996). Additionally, a number of recent articles warn 
that the intellectual consequences of head injury may not be reflected sufficiently in 
standard test of intelligence (Walsh, 1982). Part of the problem, in this third instance, 
lies in the nature of the tests used. If intellectual abilities in people are characterised 
by their fluidity and their crystallised nature (Walsh, 1985), these tests only measure 
one type of intellectual ability. That is, if fluidity is the general ability to discriminate 
and perceive relations between any fundamentals, and crystallised abilities are 
discriminatory habits established in a particular field (primarily through the operation 
of fluid ability, but no longer requiring insightful perception), then it becomes 
apparent that neuropsychological tests are very good at measuring mainly crystallised 
ability as stored information. Developed skills are known to be resistant to all forms 
of cerebral impairment (Walsh, 1985). In a similar vein, Crosson, Barco and Veloza 
(1989) propose that intellectual awareness of difficulties is only the first step towards 
full self-awareness. Patients first gain the ability to acknowledge intellectually that 
certain difficulties exist. Further along in the development of self-awareness, patients 
start recognising problems related to difficulties when they are actually occurring 
(Crosson et al., (1989), call this emergent awareness) and finally they begin to 
anticipate when a problem is likely to occur because of difficulties (anticipatory 
awareness). Psychological tests evaluate intellectual awareness only. 
One further methodological criticism concerns the use of questionnaires and 
structured interviews to quantify self-awareness of difficulties. Fleming et al (1996b) 
in talking about the limitations of using such quantitative methodology point out that, 
these techniques rely mainly on the patient's ability to understand verbal or written 
questions and to verbalise their understanding of difficulties. As such, a number of 
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patients suffering from language and speech disorders are excluded from any 
assessment that utilises such methodology. In addition, emphasis on verbal aspects 
may result in neglect of behavioural manifestations (Deaton, 1986), as some patients 
may deny verbally the existence of any problems and still participate adequately in 
treatment. 
2.8. SUMMARY AND LIMITATIONS OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
So far, the literature reviewed above reveals different theoretical positions and 
explanations that fail, overall, to account for lack of awareness of difficulties 
following a brain injury. Empirical research in the field does however, offer a time 
progression of gains of awareness of difficulties from the acute stages of the brain 
injury to the time when individuals with a brain injury re-enter the community. 
Empirical work carried out during rehabilitation or sometime thereafter points to lack 
of awareness of some cognitive and emotional difficulties as continuing to be a cause 
of concern for both people with brain injuries and their families. In reviewing this 
literature, however, some limitations were noted. 
First, theoretical and methodological difficulties encountered in the existing literature 
start with the definition of awareness. Schacter and Prigatano (1991) point out the 
fact that there are no clear conceptualisations of the term awareness. Some authors 
however (Schacter and Prigatano, 1991), have given definitions of awareness that 
regard the phenomenon as a process. Awareness is then defined as the integration of 
information from external reality and inner experience. That is, the capacity to 
perceive the self in objective terms whilst maintaining a sense of subjectivity. This 
thesis, following on Schacter and Prigatano's understanding of awareness as a 
process, conceptualises awareness under a social constructionism theory of 
consciousness. Awareness is, then, defined as the process of monitoring, regulating 
and self-reflecting of bodily experiences, cognitive activities and emotional processes 
emanating from concrete social interactions settings (Burns and Engdahl, 1998). 
Second, the almost exclusive use of quantitative methodologies to explain a 
subjective problem has meant a reliance on others' perceptions as sources of 
information. This thesis addresses this limitation by following a constructionism mode 
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of enquiry and therefore adheres to Kelly's (1955) words that "If you want to know 
what is going on for an individual, ask him". In other words, the person experiencing 
something is the only authentic source of knowledge of that person's experience. 
Third, the use of quantitative methodology has also meant reliance on questionnaires, 
structured interviews and standardised tests. Such instruments help measure different 
functions (i. e. cognitive functions) but do not reveal an accurate picture of how a 
brain injury affects individuals living in the world. The present thesis suggests 
qualitative methodologies as an alternative and more effective means of gaining an in- 
depth understanding of lack of awareness of difficulties. Qualitative psychological 
paradigms investigate phenomena from an insider's perspective, as opposed to an 
outsider's perspective (Crisp, 1992). 
Fourth, the use of qualitative methodology in brain injury research has grown in the 
last few years. Willer, Allen, Durnan and Ferry (1990) and Willer, Allen, Liss and 
Zicht (1991) used nominal group techniques to explore problems and ways of coping 
in traumatic brain injury. Karpman, Wolfe and Vargo (1985) used in-depth 
discussions for similar purposes. Grotta and Bratina (1995) used directed interviews 
to examine subjective experiences after recovering from stroke. Coehlo, Liles and 
Duffy (1991) used discourse analysis to provide evidence for differing patterns of 
deficit in closed head injured adults. Nochi (1997) used life narratives to collect the 
experiences of people with brain injuries, to mention but a few. To date, there are few 
qualitative studies researching lack of awareness of difficulties following a brain 
injury. Jacobs (1993) used phenomenological methods to investigate lack of 
awareness of difficulties in children. Sohlberg, Mateer, Penkman, Glan and Todis 
(1998) used a grounded theory approach to investigate the phenomenon. Chatterjee 
and Mennemeier (1996) used subjective accounts to investigate anosognosia for 
hemiplegia. The present work builds on these studies and explores lack of awareness 
of difficulties with the help of qualitative methodology as discussed in Chapter Four. 
Fifth, the terminology employed by the literature is unclear and needs some 
specification. Most writers in the field of awareness of difficulties following a brain 
injury refer to anosognosia to describe lack of awareness of physical difficulties. This 
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term has been passed down to describe a more general lack of awareness of physical, 
cognitive and emotional difficulties immediately after a brain injury. This thesis 
recognises, however, that anosognosia may be an appropriate term for lack of 
awareness of physical difficulties encountered immediately after a brain injury but it is 
not an accurate term to refer to the present work. While, the literature points to 
anosognosia as a temporal phenomenon that refers mainly to unawareness of physical 
difficulties, lack of awareness of cognitive and emotional difficulties are still 
problematic years after the injury has happened. It is this two lack of awareness that 
the present work addresses. 
A final limitation, and perhaps the most severe, is the unidirectional sense in which 
research in the area proceeds. That is, most research and theorising either starts with 
the assumption or implies that lack of awareness is caused by organic impairment. 
The evidence, as has been seen, has not corroborated this assumption. Empirical work 
however, has offered evidence for organic impairment of the brain to explicate 
organic impairment of the body. The questions of how much self-awareness the 
person had pre-morbidly or how much self-awareness the brain injured individual 
should have, have never seemed to have risen in the area. This perhaps is more to do 
with the understanding of science and of how science should proceed than with 
researching awareness in particular (for a more specific discussion see Chapter Four). 
However, and while it is assumed that science should be intent in demonstrating the 
causality relationship between the brain and awareness, other non-causal possibilities 
go unnoticed. For example, Manicas (1986), calling for an integration of 
psychological explanations incorporating social, cultural and structural influences 
with more conventional models of human cognition, argues that neurological 
mechanisms may themselves be shaped by different social environments. Similarly, 
Gillett (1992a) suggests that the brain, for human beings, is the case of meanings in 
that it serves as the physical vehicle in which mental content is realised and plays a 
part in the social activities of human beings. In this respect, Harre (1994) argues, the 
brain is no different from the neuromuscular system. The brain is like a muscle in the 
body, which is shaped by its use. Therefore, the brain is plastic in the face of 
experience. Throughout life, Harre (1994) explains, the brain stores experience in 
terms of the meanings that have been given to that experience and the responses made 
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by the person to aspects of the events experienced. The meanings given to experience 
draw on rules that have been shaped during social interaction. This implies that there 
must be a relation between the language that a community speaks and the 
categorisations that members of that community use to unify stimulus presentations 
and group them into meaningful patterns. 
Harre (1994), drawing on his description of the brain as a muscle and drawing from 
the work of Penfield (1958), says that the brain develops the processing structure 
required to underpin the discursive skills evident in perception, action and problem 
solving and also holds some kind of "record of past experience" that can be used to 
retrieve past events. Because of these properties of the brain, humans are provided 
with a narrative resource that is built out of their own individual history. The 
structure of this "record" and the skills that enable the subject to make use of it are a 
function of language but the brain is the substrate for the requisite mental activity. 
This argument, which has received considerable support from recent cognitive 
neuroscience (see Harre, 1994, for a review) is essential to this thesis. Manicas, 
Gillett and Harre emphasise the pre-eminence of the brain in relation to the social 
contexts of human beings and thus facilitate placing the development of self- 
awareness in an interactive context. It is this which constitutes the core argument of 
this thesis and which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM: THE THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will be concerned with establishing the theoretical perspective, which 
will allow this thesis to gain a non-neuropsychological understanding of lack of 
awareness of difficulties following a brain injury. Social constructionism is the chosen 
tool in helping develop a theory of "what is it like" to be unaware of difficulties 
following a brain injury, for social constructionism examines how people make their 
worlds and are in turn made by their worlds. That is, the work suggests that 
awareness of difficulties is primarily the result of a psychological process rather than 
of the neurological impairment depicted in the brain injury literature reviewed in the 
previous chapter. 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to deny the importance of the biological aspects of 
a brain injury. In social constructionism, the issue is not whether biological processes 
are important, but whether their contribution to action is pre-eminent in the 
remarkable diversity of human actions. In social constructionism, whatever the 
constraints of biological processes, the world and how it becomes known is presumed 
to be a construction. Indeed biological processes themselves become social 
constructions when the understanding of how they will affect individuals determines 
how they will act in response to them. 
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3.2. WHAT DOES THE TERM SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM REFERS 
TO? 
This question is not one that is easily answered. For example, for Waters (1994), 
constructionism is a kind of sociological theorising build on the assumption that the 
social world is subjective and consists of the creations and interpretations, meanings 
and ideas of acting individuals. These individuals are seen as competent and 
communicative agents who actively create or construct the social world. Waters 
places the origins of social constructionism in the work of George Simmel and the 
German sociologist Max Weber. Equally, Burr (1995) points to the symbolic 
interactionist work of Mead in America, amongst others, and to some British and 
continental writers of the late 19`h century and the early 20th century as the 
predecessors of this movement. 
The definition of social constructionism although not as clear cut as it appears is 
confused by its influences, which are sociological and psychological. Both however, 
form part of a general constructionist mode of thought in sociological theory. In this 
thesis, the theme developed is that social constructivism is derived from symbolic 
interactionism and post-modernism (for a definition of this term and an introductory 
reading on the subject please see Sarap, (1993)). Where symbolic interactionism 
focuses primarily on the way in which individuals build self-identities from the 
meanings they bring to categories of experience, social constructionism examines 
critically how those meanings are formed and then reflect on to and into the 
individual. Thus, the boundaries between symbolic interactionism and social 
constructionism are somehow ambiguous. (As an aside, it is necessary to clarify at 
this point that the terms constructionism and constructivism will be used throughout 
the work indistinguishably). This chapter will therefore first discuss the symbolic 
interactionist perspective of the self and will explain some limitations of the 
perspective. Then, a social constructivist theory of consciousness will be introduced 
from which the experiential states of the body, cognition and emotions will be 
discussed. Finally, the topic of the self in brain injury and the role of the other in brain 
injury will be explored. 
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3.3. DEVELOPING AWARENESS OF THE SELF 
The topic of self as a product and reflection of social life was introduced to social 
psychology by James as early as 1840. Cooley (1902), who is often described as the 
first symbolic interactionist, advocated that our self-concept develops from childhood. 
According to Cooley this development occurs when we see how others respond to us 
or "when in the presence of one we feel to be of importance" (p. 175). Mead in 1934, 
expanded Cooley's view of the development of the self For Mead, essential to the 
development of the self was the ability to take the role of the other and to perceive 
the attitude of the other towards the perceiver. His looking glass included not only a 
significant other, as Cooley had argued, but a generalised other, that is, the 
individual's sociocultural environment. Vygotsky (1962), also from a socio-cultural 
perspective, complemented and gave this position a more developmental flavour. 
According to this author's view human development of higher order cognitive 
capacities, including the ability to think about one self, come into being during the 
course of interactions with others. Individual human beings, Vygotsky explains, 
acquire a repertoire of discursive skills in symbiosis with those already skilled in 
speaking. An unskilled infant attempts some intentional act and an adult supplements 
his or her efforts. By the age of three a human being is beginning to develop the 
capacity for private discourse, and is thus enabled to perform complex cognitive acts 
for him/her self According to Vygotsky this skill facilitates higher level cognition by 
making possible retrospective and anticipatory comments first upon overt acts of 
public life and then on its own discursive practices, modelled on the commentaries to 
which his or her speaking and acting have been subjected by others. In other words, 
the human being starts to recognise his or her own point of view as well as many 
other attributes. 
In contrast, self-perception theorists like Duval and Wicklund (1972) argue that the 
self can be "discovered" without the need to internalise the view of the other. Duval 
& Wicklund suggest that the elements of self consciousness are indigenous to psyche 
structure, while Mead maintains that the self arises from society. These authors 
explain that the child has a self and the self is, in itself, an object. The child's 
consciousness can focus on any object but the child needs to be in society for the self 
to develop, or in other words, he/she needs to become aware of the distinctiveness of 
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the other to achieve knowledge of the subjectivity of the self As experience with 
different points of view accumulates, the child, systematically, will become aware of 
his/her causal agent self as a distinct entity in the world. Further, with repeated 
situations that cause the child to examine different dimensions of the self, he/she will 
come to build up a unified conception of the self Once he is aware of the concept of 
the self, he/she will then come to focus on those dimensions of the self that happen to 
be salient in a situation. 
In general though, Duval and Wicklund seem to recognise an essential step in 
becoming aware of the self which does not appear in Mead's theory, the 
differentiation of the causal agent self. For Duval and Wicklund, taking the point of 
view of the other (or the perception of being observed) is just a stimulus that causes 
the individual to focus attention on the causal self Contact with the ideas of others is 
another stimulus that will cause objective self awareness (objective because the 
authors consider the self as an object) as far as these ideas are different. 
3.3.1. What, no agency? 
Arguably though, it could be said that while Cooley, Mead and Vygotsky locate the 
self in the social (as a function of communicative interactions), Duval and Wicklund 
locate the self in the psychological (as a function of internal psychic processes). This 
opposition has been seen as problematic by some authors, especially in the realm of 
moral psychology, where assuming responsibility and accountability for one's actions 
is seen as key to attaining moral maturity (Tappan, 1991 a). From a dialogical 
perspective, for example, Tappan (1999) argues that the self, and by this he means the 
moral or causal self, is located dialogically. This perspective looks at the self as a 
function of the linguistically mediated exchanges between individuals and the social 
world (Tappan, 1999). It is based on three assumptions: 1) all so called higher 
psychological functioning is mediated by language and forms of discourse, 2) such 
mediation can also happen during inner speech and 3) processes of social 
communication and social relations are the base of causal functioning (Vygotsky, 
1987). Thus, the idea that the causal self develops, as the words of others become 
one's own words as social speech becomes inner speech, resolves the opposition 
between the social and psychological theories. 
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However, how social words become a person's own words is not clear from Tappan's 
argument. To clarify then, and according to Bakhtin (1981), a person appropriates 
words when these are infused with the speaker's intention, the person's accent and the 
person's semantic and expressive intention. Bakhtin argues that a speaking individual 
is always, in varying degree, an "ideologue", because language is a particular way of 
viewing the world. To gain an insight into an individual's ideology, therefore, one 
must consider the processes by which the individual appropriates and assimilates 
other's words and discourses as the individual constructs his or her ideological 
perspective of the world. 
Thus, to answer the question heading this section, there is agency to the self that 
Mead describes. The argument places the agency of the self in the words that 
individuals use in their linguistic exchanges between selves and society. 
3.3.2. Empirical evidence and limitations of the symbolic interactionist 
theoretical perspective 
Duval and Wicklund (1972,1973) and others (Swart, Ickes & Morgenthaler, 1978; 
Buss and Scheier, 1976; Davis and Brock, 1975), offer wide empirical evidence to 
support the idea that perception of being observed and encounters with the different 
ideas of others do indeed increase self-awareness. Meanwhile, empirical evidence to 
support Mead's ideas is not so clear. According to Shrauger and Schoeneman (1979) 
and Waters (1994) research into the looking glass self suffers from "ahistoricity" or as 
they explain, little sense of cumulative development of information. Evidence for 
influence of others' actual appraisals on self-appraisals has been found in some cases 
(Cast, Stets and Burke, 1999; Ichiyama, 1993) but reviews of earlier research 
(Shrauger and Schoeneman, 1979) indicate that this evidence has not always been 
supportive. Stronger evidence is found to link reflected appraisal (i. e., a person's 
perception of the appraisal of significant others) and self-appraisals (Felson, 1989), 
although the relationship seems to work better when it involves the generalised other 
rather than the significant other. Furthermore, some reviews (Kenny and DePaulo, 
1993) examining the extent to which people know how others see them, indicate that 
people determine how others view them not from the feedback that they receive from 
others but from their own self-perceptions. 
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This lack of consistency in the research has been attributed to a variety of factors. 
Ichiyama (1993) has pointed out that which others are considered as influential, the 
self s agency in protecting self views and the person's openness to change may all 
have an effect on the self-concept process. Methodologically speaking, experimental 
studies have been criticised because of their short-term nature and the demand 
characteristics of the tasks, longitudinal studies for not accounting for change of 
knowledge over time, and cross-sectional studies because of the possibility of 
reciprocal causation and the influence of a third variable (Shrauger and Schoeneman, 
1979; Felson, 1989; Ichiyama, 1993). 
Generally speaking, the symbolic interactionist tenet, that we come to see ourselves 
as others see us, has received only inconsistent support and has been found to be 
dependent on the status of the individuals (Cast et al, 1999), the type of 
communication (Felson, 1981; Shrauger and Schoeneman, 1979), the type of 
relationship between self and the other (Cole, 1991) and the tendency of the self to 
attend to other's information (Cooley, 1902). In addition, the importance of others' 
views for the self has been evaluated (Cast et al, 1999; Felson, 1989; Ichiyama, 1993) 
and the agency of the self in attending to and influencing others' views of the self has 
been underlined (Cast et al, 1999; Felson, 1989). The importance of others in 
increasing self awareness has not been examined. This thesis suggests that one 
important influence on the development of awareness of difficulties following a brain 
injury is the extent to which significant others talk about the brain injury and how 
sequelae to the injury are explained, and made sense of in everyday discourses, to the 
brain injured person. Thus, symbolic interactionism deals with the way in which 
individuals build awareness of the self through messages given by others in the 
individual's immediate surroundings. However, what this theory needs now is to be 
widened to incorporate the understanding of how messages that may not originate in 
a social context, like bodily perceptions, are constructed by the self and how the self 
can access the contents of awareness. Therefore, the discussion will turn to social 
constructionism per se and will introduce a "weak" social construction theory of 
consciousness. The term "weak" is referred to here because the theory about to be 
introduced postulates the pre-eminence of the body, cognition and emotion to social 
interaction. 
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3.4. A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF AWARENESS 
In this section the term social constructionism will be explored further as the basis on 
which this analysis of awareness of difficulties following a brain injury is built. Social 
constructionism is understood here as following symbolic interactionism in suggesting 
that: 
-Social objects do not have their own objective existence 
-They do, however, exist, and if they are not objective they must be subjective 
-If social objects are subjective, they must be constructed out of the perceptions of 
individuals, that is, they must be constructed in the social realm, subjective realm 
-Individuals are social objects, and they construct their selves, their perceptions of 
themselves and the self they portray to others (Harding and Palfrey, 1997). 
However, symbolic interactionism is not enough to describe the influences of an inner 
life in the individual. That is, all the thinking, feeling, and bodily perceptions which 
may be carried out in the privacy of the self and which the individual may bring into 
open communication. Therefore, a theory, which retains the core of symbolic 
interactionism, but allows for the inner influence of the self to be felt and known, will 
be developed here. 
3.4.1. Conscious awareness of the self 
The definition of awareness used in this thesis is part of a comprehensive social 
construction theory of consciousness proposed by Burns and Engdahl in 1998. This 
theory suggests that individual's awareness, as a defining form of consciousness, 
derives from collective processes. It argues that "human consciousness results from 
the development of collective naming, classifying, judging, reflection, and discourse 
applied to individual members or participants in the collective" (p. 166). Individuals 
acquire the capacity to engage in self-reflectivity not only through the acquisition of 
language and collective representations but through the capabilities of discussing 
conceptions, observations and assessments of the self, among other objects defined 
and discussed within the collectivity. Such reflectivity, propose Burns and Engdahl, is 
one of the many mental processes that are encircled by the term awareness. 
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To develop this theory further the authors pinpoint three tenets: 
1- The individual self is seen as a collective representation and an object of 
collective reflection and discourse. 
The argument here is that individual reflectivity, as a form of consciousness, derives 
from collective processes. Language, language-mediated collective representations 
and a cultural cognitive frame enable individuals to participate in communicative and 
reflective processes and to become objects of attention and representation themselves. 
Individuals learn to give accounts of themselves, their actions and performance 
results; they explain and justify themselves. They learn to regulate the self according 
to particular collectively defined role conceptions, norms or policies. In a few words, 
they develop an awareness of the self, a sense of self. 
Burns and Engdahl make several key points on the self as collective representation 
and object of reflection: 
- The self is not only involved in collectively defining and using collective 
representations, but is itself a collective representation in reflective processes and 
internalised dialogues. Self-reflectivity on the individual level entails self-observation 
as object and as agent. An I with desires, intentions, orientations and a will, which can 
be analysed in terms of values, goals, aims and beliefs. Furthermore, the individual 
experiences the own self in ways differing from the ways the individual is aware of 
other selves, albeit still capable of identifying with others. 
- Self-monitoring and regulating activities, within a particular socio-cognitive frame, 
work to constrain activity in particular ways, through organising conceptions of 
reality, classifying states of the world, assigning values and making judgements on the 
basis of the principles specific to a social order or institutional domain. 
- Self-conceptions are originated and sustained or changed through social 
interactions, in particular, communicative activities with others. A person's self image 
is largely the result of interactions between self and significant others when it comes 
to interpretations, classifications, enactments, assessments and judgements in relation 
to the individual self 
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2- Complexity of human mental life and the multiple modes of individual awareness 
and consciousness. 
According to Burns and Engdahl (1998) human beings experience a variety of 
sensory states in respect of their bodies, mental activities, etc. Their awareness of 
some of these conditions and processes is considered a phenomenological fact and as 
such, it should be distinguished from purely material aspects of a physical and 
physiological nature. In addition, Burns and Engdahl note that sentience and 
cognition entail some organising mechanisms that are non-conscious. In some 
instances, they explain, individuals become aware, recognise and respond to certain 
patterns of data. Furthermore, in some modes of mental activity, states, events and 
processes are named and are brought into dialogues and reflective processes within a 
collectivity. Analysis of individual mental processes, including awareness and 
consciousness, indicates that there are multiple processes within a mental process, 
biological, neurophysiological, mental, symbolic, and that some of these take place in 
parallel. On other occasions, the multiple processes are interlinked and translations 
take place transforming the information contained in one process into another. Some 
of this interlinks happen between physical-biological processes and linguistically 
mediated processes that make up higher-order forms of awareness. For the authors 
the individual mind consists of multiple, interrelated processes, with a number of 
transformations that go on between processes. This transformation of data from one 
encoding to the other is a fundamental type of process in the complex of mental life. 
The interrelationships between sentience, cognitive processes, and language based 
representation and reflectivity entail both, internal and external interactive and 
feedback effects. The processes of data selection and organisation, in part through 
anatomical and physiological mechanisms, in part through subconscious structuring, 
and in part through language and culture mediated structuring of experience and 
cognition, makes humans active cognisers within an established cultural cognitive 
frame which, in turn, make communication and social sharing of experiences and 
definitions of reality possible. 
The individual reflective mode, Burns and Engdahl suggest, originates and develops 
with respect to the complexity of mental processes. These mental processes depend 
on the interrelationships of the sensory experience of the body, cognitive processes 
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and the symbolic interactionism of communication with others. Via such processes, 
other mental processes can be reflected on, and even these reflections can be in their 
turn, reflected upon and so on. The explanation of how this takes place is broken 
down by Burns and Engdahl into: 
Sentience 
Sensations relating to the body are many and diverse. Smells, chemical processes, 
sounds, are seen as primitive phenomenological processes, position, movement and 
functioning are essential in monitoring and regulating the body. Although many of 
these processes are non-reflective or automatic, some are conceptualised and can be 
brought into a communicative interaction. The person is aware and reacts to 
experience based on multiple pieces of information. If the person hears, sees, smells, 
feels his/her body, the person reacts to these data and uses it to orient and regulate 
his/herself. 
Cognitive processes 
Experiences, images, memories, representation of objects, concepts, and processes of 
self, among others, are conceptualised with the help of language or without it, 
although language helps articulation and elaboration of category systems. Burns and 
Engdahl explain at this point that complex, parallel and linked information processing 
is a characteristic of advanced beings. They see the developed brain as capable of 
recording, experiencing and organising multiple sensations into multiple cognitions 
and maintain that representations are not uni-dimensional, "but complex and multi- 
faceted" (p. 171). Information processed in a cognitive framework is integrated into 
holistic experiences, which are the basis for experiencing patterns rather that just bits 
of data. Mental states maybe investigated not only at a physical level but at a 
phenomenological level. In humans this phenomenological level is enhanced by 
language and so internal monitoring is possible. Without language these processes 
remain unelaborated. 
Self reflectivity 
This is what Burns and Engdahl call "consciousness proper". Consciousness is based 
on language-mediated representations and inner dialogue. The person by internalising 
collective representations and skills of social dialogue gains the basis for individual 
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reflectivity. Such individual reflectivity can be reported to others depending on 
language and communicative interactions. 
What is essential in reflectivity, the authors claim, is not only the noticing of a change 
but the translation of such change into language-based representation processes. 
Thus, one's state of awareness can be discussed with self, in inner dialogue, as well as 
with others. 
Thus, Burns and Engdahl recognise the complexity of the human mind and explain 
how it can categorise, discriminate and react to environmental stimuli. Also, it can 
reflect, judge and alter these discriminations, categorisations and reactions to the 
environmental stimuli. Awareness of self-processes requires, according to the authors, 
a representation of the self s states and this depends on memory. The enduring self, 
they say, is a variety of social and cognitive mechanisms, which stabilises 
representations, cognitions and memories. 
3- Different levels of awareness and reflectivity. 
Within the individual mind, there are multiple levels of awareness and consciousness: 
- processes, states, events and developments that are outside of human sensory 
experience (without aid) 
- processes, states, events, developments which humans experience but of which they 
have no developed conceptions 
- processes, states and developments that make up sensory experience: some sensory 
inputs (perhaps qualitatively different aspects: whether visual, motor or emotional) 
are framed, conceptualised and understood as being connected 
- experiences of the body, movements, habits, perceptions, and sensory 
inputs are 
encoded in language. They can be discussed and reflected on. 
Although Burns and Engdahl stress that these levels are not hard and fast in an 
empirical way, analytically speaking, they emphasise the need to differentiate types 
and qualities of awareness and these are explained below: 
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a) Signals outside sentience and direct awareness 
These are signals that are not accessible to the individual and even if they were, the 
individual would not be able to attend to all possible sensory data. Factors that 
explain this unawareness can be biological, cognitive and emotional. 
  Biological - there are numerous bodily processes and states that are outside 
awareness. Making use of medical instruments, a doctor may be able to measure and 
analyse some of these conditions. 
  Cognitive - some cognitive processes are ignored while the individual focuses on 
other cognitive conditions; other processes are taken for granted by the individual and 
are not cognised or perceived (like seeing something out of the corner of the eye or 
certain, well rehearsed activities). 
  Emotional - certain emotionally threatening or destabilising sensations, experiences 
and cognitions are ignored or forced out of awareness, re-framed and so on. 
b) Awareness and primary reflectivity 
The authors state that the individual may be aware of states and processes of self, 
self-sensation and self-awareness, without being able to verbalise and discuss these 
conditions; primitive forms of primary reflectivity may be present at this stage. The 
individual or agent engages in primary reflective mode to monitor, assess, describe 
and re-orient activities, to exercise a will or control of behaviour and influence the 
environment. 
This self-regulation implies self-referentiality. The individual's goals, values and 
intentions that derive from a position or role in a social organisation are tested against 
relevant observed states, actions, developments and results. In turn, these states may 
or may not have anything to do with actions taken by the agent. But if they are 
perceived as connected with actions, the self-reference becomes obvious: in the 
individual's conception of the situation, the actions of the individual are different from 
those of others or from other factors in the situation. 
c) Higher order reflectivity 
Burns and Engdahl consider that consciousness is different from just being awake. 
Wakefulness entails a type of awareness or experiencing, but not necessarily 
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reflectivity. That is, the individual may be aware of the self, may be experiencing the 
self but may not be reflecting on one's own awareness or type of awareness. 
However, if the individual enters the reflective mode and applies it to the self, Burns 
and Engdahl explain, by assessing it and re-orienting it, then the individual enters a 
higher order awareness or reflection on self-awareness. At this stage, the experience 
of states and processes of the self are named and can be verbally thought about. 
Therefore, if awareness is attending to the self, higher order awareness implies that 
the individual can observe and analyse that very attending to the self 
3.4.2. Summary 
Under this framework, it is recognised that humans experience a variety of sensory 
states to do with their bodies, their cognitions and their emotions. Although a certain 
number of these sensory states may be unconscious, individuals become aware, on 
occasions, and recognise and respond to stimuli. When this awareness takes place, the 
sensory states are named and brought into dialogues and reflective processes within a 
collectivity. Reflective processes can be biological, neurophysiological, mental, 
symbolic, etc. and can take place in parallel or interact with each other. There are 
processes of data selection and organisation. In part through unconscious 
mechanisms, in part through anatomical and physiological mechanisms and in part 
through language and culture mediated structuring of experience and cognition, or to 
the same effect, humans can be seen as active cognisers. They can structure data and 
organise perceptions within established cognitive and cultural frames. Thus, 
communication and social sharing of experiences and definitions of reality becomes 
possible (Burns and Engdahl, 1998). 
Furthermore, the person's reflective mode "emerges and develops" from the complex 
of mental processes. This means that it emerges not only from sensory experience of 
the body and cognitive processes but also from the symbolic, representative processes 
involved in communication and interactions within a collective. Through such 
processes, emotions, cognitions and sensations of the body can be reflected on or 
communicated (Burns and Engdahl, 1998). 
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However, and even though Burns and Engdahl recognise the body, cognition and 
emotion as objects to be reflected on and/or as the objects of communication, the 
authors do not seem to emphasise enough the role of the body, cognition and emotion 
as agents. That is, Burns and Engdahl explain that self-reflectivity entails self- 
observation of the body, cognitions and emotions as objects and agents but do not 
make this distinction sufficiently clear. This distinction is important however for two 
reasons. First, because the body, cognition and emotion as agents can also be the 
subject of communications. Second, to regard the body, cognitions and emotions as 
agents helps to understand the self as active and not as a mere passive recipient of 
feedback from the social world. Therefore, the discussion will focus now on this 
distinction and will see the difference between the body, cognition and emotion as 
objects and as agents. 
3.5. THE BODY AND AWARENESS 
From a social constructivist perspective awareness emanates from the interaction 
between the private self and the social self Both selves are related to the body. 
Bodily sensations provide the initial way of knowing about the world and provide the 
first experiences from which self-awareness can develop (Piaget, 1959). Mead (1934) 
argued that awareness of the body as a separate object is an essential prerequisite to 
the development of the social self, while Dewey (1963) argued that to view the body 
as a causal agent is also crucial. Things happen to the body but the body, in turn, can 
also make things happen. Both ways of viewing the body, it is argued here, are 
essential to understanding awareness of the body. Let us consider first the body as an 
object. 
The body as object 
From the theoretical perspective offered by Burns and Engdahl (1998) it is 
understood that the human body is both an object of knowledge and a knowing, 
sentient being. Humans sense, touch, feel, hear and see ourselves as individuals in 
space and time, and so experience ourselves as continuous beings. However, through 
relations to others and in the establishment of a relationship to our own self, we can 
see ourselves from a distance and also act and perform differently in different 
contexts. Some authors have divided this experience into the body located in time and 
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space which experiences itself as a unified entity (Self) and the various selves that 
humans display in various social contexts (Person) (Harre, 1983). The person is the 
public being, the self the subjective, private being which has no physical referents. 
The distinctiveness of one's own body serves as the basis of the identification of one 
self by others, and the basis of one's personal sense of identity has also to be, at least 
in part, referred to bodily considerations. For Harre, both senses of self are produced 
through discourses of the local moral order, pertaining to the rights and obligations 
one has as an individual within one's community. That is, within local moral orders 
individuals are held accountable for their actions by others, and these accounts must 
be framed in terms of local moral principles. Harre explains that individuals do this 
because they have a basic desire for respect and honour within their communities, and 
this is achieved by being known as a morally good member of society. 
Adding to Harre's view, Burkitt (1999) argues that the embodied location of the 
individual, in both its spatio-temporal context and in social interactions, can be seen 
as the person, upon whom is conferred rights and duties, along with particular marks, 
names and numbers. Burkitt says: 
"It is around these symbolic markers (including the ethical codes and norms), as well 
as through our own sense of bodily location, that we identify ourselves as a person. " 
(Burkitt, 1999, p. 62) 
Furthermore, perhaps the most obvious way in which the physicality of the body 
influences awareness is by shaping this social identity (Stone, 1962). The shaping of 
identity, according to Kelly and Field (1996), happens in three different ways. First, 
being aware of the body helps the person to be acknowledged as competent social 
performer by giving the impression of control, use and presentation of the body. This 
becomes more clear when our bodies let us down as in the case of brain injury. In this 
instance, a brain injury may affect self and social identity by inhibiting the capacity of 
each individual to play a social role/s. Instead, the body becomes central to the social 
process (Kelly and Field, 1996) and central to the coping task of having a brain injury. 
This occurs because the individual has to deal with the physical manifestations of the 
injury, if any, which precedes having to cope with relationships, disruptions to daily 
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life activities and social reconstruction of events (Kelly, 1991). The physical aspects 
of living (eating, washing, etc. ) become then the focus of the experience of having a 
brain injury for the individual and the carers of the individual (Anderson and Bury, 
1988). Second, in many cases, after a brain injury especially, bodies change and this 
change often creates tension between the physical appearance (i. e. cripple) and the 
individual's self-conceptions based on the actual identity of what they are able to do 
(Goffman, 1963). Third, the enduring quality of the body itself Although after a brain 
injury the body can change just as the self and social identity can do, the body is the 
same body as it was premorbidly, just as the self and social identity are part of the 
same person. It is the same person who has endured the brain injury, the same body. 
What is different is that after the brain injury, the awareness of the body is greater, in 
the self and in others. This awareness stops the body being taken for granted. The 
changes suffered during brain injury have to be incorporated into the self and become 
the basis for the imputation of identity by others. 
Thus, the arguments emphasise how central the body is to the identity of the person 
and how this identity is shaped by the presentation of the body, especially when 
presented as disabled. As an object, the body is ascribed meaning in its own right. 
However, to come to grips with awareness of difficulties in people with brain injuries 
as individuals that have bodies of flesh and bones and do not just have a body as a 
cluster of meanings attached to it, the body as a communicative device or as a 
meaning-producing device needs to be understood and it is to this that the argument 
turns now. 
The body active 
Social constructivists argue that knowledge of the world is produced during social 
interactions, which actually construct the objects we take to be the things in the 
world. Lately, Danziger (1997) has observed that social constructivism can be divided 
into "strong" or radical and "weak" positions. The strong position links knowledge to 
power, while the weak versions link knowledge to everyday relations and 
communicative interactions (Gergen, 1994a). Both positions, however, claim the 
uncertainty of the existence of objects beyond their construction in social interchange. 
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In other words, individuals can never know with certainty the existence of a world 
beyond their linguistically formulated knowledge of it 
It could be argued though that it is the weak social constructivist position that 
facilitates placing individuals not as objects but as communicators in relationships and 
conversations, and therefore, as active agents. This argument can be clarified with 
some ideas suggested by the phenomenological studies of Merleau-Ponty (1962). For 
this author, thinking is not the consequence of a disembodied mind located 
somewhere outside the material world, beyond time and space. Nor it is just the 
product of a body reacting to its surroundings. Thought, for Merleau-Ponty, is part of 
the active relationship between individuals and their worlds. Before thought and 
ideas, the author argues there is a co-existence between the body and its world. This 
co-existence is what makes it possible for individuals to develop conscious awareness 
and knowledge. Space and time are not dimensions that the body is situated in, but 
body, space and time are seen as a unity. This concept of unity draws attention to 
how the self is conscious of always being in a particular location, and that, because of 
other perspectives, there are always other points of view on the world. 
According to Merleau-Ponty humans can never gain an objective knowledge of the 
world that exists outside individual subjectivity, for, the author explains, there is no 
such knowledge to be had. That is, a disembodied perspective of the world is a 
perspective from nowhere and is therefore impossible to achieve. All knowledge is 
embodied and placed, created in the fundamental unity between subjects and objects, 
which is the consequence of having an active body. Action, for him, is the clue to 
understanding human beings and this active perspective involves not only the 
fundamental and variable relation between the body and its objects, but between 
different human bodies as well. Therefore, the human world is primarily a social 
world. For Merleau-Ponty this relational unity, this being in the world, is the context 
for human thought and knowledge. 
Merleau-Ponty (1962) speaks of the sentience of the body in a similar way as Burns 
and Engdahl (1998) speak of sentience of the body. With reference to the human 
body and the way in which the body is embedded in the various natural settings. 
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Sentience is understood here as the body's sympathetic and responsive relation to its 
environment, which is regarded as mindful even though it is not rational and pre- 
linguistic. Thus, the body can be described as a thinking body and having 
intentionality before the emergence of language and self-consciousness. Grasping for 
an object, for example, is a basic form of intentional action and no cognitive 
representation of grasping is needed for such action. Thinking and intentional activity 
are then seen as pre-linguistic and pre-cognitive, and prior to the self-conscious 
individual there exists the bodily individual which is its foundation. 
Merleau-Ponty's view of this bodily individual pre-existing the self-conscious 
individual is in direct opposition to the cognitive subject described by Descartes. If for 
Descartes the person was a spectator, viewing the world from an intellectual distance, 
for Merleau-Ponty, humans are always enmeshed in a lived relation with the world, 
grounded in the activity of the body, which engages all the senses. In other words, 
humans not only look at the world but live the world through their bodies. Further, 
the senses are not understood as a set of bodily pre-givens. Merleau-Ponty thinks that 
sense data in themselves cannot be the base of thought for there is no initial 
distinction between the senses. The senses have to be differentiated and organised for 
them to have any meaning for the individual, a process that takes place in bodily 
action, that is, through active perception. A body that is active in the world brings 
together the senses in a coherent way (Merleau-Ponty, 1962), and the formation of 
habits plays a part in this process of perception. Yet this distinction and differentiation 
of the senses is never complete and absolute, for the senses continue to infuse one 
another to varying degrees. For example, there is always some taste sense when 
looking at an attractive meal, and vice-versa. 
Empirical evidence does indeed seem to support this idea. Wong (1975) for example, 
explored the relationship between visual and tactile perception, using the Necker cube 
and the Schroeder staircase as visual stimuli. The study attempted to elucidate 
experimentally how pre-reflective (i. e. non-verbalised) perception integrates the other 
sensory modalities (i. e. touch) in comparison to reflective (i. e. verbalised) sensory 
experience. Wong divided 24 participants into 4 experimental groups. Her 
findings 
showed significant differences between the verbal and non-verbal groups indicating 
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that the reflective condition group lowered the degree of relationship of visual and 
tactile perception. The author concluded that in spontaneous perception seeing and 
touching are "inseparable". 
Therefore, the body and its habitual actions are not mechanical process, such as 
simple physical reflexes, but are forms of knowledge or ways of carrying on 
effectively in the world. Thus, while this body knowledge is not mechanically 
produced, neither it is constituted as self-reflective and fully articulated understanding 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962). However, it could be argued that the body can be placed in a 
self-reflective mode if an anomaly, such as brain injury, affects it or disrupts the 
habitus. Then the signs of a malfunctioning body need to be differentiated and 
interpreted after the injury. This interpretation is then open to communication once 
and only once the person has the intention of making something public. Furthermore, 
the person has to make use of a socially shared signal or code in order to make this 
possible. In cases where these conditions are not met, bodily conduct should be 
considered as symptomatic of a certain bodily state rather than communication. 
Paralysis of an arm, for example, may be symptomatic of having had a brain injury, 
but should not be considered as communication about feeling the arm not moving. In 
this sense, the body is active in interpreting sense data and formulating interpretations 
of these data. These interpretations are open to communication and are, in part, the 
subject of this thesis. 
3.5.1. Summary 
In this section, the body has been considered under two different lights: as an object 
and as an agent. As an object, the body has been described as creator and receptor of 
identity. This identity is shaped by the presentation of the body (injured or intact) 
which in turn, is the basis for imputation of identity by others. As an agent, the body 
and its habitual actions, have been described as forms of knowledge or ways of 
carrying on effectively in the world. Thus, each perspective allows the body to be 
both object of knowledge and a knowledgeable object and therefore, the possible 
subject of communication. The same distinction will now be attempted for cognition 
and emotion in the subsequent sections. 
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3.6. AWARENESS AND COGNITION 
It is a well know fact that the variety and quantity of social and environmental 
stimulation available to the individual at any one time is too great for the individual to 
be able to be aware of, process or attend to (Spinelli, 1989; Markus, 1977). People 
need to be and are selective in what they attend to. This selectivity is not random but 
it is said that depends on internal cognitive structures that allow the person to process 
incoming information with some efficacy (Markus, 1977). These structures have been 
called "schemata" (Tesser and Conlee, 1975), "scripts" (Abelson, 1975) or "frames" 
(Minsky, 1975). 
According to Markus (1977) these cognitive structures are more apparent when we 
process information about ourselves. Research on self-perception (Bem, 1972) and 
self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974) supports this idea and indicates that the individual 
takes an active role in the information processing construction. Markus argues that 
when an individual explains his or her own behaviour in a particular field, what is 
communicated is information about the self or what Markus calls self-schemata. 
Markus defines self-schemata as "generalisations about the self, derived from past 
experiences, that organise and guide the processing of self-related information 
contained in the individual's social experiences" (p. 124). The author argues that self- 
schemata can be specific (derived from personal experiences) or general (derived 
from repeated categorisations and evaluations on the person's behaviour made by the 
individual and others) and constructed by the person from information processed in 
the past. Self-schemata then represent the way the self has been differentiated and 
articulated in memory. 
This point brings to relevance the important role that memory plays in the process of 
awareness. Tulving (1985) for example, claims that "there is no such thing as 
awareness without remembering" (p. 5). Individuals, he argues can behave and learn 
without awareness but they cannot remember without awareness. They may know 
something about an event but they may not remember such an event. Such 
knowledge, Tulving argues, can be created and be of the same quality as the 
knowledge about the spatially and temporally extended world. The difference 
between knowing and remembering is then, the phenomenal experience that 
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accompanies the recovery of episodic knowledge. This difference can be made 
manifest by asking people to recall an event and enquiring whether they remember the 
event or know about it. Empirical evidence for this distinction (Tulving, 1985) does 
indeed support the idea that people can retrieve information about personally 
experienced events without remembering the event. Indirect empirical evidence is also 
offered from a narrative perspective. Nochi (1997), in a qualitative investigation of 
individuals with traumatic brain injury, describes how these individuals on recovering 
awareness of themselves and their environments, found that they could not remember 
their accident. This not knowing lead them to what Nochi calls "finding the void" (p. 
539). Finding the void is a term used to describe how four brain injured patients 
searched for information from medical staff, relatives, newspapers and other sources, 
about the accident, in and effort to fill the absence of this particular memory. When 
they were talking to the researcher, their narratives were not about their memories of 
their accidents but about what they knew of their accidents. 
The difference between knowing and remembering that Tulving derived from his 
observations of amnesia patients has various implications. It emphasises the 
phenomenological nature of awareness on one hand and on the other, puts a stop to 
simply equating awareness with knowledge often found in common parlance and 
unawareness of difficulties research. The evaluation of the phenomenological nature 
of awareness is dealt with below. Deconstructing the equation knowledge/awareness 
helps understand why, in brain injury in particular, some individuals who know the 
facts about their disabilities don't do anything about them (Stuss, 1991). If the 
disability involves memory difficulties, they may know about it but they may not be 
able to remember it. Therefore, knowing is not enough for awareness to be activated, 
according to Burns and Engdahl (1998), knowing needs to be accompanied by 
reflectivity or be "illuminated" by consciousness (Zahavi and Parnas, 1998). 
3.6.1. The phenomenological nature of awareness 
Traditionally, and from a dualistic perspective, consciousness and its contents exist in 
an immaterial realm that has no location or extension in space. From a materialistic 
perspective, consciousness and its contents is nothing more than selected states or 
functions of the brain. And yet, from a phenomenological perspective the contents of 
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normal phenomenal consciousness define and fill three dimensional space as they are 
none other than the everyday world, as experienced (Velmans, 2000). What one 
experiences at a given moment depends on how one directs one's attention. 
Consciousness contents differ depending on what a person attends to and they include 
not only inner and body experiences, but what it is conventionally known as the 
physical world. Thus, consciousness involves, among others, references to one self 
and self-awareness is a necessary part of any instance of this consciousness. 
Although there is disagreement among theorists concerning the process by which 
inner awareness or self-awareness is accomplished, it is rare for psychologists to deny 
that humans possess the ability to be directly aware of some of aspects of the inner 
self (Natsoulas, 1998). From a philosophical perspective, the idea of reflection or the 
ability of the mind to turn its view inward upon itself is one (Locke in 1975) hinted as 
a way to knowing the contents of consciousness. Equally, Armstrong (1993) 
advocates that there is a close analogy between perception and introspection. A 
perception is a mental event whose intentional object is a situation in the physical 
world (i. e. bodily perceptions, visual perceptions, etc. ). An introspection is a mental 
event whose intentional objects are other mental happenings occurring in the same 
mind. Armstrong claims that it is only by becoming the object of introspection that a 
mental state becomes conscious or manifests itself subjectively. 
This account of knowing about the contents of consciousness however, has been 
criticised on two accounts. Firstly, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) proposed that when 
people attempt to report on their cognitive processes, that is, on the processes 
mediating the effects of a stimulus on a response, they do not do so on the basis of 
any true introspection. Instead, their reports are based on a priori, implicit causal 
theories or judgements about the extent to which a particular stimulus is a plausible 
cause of a given response. This suggests that though people may not be able to 
observe directly their cognitive processes, they will some times be able to report 
accurately about them. This would imply, in turn, that giving accurate reports of the 
contents of consciousness is a bit of a fluke anyhow. Nevertheless, the evidence 
presented by Ericsson and Simon (1980) has refuted Nisbett and Wilson's objections. 
These authors argue that the inaccurate reports found by Nisbett and Wilson in 1977 
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were the result of requesting information from participants that was never directly 
heeded, thus forcing participants to infer rather than remember their mental processes. 
In other words, in some of the studies presented by Nisbett and Wilson, the questions 
presented to the participants contained considerable background information that 
would make it feasible for participants to generate answers without consulting their 
memories of the cognitive processes. 
Secondly, using introspection to acquire knowledge of the contents of consciousness 
implies understanding the self as object of thought only. Natsoulas (1998) for 
example, argues that this understanding stops psychologists from considering 
awareness as part of the stream of consciousness (James, 1890). Psychologists fail to 
realise, Natsoulas explains, that in the absence of inner awareness humans would be 
ignorant as they went along with their seeing, feeling, thinking or intending whatever 
they may be seeing, feeling, thinking, or intending. If there was no inner awareness, 
humans would be, with respect of mental life, like people who possess only 
"blindsight" over the entirety of their field of view (Weiskrantz, 1993). In a similar 
vein, Zahavi and Parnas (1998) argue that regarding self-awareness as an object is to 
regard consciousness as aware of itself not as aware of the self Zahavi and Parnas 
(1998) explain that the object of perceptual experience is intersubjectively accessible 
in the sense that it can, in principle, be given to others in the same way that it is given 
to an individual, the perceptual experience itself is given directly only to the 
individual. It is the first personal "givenness" of the experience, which makes it 
subjective. In contrast to physical objects, which can exist regardless of whether they 
appear, de facto, for a subject, conscious experiences are essentially characterised as 
having a subjective feel (Nagel, 1986; James, 1890). However, while we cannot ask 
what it feels like to be a something, we can ask what does it feel like to be a human 
being because human beings are taken to be conscious. To undergo a conscious 
experience necessarily means that there is something it is like for the subject to have 
that experience. This is true for bodily sensations, perceptual experiences and 
intentional feelings. There is also something it is like to contemplate the problem of 
self-awareness. Therefore, if there is something it is like to experience self-awareness, 
there must be some awareness of these experiences themselves or in other words, 
there must be self-awareness. 
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Nevertheless, if there is self-awareness how is this self-awareness known? According 
to Zahavi and Parnas, this state is known because consciousness, like a flame, 
illuminates itself and other things. That is, Zahavi and Parnas, like Burns and Engdahl 
(1998), understand self-awareness as part of consciousness not as a secondary act or 
reflex but as a constitutive moment of the conscious experience itself. Thus, they 
argue, there is only one component in self-awareness, which means that the 
experience is and is present to itself and it is this self-presence which constitutes the 
self in its most original and fundamental form. 
This "experience" has also been described by Natsoulas (1998) who complements his 
argument by defining the conditions for self-awareness to take place. According to 
Natsoulas for self-awareness to happen a person must be witnessing oneself, the 
oneself needs to be appropriated, there needs to be "retrowareness of oneself', inner 
awareness and consciousness extended backwards. The concepts, which are explained 
briefly below, and as described by the author seem to relay on one important 
cognition, namely, memory. Natsoulas observes, and as noted by most philosophers, 
that consciousness cannot be about anything. Rather, a person is or has been at some 
point, aware firsthand, on the spot, at the time of its occurrence, of a certain relevant 
piece of one's own behaviour or a certain relevant part of one's stream of 
consciousness (James, 1890). This behaviour or the particular part of one's stream 
must be suitable for serving as evidence about one's cognitions, beliefs, abilities, 
traits, dispositions or tendencies. The evidence cannot pertain instead to merely social 
or material factors because awareness is always about oneself, although in evaluating 
evidence concerning an aspect of oneself, one may take into account social and 
material factors. For example, one may acknowledge one or more of these factors as 
determinant of one's intellectual performance. However, it is not these factors that 
one has awareness of or about; rather, it is the relevant outcomes to which they may 
have contributed, such as a habitual way of thinking about the world or treating other 
people. This is how Natsoulas defines witnessing of oneself. 
Further, self-witnessing cannot happen of its own accord. Natsoulas suggests that the 
self-witnessing must "appropriate" to oneself that which is witnessed. One must not 
only be aware firsthand of the particular piece of one's behaviour or part of one's 
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stream of consciousness that would serve as evidence, but also one must be aware of 
that piece or part as being one's own. In this sense, self-witnessing must be personal. 
Natsoulas explains that it is possible for one to have, instead, inner awareness of one's 
stream of consciousness whereby one's stream of consciousness seems to have been 
taken over by another agent or at least, seems not to be one's own. Reed (1972) 
pointed out that behaviours, as well as parts of one's stream of consciousness, may 
suffer a loss of personal attribution, either transiently, as a result of stress situations 
or more consistently, as part of neurological pathology such as schizophrenia or brain 
damage. 
To explain retrowareness of oneself Natsoulas observes the instances of 
consciousness that sometimes take place at a temporal distance from the specific self- 
witnessing that provides evidence for them. For instance, something of oneself that 
was witnessed at a certain, perhaps early point in life may repeatedly serve one as 
evidence for judgements regarding the kind of person one is. Therefore, remembering 
proper is a part of being conscious and all instances of such remembering, whether or 
not they take place as part of consciousness, necessarily involve occurrent awareness 
now of a past happening or state of affairs. In being conscious, one now remembers 
something that one previously did or experienced. In other words, consciousness 
usually involves a kind of self-awareness that is a "retrowareness". For instance, one 
can apprehend in thought right now, and not for the first time, how one behaved in a 
particular instance in a particular occasion. 
However, for an occurrent awareness to qualify as an instance of remembering 
proper, the awareness must be a retrowareness of a special type. It is not enough that 
one was originally aware first hand of the object of the particular retrowareness. In an 
act of remembering something in particular, one must be occurently aware now of 
oneself as now apprehending that which one had earlier apprehended. Therefore, 
necessarily involved at the point of remembering is inner awareness of one's present 
self-retrowareness. Further, according to Natsoulas, there is also a kind of 
retrowareness that resembles inner awareness. There occurs a present retrowareness 
of one's past experience. For example, one's perceiving, emotion over, thinking about, 
planning, remembering or expecting something or other in particular that was taking 
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place or was going to take place. Thus, in those cases of consciousness whereby one 
remembers witnessing the relevant evidence, there occurs both inner awareness of 
present components of one's own stream of consciousness that are retrowareness of 
the evidence witnessed and inner awareness of present components of one's stream of 
consciousness that are retrowareness of some of the mental acts that took place as 
part of one's witnessing the evidence. 
However, there is more to consciousness than remembering the right sort of item. For 
Natsoulas, one is conscious not simply because one is remembering one's act of 
witnessing about oneself but one is conscious because one puts to use what one 
remembers. It becomes evidence by being brought to bear on something that one 
already believes or may come to believe. In addition, to one's undergoing 
retrowareness of particular past events as being occurrent parts of oneself, one must 
have thoughts regarding one or more characteristics that may belong to the 
intellectual, moral or belief dimensions of one's personality, and one must make 
judgements regarding how the remembered evidence bears on whether those 
characteristics do so belong. 
Thus, Natsoulas avoids focusing, while not denying it, on the individual gaining 
knowledge of the contents of awareness, via self-reflection or introspection, in favour 
of an immediate or direct awareness of present and past events. This immediate 
awareness, in turn, places a necessary emphasis in the role memory plays in awareness 
based on past evidence. However, Natsoulas argues that the processes of awareness 
described above take place in the same manner in the present. They can occur on the 
spot, that is, while one is engaged in witnessing a behaviour or a part of 
consciousness. The conclusion then, and by implication, converges with Tulving's 
empirical studies in that, in the absence of memory, humans may still be conscious but 
not aware of some or all the behaviours witnessed or parts of consciousness. The 
distinction, which will be explored further below, is important because it may help to 
explain knowing without remembering. 
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3.6.2. Memory or knowledge 
If self-schemata, as has been seen, are understood as cognitive representations 
derived from an individual's social experiences then, they can be conceptualised as 
representations that have been articulated and differentiated in memory (Markus, 
1977). Cognitive science has classified these representations in memory into two 
types of knowledge: semantic personal knowledge and episodic personal knowledge 
(Tulving, 1989). Semantic personal knowledge refers to information that has been 
abstracted from memories of the self in specific events (Tulving, 1989). Semantic 
personal knowledge of traits may include the facts that a person is generous, active, 
disabled or lazy. Episodic personal knowledge refers to memories of specific events 
involving the self (Tulving, 1989). Episodic personal knowledge of traits includes 
those instances in which behaviour was generous, active, disabled or lazy. 
Empirical studies have examined the relationship between these two kinds of trait 
knowledge about the self This research has consistently supported the view that in 
the field of trait knowledge, semantic personal memory and episodic personal memory 
are functionally independent. In other words, functionality of semantic personal 
memory does not require the functionality of episodic personal memory (Kihlstrom 
and Klein, 1994). Klein, Loftus and Plog (1992) for example, utilised the concept of 
transfer-appropriate processing in a study of recognition memory of own traits to 
show that different processes are involved in accessing the two types of memory. In 
addition, Klein, Loftus and Burton (1989) applied the principle of encoding variability 
in a study of recall for own traits and found that the type of information made 
available by accessing semantic personal memory was different from that made 
available by accessing episodic personal memory. 
However, the problem with this type of research is that it tries to demonstrate the 
functional independence of two types of semantic and episodic trait knowledge of the 
self from the performance of individuals with no memory loss (Parkin, 1993). 
Research of this kind needs to demonstrate such independence owing to the fact that 
when participants have access to both memories it is very difficult to rule out 
interplay. Research carried out with people with brain injuries, specifically with 
participants with amnesia, provides a more effective way of testing the independence 
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of the two systems. Amnesia patients usually display intact semantic memory with 
impaired access to episodic memory (Tulvin, 1989). Tulving (1993), for example, was 
able to demonstrate this point with a patient who had experienced permanently loss of 
episodic memory. Tulving asked on two occasions from his participant to rate a list of 
trait adjectives for self-descriptiveness. Tulving also asked the mother of the 
participant to rate her son on the same traits. Tulving found that the participant's 
ratings were reliable (78% agreement across the two ratings) and consistent with the 
way he was perceived by others (73% agreement with the ratings made by the 
participant's mother). Thus, Tulving's participant appeared to have accurate, detailed 
knowledge about his personality despite the fact that he had no access to any 
behavioural episodes from which to infer this knowledge. 
This remember-knowing distinction is of particular relevance to this thesis because it 
helps to underline that an individual may have knowledge of difficulties following a 
brain injury without having the memories from which to infer that knowledge. To 
illustrate, in a study carried out by Levine, Black, Cabeza, Sinden, Mcintosh, Toth, 
Tulving and Stuss (1998) the authors found that remembering episodes from one's 
personal past is not possible in the absence of awareness of one's self. Using the 
remembering-knowing paradigm on a brain injured participant, the authors found that 
the participant's behaviour was driven by generic information about how he should 
behave, rather than by the goals and intentions that could arise from his own identity. 
Furthermore, Cermak and O'Connor (1983) reported the case of another patient with 
amnesia who spontaneously provided what initially appeared to be descriptions of 
memories but which on further investigation turned out to be well-established 
narratives that the patient was in the habit of relating during social conversations. 
Thus, it is argued here, knowing about difficulties may indicate awareness of these 
difficulties but it may also indicate that some people with brain injuries may have 
learned to "narrate" their difficulties without remembering. Therefore, the attention 
focuses, once more, on the role of the social interactions of people with brain injuries. 
In addition, this would be an extension of Tulving's theory in that it shows that 
knowledge emerges from the social and not only from internal processes. 
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3.6.3. Summary 
So far, cognitive structures have been discussed as being more apparent when people 
process information about the self Self-schemata are constructed with the 
information that is differentiated and articulated in memory. Memory in turn has been 
discussed as an essential component for the process of awareness. That is, and 
according to Tulving (1985), there is no awareness without memory. This is the 
equivalent of saying that people with an impaired memory had had the contents of 
awareness wiped out. The contents of awareness however, have been considered as 
objects and within reach of the individual through introspection. Using introspection 
to acquire knowledge of the contents of consciousness however implies 
understanding the self as an object of thought only. Therefore, to help understand the 
nature of the active self the phenomenological nature of awareness has been discussed 
as the ability of humans to be directly aware of some aspects of the inner self 
As with the subject of the body in the preceding section, the distinction emphasises 
that individuals can then access the contents of awareness and experience immediate 
awareness. In both cases, the contents of awareness and the experiences of awareness 
can be used as the subject of social interaction. However, in the absence of a 
functional memory, humans may still be conscious but not aware of the contents or 
experiences of awareness. In addition, a remember-knowledge distinction has been 
introduced in the section that helps explain why some people with brain injuries can 
narrate their difficulties without being able to remember them. On this note, and 
having discussed so far the body and cognition, the discussion continues to consider 
the role of emotion as an object and as an experiential state or agent. 
3.7. EMOTION AND AWARENESS 
Emotional difficulties is a term used in brain injury literature as a general label to 
encapsulate observed characteriological changes in individuals who have suffered a 
brain injury. These changes include: anger, depression, exaltation, altered mood, 
apathy, indifference, automaticity, incontinence, restlessness, euphoria, lack of 
motivation, lack of initiative, irritability, disinhibition, social withdrawal, lack of 
restraint, impulsivity, shallow affect, egocentricity, childish behaviour, to mention but 
a few (Stuss and Benson, 1986). These disparate statements collected under the 
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umbrella of emotional difficulties observed in people with brain injuries cannot be said 
to describe the behaviour of these individuals (Bedford, 1986). On the contrary, these 
statements are interpretations of behaviour made by researchers and caregivers to 
help define lack of awareness in patients showing such manifestations. The situation 
being that emotional behaviour is far from being homogenous and people who share 
the same information and expectations about another person's behaviour may possibly 
place different emotional interpretations on that behaviour (Bedford, 1986). 
However, before elaborating further on this point it is necessary to underline a social 
constructivist perspective of emotion, question the understanding of emotion and 
define its role in awareness. This section therefore, will discuss these points and will 
lead, like the sections on the body and cognition to the distinction of emotion as a 
behaviour (object) and emotion as an experiential state (agent). 
According to Burns and Engdahl (1998), emotions are reactions to threatening 
sensations, experiences and cognitions. This definition departs from the traditional 
understanding of emotion as an innate response elicited by natural features or from 
the theory of physiological arousal, proposed by Darwin (1872), involving innate 
instinctual drives such as self-preservation and pain avoidance. However, some 
critical features of what the constructivists mean by emotion are briefly described 
below (Armon-Jones, 1986): 
a) Emotions are a socially prescribed set of responses to be followed by a person in a 
given situation. 
b) Emotions are characterised by attitudes such as judgements, desires and beliefs, the 
contents of which are not innate but prescribed by the systems of value and cultural 
belief of particular societies. 
c) The attitudes involved in emotion are culturally determined as these attitudes are 
learnt as part of the individual's introduction to beliefs, values, norms and 
expectations of the culture the individual is embedded in. 
d) Emotions are functional in as much as the possession of culturally appropriate 
emotions serves to restrain undesirable attitudes and behaviour and to sustain and 
endorse cultural values. 
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This radical alternative to naturalist theories of emotion begs the question of how is it 
possible that emotions can be socio-culturally constituted. To answer it, it is 
necessary to understand first a constructivist theory of mind in which emotions, as 
instances of psychological states, are defined as cognition based. Culturally 
appropriate emotion attitudes are acquired by reference to those contexts for which 
the emotion is deemed to be desirable. This implies that once the emotion has been 
learnt then the individual's further ability to respond appropriately will depend upon 
his or her ability to appraise a situation as warranting the emotion. Secondly, and 
under this theory of mind, emotions need to be world-dependent. That is, defining 
emotions as responses appropriate to cultural contexts implies some sort of 
connection between the emotion and the external world of affairs. Emotions are 
identified in part by behaviour and in part by those external situations to which the 
emotion is directed. The attitudes which constitute emotion are then, in principle, 
learnable and their external referents are either irreducibly or significantly socio- 
cultural in nature. Thirdly, emotions are seen as purposive in nature. The function of 
emotions is essentially socio-cultural and serves individuals only as members of a 
community. 
This far the only objection that can be raised in the constructivist definition of 
emotion is concerning the functional role of negative emotions (see Markus and 
Kitayama, 1991, for a full response to this objection). Thus the need to provide an 
account on this socio-cultural function of emotion. Ready made explanations 
however, come from two different positions: strong constructivism and weak 
constructivism. Strong constructivism explains emotion solely as a socio-cultural 
product. From this position, no emotion can be an innate state, and therefore complex 
or sophisticated emotions cannot be regarded as cultural modifications of an innate 
state. The similarities between innate responses and emotions are incidental. 
However, the weaker position of social constructivism concedes a limited range of 
innate emotion responses. For example, Averill explains (1980) that to consider that 
there is an invariant core to emotional behaviour which remains untouched by socio- 
cultural influences is essentially a reification of emotion in to a biological given. This 
position clearly allows for the possibility that emotion responses could exist prior to 
and extra to socio-cultural influences. 
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Furthermore, the advantage of accepting the existence of innate emotions as opposed 
to just seeing emotions as socio-cultural products is that it escapes some of the 
difficulties of the strong position (Armon-Jones, 1986). For example, a brief look at 
the list of emotional behaviours given in the opening paragraph will suffice to identify 
anger as the only "genuine" emotion. Depression is not an emotion but a mood. 
Disinhibition is not an emotion neither is anxiety or any of the other terms describing 
emotional behaviours in brain injury literature. From the strong constructivist position 
it is difficult to explain why anger is not an innate response while the individuals that 
display such emotion exhibit much the same type of behaviour as some non human 
species. Following this argument, if such a behavioural feature can be ascribed to 
non-human species, then it need not serve as evidence of socially constructed human 
emotions. In particular, the fact that humans often regard non-verbal behaviour as 
sufficient for the ascription of emotion such as anger to other persons suggests that 
the mastery by them of the concept of anger is not a necessary condition of their 
experiencing this emotion. Thus the strong position needs to explain the above points 
and it is in this respect problematic. Nevertheless, from the weak position it is 
necessary to specify what exactly is being proposed. Armon-Jones (1986) in her 
"Thesis of Constructionism" asks: Is it that some emotions, like non-innate emotions, 
are constituted socio-culturally? Or is it that all emotions are socio-culturally 
influenced to some extent? For Armon-Jones and this thesis, the second position 
seems preferable. This position enables the weak constructivist to demonstrate the 
extent to which both innate and non-innate emotions are socio-culturally influenced, a 
position which is compatible with there being instances of both types in which they 
are innate responses to natural situations. This is the position adopted in this thesis 
and from which emotional changes in people with brain injuries will be considered. 
However, to understand emotion as cognition based and as involving attitudinal 
components it is necessary at this point to delineate briefly the theoretical framework 
on which this weak constructivist position of emotions rests. 
3.7.1. Cognition and attitudes in emotion 
Traditionally, and as Armon-Jones (1986) remarks, philosophers through history have 
equated emotions with passions. Passions were seen as non-cognitive phenomena, 
like sensations and perceptions, impressions named by simple concepts. Like 
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sensations and perceptions, emotions were considered as inner feelings independent 
of their expressions in verbal and physical behaviour. 
This traditional view of emotion was disputed by Wittgenstein (1980) by pointing out 
that this conception of emotion renders inner feelings as absolutely private. For 
Wittgenstein (1980) while not denying their existence, inner feelings are accessible 
since the terms people use to describe them depend upon objective criteria for their 
meaning and justification and hence form part of a shared public knowledge. Equally, 
he argued, emotions and sensations are not the same. Emotions, unlike sensations, are 
about external objects or situations. Expressions like, "I am afraid of something" or "I 
am angry with someone" whereby "something" and "someone" is the object, provide 
the extension of the emotion. Thus, and departing from the traditional view, emotions 
involve something beyond the person or the present state of the person. 
However, while emotions may be dependent upon cognitions, the latter may not be 
enough to generate particular emotions because different emotions can be generated 
by the same cognition (Armon-Jones, 1986). For example, the belief that something is 
upsetting could provoke sadness in someone or anger in someone else. Therefore, 
evaluation and attitude are also involved in the generation of emotion. This point is 
crucial to the constructivist framework as it separates emotions as ontologically 
different to sensations or perceptions. As discussed previously, perceptions, for 
example, can be acquired, but as Merleau-Ponty (1962) indicated, perceptions are 
natural phenomena, which exist prior to the acquisition of any socio-cultural frame of 
reference within which it may be possible to explain them. Furthermore, explaining 
emotion as involving reference to an object or situation enables the constructivist to 
demonstrate the extent to which such situations reflect the beliefs, values and 
expectations of particular cultures and the way in which such situations are used as 
contexts for the acquisition of the culturally appropriate emotion attitudes. 
3.7.2. Physiology, emotion, constructionism and self-awareness 
Perhaps one of the biggest challenges to this constructivist framework is the one 
posed by the physiological argument (Perkins, 1966) and the body of knowledge 
presented by the brain injury literature. In the one hand, Perkins argues that 
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chemically induced autonomic arousal and increased motor activity are biological 
events understood to be basic, innate and involuntary. Thus if these events are 
necessary of a felt emotion, then this limits the scope of the constructivist thesis in 
that it reduces those components of emotion which could be explained as socio- 
culturally constructed. Nevertheless, the constructivist position would argue that even 
if emotion feelings amount to physiological events, this is not inconsistent with 
constructionism since it is the individual's attitudes, themselves socio-culturally 
constituted, which cause the physiological events in question. 
On the other hand, this poses the question of what happens when the mechanisms that 
regulate physiological functions and cognitions malfunction, as it is the case in brain 
injury. To date, neuropsychological and brain injury literature is beset by empirical 
indications of the physiological correlates of emotion (and cognitions and perceptions 
and so on). From either a materialist or a dualist position, researchers work towards 
establishing these neurological correlates and, by implication, speculate about the 
nature of human awareness and consciousness. However, from a social constructivist 
perspective it is difficult to explain emotion in brain injury if the strong constructivist 
framework of emotion as radically constituted by socio-cultural influences is applied 
to the area. This perspective would deny drastically a possible role played by 
physiology in emotions. However, if the weaker position is considered, which this 
thesis subscribes to, the weaker argument being that some emotions may be innate, 
and therefore prior to socio-cultural influences, the physiological role in some 
emotions is not denied and it is then open to further analysis. 
As an aside, it is also necessary to point out here that when the literature on brain 
injury reflects on emotions and the emotional changes observable in individuals who 
have suffered a brain injury, it is rarely the case that it is emotion per se that this 
literature is referring to. As mentioned previously, most of the emotional complaints 
listed in the literature on brain injury seem to refer to the characteriological or 
personality changes of the individual with a brain injury. This is perhaps more to do 
with the pragmatic side of research grouping complaints under one umbrella than to 
any conceptual reason. What is important here however, is that a weak constructivist 
perspective allows this thesis to differentiate between an innate emotion and changes 
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to the self with emotional overtones of a socio-cultural nature. Nevertheless, having 
defined emotion from a weak constructivist position, the question come to the fore of 
how is it that a person can lack self-awareness of his/her own emotions and/or 
his/hers own characteriological changes. Self-awareness of emotions will be dealt 
with here; self-awareness of characteriological changes will be dealt with at a later 
stage. 
3.7.3. Self-awareness and emotion 
The concept of self awareness introduces an element of subjectivity in emotions 
which some authors think is not reducible to belief, desire and judgement but may 
supplement these attitudes (Armon-Jones, 1986). This subjective element, which the 
literature recognises as qualia or feeling itself, is regarded as a distinct phenomenon 
which is evident in the experience of being moved by an emotion but can only be 
described through evocation and metaphor (i. e. what is it like to be ..... 
) and so 
cannot be entirely captured through attitudinal analysis. For example, Leventhal 
(1980) explains that the conceptual system of emotions is a way of representing and 
communicating about feelings but not a representation of feelings themselves. 
Although the concept of qualia may be difficult to integrate into a constructivist 
theory of emotion it cannot be rejected out of hand. Even if the concept of qualia 
casts doubts on the possibility that emotions may be socio-culturally constructed 
(Armon-Jones, 1986) qualia may be integrated into this perspective if they are 
considered as part of and not the sole constituent of emotion. From a philosophical 
perspective, Wittgenstein (1980) for example, remarked that terms for emotions and 
sensations were conceptually related to verbal and physical expressions to which they 
give rise. However, while sensations referred to inner processes, emotion words do 
not. For Wittgenstein, emotion words did not designate anything. In other words, 
neither inner feelings or outer behaviour provide sufficient conditions for interpreting 
emotions. In this way, Wittgenstein criticised theoretical reductions of emotion to 
either pure qualia or physical behaviour. Furthermore, the reason why sensation terms 
are understood as representing inner processes by Wittgenstein is that sensations are 
not perceived to be ontologically different to the expressions to which they give rise. 
Thus, feeling pain cannot be constituted by believing that a person is in pain and the 
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behavioural expressions of pain. Hence Wittgenstein's remark that sensation feelings 
are conceptually related to outward criteria in the form of the appropriate verbal and 
behavioural expressions is a purely semantic remark concerning conditions of 
meaning making for sensation words, not an ontological remark about the existence 
of sensation feelings. 
With reference to emotion words, individuals do not recognise their emotions as a 
consequence to observing their thoughts and behaviours. Rather, and as Wittgenstein 
implies, individuals simply think and behave in an emotional manner such that it is a 
recognition of an emotion and is part of the expression of that emotion. Further, and 
unlike sensations, emotions are identifiable with the experience of those emotions, 
hence these factors are ontologically constitutive of emotion feeling. 
However, while Wittgenstein's remarks seem to focus on outward verbal and 
expressive behaviour, emotions may not necessarily be openly expressed. For 
example, on one hand a person who is expressing anger can convey these feelings to 
the person or object responsible for that anger via spoken appraisals or can behave in 
a violent manner towards them. On the other hand, the person may not express anger, 
in which case the attitudes and behaviour remain undisplayed. This does not mean 
that the person does not feel angry. On the contrary, in this second instance linguistic 
and behavioural expression does not represent inner feeling as far as overt expression 
can be a refined version of the inner feeling. The covert expressed emotion is a mode 
of experiencing the emotion which shares the same features as the overtly expressed 
emotion (Armon-Jones, 1986). Furthermore, the overt expression of emotion can be 
regarded as a communicative act with particular consequences. Overt anger can lead 
to appeasement attempts from others and to assuming responsibility for feeling that 
anger. By comparison, covert emotion can remain ambiguous and consequently more 
amenable to self-deception. If the individual suppresses outwards signs of feelings of 
anger then it is easier to pretend or persuade himself/herself that these do not exist, or 
indeed, that he or she is not really feeling angry. Both modes though must be 
understood as constitutive of emotion just as the consequences of overt and covert 
emotion may enhance or diminish feeling. That is, overt anger may be intensified 
through, for example, provoking a fight or it may be "bottled up" and left to grow in 
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intensity. Overt anger can also diminish if for example, the agent responsible for 
causing the individual's anger manages to reason the individual out of the emotion, 
"talk him out of it", while the individual can reason himself/herself out of it as well. 
Nevertheless, if to feel these emotions is either to express overtly or entertain 
inwardly the relevant attitudes, then how can this account help explain emotions 
following a brain injury? To be more precise, how can this framework help explain 
the lack of awareness of emotional changes observed in people with brain injuries? To 
answer this question it is necessary to know first how individuals identify their own 
emotions. Some writers on emotion argue that people learn about their own emotions 
through the interpretation of behaviour and the use of psychological concepts 
(Bedford, 1986) thus denying the role of introspection in knowing emotional states. 
Bedford explains that it is hardly possible for an individual to be completely ignorant, 
as others may be, of the context of his/her own behaviour. Thoughts may cross the 
individual's mind but these may not be made public. It is only in some respects, 
according to this author, that each of us is in a much better position to understand the 
self than anyone else is. Further, Bedford points to the fact that humans make 
mistakes about their own emotions. He exemplifies this observation with the case of 
individuals who feel jealous and how those who are jealous are often the last, instead 
of the first, to recognise that they are. In a similar vein, Laird (1989) assumes that 
feelings are a kind of knowledge about ourselves in the same way that others know 
about us. People know their own attitudes, desires and emotional feelings by a kind of 
nonconscious observation and interpretation of our action and the context in which 
we act. 
However, while this may ring true for some emotions, like Bedford's jealousy, it may 
not be true of all emotions at all times. It is argued here that these explanations of 
how we know emotions need to take into account experiential (conscious and non- 
conscious) states as well. Emotions can be qualitative, experiential states to which an 
individual can turn his/her attention. Armon-Jones (1986) argues that emotions need 
to be vivid, serious and all consuming to induce the person to be moved by them. By 
vividness, the author refers to cognitive components of emotion, such as memory, as 
it is not possible to feel emotional about something that may be vaguely remembered. 
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In reference to seriousness, Armon-Jones explains this term as an attitudinal 
component of emotion and as the level of intensity to which the emotion refers. In 
other words, individuals cannot feel about something that just requires a passing 
acknowledgement. Finally, all consuming is the term used by the author to refer to the 
subjective element of emotion. In this case, the author argues that the collection of 
thoughts or memories and acknowledgements needs to occupy greatly or totally the 
individual's attention. Thus this inner array of events described constitute emotions 
which can be conveyed via language and behaviour, if they cannot be conveyed, the 
author argues, this is because "they are barely a feeling"(Armon-Jones, 1986, p. 50). 
Therefore, it could be argued, that for a person to know his or her own emotions the 
person's attention must be turned inwards. That is, towards the array of memories and 
acknowledgements with preoccupation. Then the object of attention, the emotion, can 
be interpreted and thus expressed overtly or entertained covertly. Empirical evidence 
for the effect of this attention or private self-awareness seems to support this process. 
Fejfar and Hoyle (2000) conducted a meta-analysis to examine the effect of private 
self-awareness on affect and attributions of responsibility to the self The results 
showed that there is an association between private self-awareness and emotion and 
that private self-awareness increases rather than produces existing emotion. 
Therefore, and having emphasised the role of experience, cognition, attitude and 
introspection in emotions this framework is used in this thesis to understand the lack 
of awareness of emotion observed in individuals who have suffered a brain injury. The 
thesis does not deny the possibility that physiological malfunction may contribute to 
this particular lack of awareness. Instead, it argues that the phenomenon, when 
emotions are not understood as being solely produced physiologically, may be 
explained in the same manner as emotions are explained in the non-brain injured. The 
fact that the brain injury may affect cognitive functions which, in turn, may interfere 
with emotions is a valid consideration. However, this consideration is one that does 
not stop the thesis from viewing people with brain injuries as knowing their emotions 
in the same way as non-brain injured individuals do. 
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3.7.4. Summary 
Emotional difficulties is a term used in the brain injury literature as a general label to 
encapsulate a variety of observed characteriological changes in individuals who have 
sustained a brain injury. However, these observed characteriological changes do not 
always describe emotion. Emotions have been discussed here as a socially prescribed 
set of responses to be followed by a person in a given situation. This radical 
alternative to naturalist theories of emotion, from a weak position of social 
constructivism, concedes only a limited range of innate emotion responses. Equally, 
under this framework, emotions have been seen as generated by cognitions and 
attitudes and ontologically different to sensations and perceptions. 
Further, emotions have been discussed as behaviours and as experiential states. As 
behaviours, emotions are a kind of knowledge about the self in the same way that 
others know about us. People know about their emotional feelings by a kind of 
nonconscious observation and interpretation of their own actions and the context of 
the actions. As experiential states, emotions are qualitative states, conscious and 
nonconscious, to which an individual can turn his or her attention. However, for an 
individual to know his or her own emotions, it has been discussed, the individual's 
attention must be turn inwards. In both cases, as with the body and cognition 
previously, emotion as behaviour and emotion as an experiential state can be the 
subject of social interchange. 
3.8. OVERALL SUMMARY 
So far, awareness has been seen as part of a weak social constructivist theory of 
consciousness derived from symbolic interactionism and accessible by self-reflection. 
The theory is weak because the body, cognitions and emotions are considered and 
have been discussed, in relation to their occasional pre-eminence to awareness and as 
both objects and agents. As objects, they can be used by the individual in self- 
reflection and communication. As agents, they can also be used as the contents of 
social interaction. In addition, regarding the body, cognitions and emotions as agents 
helps to understand the self as active and not as a mere passive recipient of feedback 
from the social world. The symbolic interactionist tenet of personal identity being 
negotiated during social interaction has then been widened to incorporate an inner or 
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self awareness that can help explain how it is that private individuals can emerge from 
socially created contexts. On this note, the discussion will turn to how the subject of 
the self has been treated in the brain injury literature and will emphasise the role of the 
other in brain injury. 
3.9. THE SELF IN BRAIN INJURY 
The scant literature that exists on the subject of the self in brain injury refers mainly to 
how organic impairment affects the self. While some authors seek to find the 
correlates of brain injury and personality changes (Stuss, Gow and Hetherington, 
1992), others seek to address how the self is preserved after a brain injury (Morse and 
O'Brien, 1995), how the self interprets the brain injury (Nochi, 1997) or whether the 
self is lost when the individual suffers from a brain affliction (Tappen, Williams, 
Fishman and Touhy, 1999). For example, patients with Alzheimer's disease, who also 
experience lack of awareness of difficulties (Bohling, 1991), are said to experience a 
diminishing self (McGowin, 1993). Complaints from spouses about their Alzheimer's 
disease partners (Jenkings and Price, 1996) and the assumption of nursing staff in 
residential homes that the patients experience life as meaningless (Norberg and 
Asplund, 1990) all seem to support the idea of a lost self However, Tappen, 
Williams, Fishman and Touhy (1999), in a qualitative study offer evidence for a 
persistence of self even into the middle and late stages of Alzheimer's disease. These 
authors observe that failure to recognise this continuing awareness of the self leads 
caring others to concentrate on task-orientating care and low expectations in 
therapeutic interventions. Furthermore, Tappen, Williams, Fishman and Touhy 
(1999), argue that the victims of Alzheimer's disease need to be told and be offered 
explanations about their condition. 
Arguably, Alzheimer's disease is a degenerative disorder while brain injury is not and 
recovery or some recovery of function is possible (cognitive functions in particular) 
following brain injury. Comparisons may be limited here but the emphasis placed in 
the role of communication by Tappen, Williams, Fishman and Touhy (1999), in their 
study is also relevant to this thesis. Thus the need to account for the role of the other. 
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3.9.1. The other in brain injury 
If the development of the self depends partly on the views of others the way these 
views are transmitted, received, interpreted and acted upon may be crucial for the 
development of awareness of difficulties following brain injury. The development of 
this awareness may be influenced by the accurate perception of how others see us 
which, in turn, depends on open communication. However, according to Shrauger 
and Schoeneman (1979), incongruences between self-appraisals and others' appraisals 
are often due to strong cultural sanctions against making direct appraisals, especially 
if these are of a negative nature. Goffman in 1955 had already observed that negative 
evaluations are only given when directly solicited, and then, if they have been solicited 
it is because negative self-appraisals have already been carried out. Empirical 
evidence though shows that people tend to inhibit direct communication of all types 
to others, particularly if it is of the negative type or if the recipient is not well known 
(Blumberg, 1972). In clinical settings, however, where there is an expectancy of 
information given to patients, it was found that when more information was given and 
when this was more understandable to the patient, this was associated with a greater 
wariness of the treatments available (Edwards, Elwyn, Covey, Matthews and Pill, 
2001). 
Generally though, and as mentioned previously, it is said that individuals are 
necessarily selective in what they attend to, remember, learn or infer in a given 
situation (Markus, 1977). This selectivity has been seen to depend on internal 
cognitive structures that allow the individual to process incoming information. In the 
literature these structures are called "frames" (Minsky, 1975), "scripts" (Abelson, 
1975) and "schemata" (Tesser and Conlee, 1975). Attempts to organise and explain a 
person's own behaviour have been called "self-schemata" (Markus, 1977). Self- 
schemata, according to Markus, are constructed from information processed in the 
past and influence both input and output of information connected to the self They 
depict the way the self has been differentiated and articulated in memory and once 
established, they function as selective mechanisms. Self-schemata determine what 
information is attended to, how it is structured and how much importance is attached 
to it. Moreover, and although the empirical evidence offers wide support for the 
concept of self-schemata (Markus, 1977), the concept does not explain the 
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persistence of inaccurate beliefs about the self. Lepper, Ross and Lau (1986) argue 
that, sometimes, the impressions an individual forms about the self are inaccurate or 
unfounded. Under such circumstances, the individual may be challenged to update 
those impressions in view of subsequent outcomes and new insights. Failure to 
assimilate new information would promote erroneous self-assessments and potentially 
dysfunctional decisions. Empirical evidence for this speculation shows that initial 
impressions and beliefs are considerably resistant to subsequent logical and empirical 
challenges (Ross and Leper, 1980). This evidence also shows that individuals' first 
impressions, in laboratory experiments at least, tend to be lasting and new information 
that appears to disprove previously formed beliefs is given little weight (Lord, Ross 
and Lepper, 1979). Further, even thoroughly debriefing participants about deceptive 
feedback may not suffice to undo the effects of deceptive information (Anderson, 
Lepper and Ross, 1980). 
This last point underlies the importance of the way information, especially information 
that refers to the self, is interpreted. Shrauger and Schoeneman, (1979) for example, 
observe that people differ in their interpretation of others' feedback, particularly if the 
feedback is not explicit. The authors point to the individual's agency in interpreting 
feedback and to how this feedback is given more importance according to the status 
of the person that imparts the appraisal. Research from the social cognition field adds 
to this idea by pointing out that speakers status and memory play a significant role 
when interpreting information. Holtgraves, Srull and Socall (1989) investigated in 
three different experiments how speakers' status affected memory of assertiveness. 
They found that under certain conditions the remarks of a perceived high status 
speaker were remembered as more assertive than those made by a perceived lower 
status speaker. These researchers provide evidence for the existence of a relation 
between how information is communicated (in this case assertiveness) and one 
interpersonal variable (speaker status). Furthermore, Holtgraves, Srull and Socall 
explain that their results demonstrate how social knowledge is implicated in the 
interpretation of communication. By this they mean that they have made explicit the 
assumption that many aspects of knowledge cannot be understood apart from the 
context in which the communication occurs (Levinson, 1983). In other words, what 
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can be taken as a suggestion if spoken by a low status speaker can be constructed as a 
command if spoken by a higher status speaker. 
Thus, it can be seen that how information is interpreted depends, to some extent, on 
the importance given to the speaker. In addition, more recent research indicates that 
how relevant the information is made to be is also a factor in the interpretation of 
information from others (Garcia, Metthe, Paradis and Joanette, 2001). Conversation 
involves a collaborative process, usually between two people, whose target is to 
identify and respond to each other's intentions (Grice, 1975). To uncover this target 
inferential processes must be at work in order to get at the true message and only 
then can relevant contributions be made (in social constructivist terms, this idea 
would be referred to as the meaning-making process (Carlsen, 1996)). 
According to Bach and Harnish (1979) the conversational partner's goal is to convey 
an intended meaning to the hearer. Garcia, Metthe, Paradis and Joanette (2001), 
argue that when communication lacks coherence, as in many cases after neurological 
impairment, the responsibility of determining relevance lies entirely on the healthy 
conversational partner. This is also likely to be true when "the partner with a 
neurological impairment is unable to identify the healthy speaker's intentions due to an 
incapacity to use contextual information" (p. 18). 
Nevertheless, identifying the speaker's intention is only one step. Judgements about 
the relevance of the content of the conversation must be made in order for a 
conversation to take place. Garcia, et al (2001) explain that the collection of such 
information depends on certain cognitive capacities, like attention and memory, which 
may not be entirely intact in certain populations with brain damage. When this 
happens, the healthy conversational partner may need to compensate for the speaker 
with the neurological impairment so that relevance may predominate. However, 
Sperber and Wilson (1986) propose that a speaker is interested in communicating 
only what the hearer needs to know to make his or her message relevant. And, 
according to Sanders (1983), what is relevant depends entirely on the hearer's ability 
and willingness to infer or invent a reason for the speaker's having made the 
statement. 
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In brain injury, what is relevant and how it is explained is important when examining 
the discourse abilities of the neurologically impaired. Empirical evidence shows that 
different types of brain injury affect discourse abilities differently. Patients with right 
hemisphere damage on one hand, are known to have very few problems with the 
content of communications but significant problems with communicative abilities 
(Tompkins, 1995). Patients with traumatic brain injury on the other hand, have been 
found to show irrelevant conversational discourse. Coelho (1995) carried out a study 
on a traumatic brain injured sample and found that subjects with traumatic brain injury 
were most impaired at global coherence levels. These subjects were judged difficult 
conversational partners and were found frequently to rely on their partners to 
maintain the coherence of the conversations. Coelho, Liles and Duffy (1991) detected 
that the conversations of subjects with traumatic brain injury had more irrelevant 
comments in them and that as a consequence, more explicit requests for responses 
were being made on the listener. Furthermore, Gajar, Schloss, Schloss and Thompson 
(1984) found that feedback from the listener was crucial in producing positive 
conversational behaviours. 
This feedback is of particular relevance to this thesis not only because of the effect it 
may have on the conversational behaviour of people with brain injuries but because of 
the information that it can carry. Arguably, if adults affected by brain injury appear 
unaware of their difficulties, the kind of information they receive, how it is 
transmitted and by whom may all enter into the process of gaining awareness of their 
difficulties. 
3.10. SUMMARY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Chapter Two highlighted the neurological, neuropsychological and psychological 
explanations that are given for the phenomenon of lack of awareness of difficulties 
following a brain injury. The chapter then hinted at an independence of self-awareness 
from neurological impairment. In this chapter a social constructionism theory of 
consciousness based on symbolic interactionism with a "weak" orientation, was 
outlined for analysing lack of awareness of difficulties. The central question for social 
constructionism is what is the self or what is the person; that is, how are identities 
constructed? Therefore, it is necessary to examine the discourses or messages which 
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are received by the individual in the social context and the messages which may not 
originate in the social context, like bodily perceptions, but may form part of the 
contents of awareness. Following Burns and Engdahl, the messages are received by 
individuals who in turn absorb and interpret them, suggesting a two-stage process for 
understanding lack of awareness of difficulties. The first stage comprises the 
messages that are given. The second stage concerns the recipient or the interpretation 
of these messages. 
Brain injury can affect all sorts of individuals in a variety of contexts. The messages 
given by societies to people with brain injuries include: 
-Messages given by medical personnel and rehabilitation staff (which will not be the 
subject of this thesis as the participants in the research are year/s away from the 
clinical and rehabilitation settings) 
-messages given by significant others or close to the individual social environment 
-messages given by non-expert health professionals as daily carers of people with 
brain injuries. 
These, then, are some of the messages sent to people with brain injuries. The research 
presented here asks, "Does social interaction increase awareness of difficulties? " and 
comprises three studies. Study One is divided into two parts. Part 1 asks if people 
with brain injuries know about their injuries and subsequent difficulties. Part 2 
investigates how significant others explain difficulties to the patients. The research 
looks at people with brain injuries within a community setting, years after the brain 
injury has occurred and official rehabilitation efforts have ceased. 
Following this first study a Second Study was conducted with the brain injured 
participants. This study asks how the participants' knowledge of their difficulties is 
constructed and how this knowledge is used for understanding the implications of 
their difficulties. 
A Third Study was conducted with non-expert health professionals at two day care 
centres that the brain injured patients participating in this research attend. This study 
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inquires how difficulties that can be experienced following a brain injury are 
understood, communicated and dealt with by this staff. 
Finally, having discussed the theoretical issues underpinning the present investigation, 
and having defined the research questions, the following chapter will continue with a 
discussion of the methodological paradigm underlying the research. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCHING LACK OF AWARENESS IN BRAIN INJURY: 
THE METHODOLOGY 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the double aim of this thesis is: a) to explore the 
messages people with brain injuries receive with respect of their difficulties in their 
everyday social interactions and, b) to explore the processes by which they construct 
their brain injury, subsequent difficulties and implications. In Chapter Two, it was 
hinted that the level of awareness of difficulties might be independent from 
neurological impairment. In Chapter Three, it was argued that self-awareness is a 
product of social interaction and reflection. 
This chapter considers the assumptions and implications of some of the methods most 
commonly used to study the degree of awareness of brain injury and discusses their 
limitations. It then describes the philosophical framework within which the work in 
the present thesis has been undertaken. The constructionist ontological position 
(assumptions about the nature of reality) already outlined in Chapter Three will be 
explored further here. The constructionism epistemological position (how reality is 
known) will also be explored. This will demonstrate that the methodology or theory 
of method, and methods used are congruent within the chosen paradigm. A paradigm 
according to Patton (1978) is: 
"A world view, a general perspective, a way of breaking down the complexity of the 
real world. As such, paradigms are deeply embedded in the socialisation of adherents 
and practitioners: paradigms tell them what is important, legitimate and reasonable. 
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Paradigms are also normative, telling the practitioner what to do without the 
necessity of long existential or epistemological consideration. " (p. 203) 
It is important that the ontological and epistemological positions underlying any 
research are made explicit. It is important since the common assumptions and 
academically accepted paradigms of times gone by (like the positivist paradigm), 
arguably, no longer hold in the terrain of the social sciences, if indeed they ever were. 
The research design, the definition of the concepts, and the type of evidence sought 
are all heavily influenced by the epistemological position adopted by the researcher; it 
is thus consequential that this be made explicit. The second section of this chapter 
therefore will concentrate on the epistemological position on which this research is 
based. 
The choice of exploring awareness of brain injury by talking to the people most 
affected by it will be justified and the two analytical procedures employed to examine 
their accounts will also be explained. The chapter concludes with a consideration of 
the credibility of the work undertaken. 
4.2. SOME METHODS IN AWARENESS OF BRAIN INJURY: 
LIMITATIONS, ASSUMPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCHING 
LACK OF AWARENESS AFTER BRAIN INJURY 
Research into lack of awareness of difficulties following brain injury has, to date, been 
inconclusive and contradictory. What consensus exists in the literature on this subject 
refers to: a) lack of conclusive evidence on whether awareness of difficulties is due to 
organic impairment or psychological impairment and that, b) regardless of the cause, 
lack of awareness of difficulties usually follows brain injury. The literature also agrees 
in that awareness of difficulties is important at the time of rehabilitation. Attempts to 
measure awareness and responses to awareness interventions present more dilemmas 
than offer answers. This chapter considers some of the methods used in research of 
awareness of difficulties following a brain injury, their limitations, assumptions and 
implications while suggesting qualitative methods as better ways to gain an insider's 
perspective of the phenomena. 
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4.2.1. In the beginning 
It is widely accepted in the literature of awareness of difficulties following brain injury 
that the aetiology of the phenomenon is largely unknown (Prigatano, 1991). It is also 
accepted that awareness of difficulties is usually observed following a brain injury 
(Prigatano, 1999) and that it can be the deciding factor between successful or 
unsuccessful rehabilitation (Ponsford, 1995). An individual who is not aware of the 
difficulties caused by a brain injury may be resistant to treatment or reluctant to 
implement the strategies offered during rehabilitation. 
To investigate awareness of difficulties following brain injury researchers have 
focused on different factors ranging from severity of injury, time since injury to social 
psychological analysis, neuropsychological analysis, intensive rehabilitation and 
coping with environmental demands (Crisp, 1992). This focusing on one or a few 
factors, together with the different methodological designs employed to study them 
has meant that discrepancies and inconclusive results litter this particular field of 
study (Crisp, 1992). A closer look at this state of affairs will illustrate the point. 
Research on awareness of difficulties following brain injury can be divided into two 
areas: attempts to assess awareness of difficulties and measurement of responses to 
awareness interventions. Both areas use patients verbal reports and interpretations of 
certain aspects of the patients' behaviour, amongst others, as sources from which to 
infer awareness (Sohlberg, Mateer, Penkman, Glang and Todis, 1998). 
4.2.2. How has awareness of difficulties been measured? 
According to Deaton (1986) and Fleming, Strong and Ashton (1996b) the literature 
presents three ways to measure awareness of difficulties following brain injury. These 
are. differences between patients' self-ratings of their functions and those made by 
their relatives, differences between self-ratings and those made by rehabilitation staff, 
and estimates of patients abilities and performance on neuropsychological tests (for a 
comprehensive review please see Fleming, Strong and Ashton, 1996b). 
Differences between patients' self-ratings and a relative/rehabilitation staff are usually 
found by asking the patient and relative or rehabilitation staff to rate the ease with 
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which the individual is able to perform certain functional activities. The most widely 
used measure, the Patient Competency Rating Scale (PCRS)(Prigatano, 1986), for 
example, asks the patient and relative/rehabilitation staff for ratings on a five point 
Likert scale on how easy or difficult it is to perform 30 different behavioural tasks. 
The scale covers the areas of functional ability, interpersonal skills and emotional 
status and is considered a useful and reliable instrument for self-awareness research. 
Similarly, the Head Injury Behaviour scale (RIBS) (Godfrey, Partridge and Knight, 
1993) asks the patient and a significant other to rate, on a four point Likert scale, 
how much of a problem it is to perform a particular behaviour and how much distress 
it causes. On both scales comparisons between the patients' self-ratings and the 
ratings given by a family member or a member of the staff rehabilitation team are 
meant to give an indication of the patient's self-awareness. 
In the same fashion, it is usual to quantify awareness of difficulties by comparing the 
patients' self-reports of abilities with performance on neuropsychological tests. 
Prigatano and Altman (1990) found no relationship between neuropsychological 
scores and subject's own estimated behavioural limitations and concluded that 
neuropsychological instruments did not adequately measure lack of awareness. This is 
not surprising if it is considered that neuropsychological tests are constructed to 
measure intellectual impairment only. 
Other instruments that are used to quantify awareness are questionnaires and 
structured interviews. Some of these questionnaires gather data from the patient's 
point of view, like the Change Assessment Questionnaire (CAQ) (Lam, McMahon 
and Priddy, 1988) or from the perspective of a family member, like the Katz 
Adjustment Scale (KAS) (Fordyce, Roueche and Prigatano, 1983). Structured 
interviews have been rarely used and offer an alternative way of collecting 
quantitative data by given responses which are scored according to a rating scale 
(Cutting, 1978; Bisiach, Vallar, Perani, Papagno and Berti, 1986). 
Although these methods suffer from certain limitations, which will be discussed later 
in this paper, some researchers have tried to surpass these limitations by developing 
methods for assessing awareness through more naturalistic enquiries. In a prospective 
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study, Hart, Giovannetti, Montgomery and Schwartz (1998) developed a method for 
assessing "on-line" error detection and correction during performance of naturalistic 
actions. Two groups of 18 participants each, 18 with traumatic brain injury and 18 
controls performed two tests of naturalistic action. Subjects were asked to complete 
everyday activities, like making toast or wrapping a gift, at different levels of 
complexity. Using a specially developed coding system, each error on the tasks was 
scored as to whether the participant corrected it and whether the participant had 
demonstrated awareness of the error. Scores were also compared to participants' 
responses on a questionnaire in which they had estimated their own performance. 
According to the authors, the study showed that error detection and correction could 
be reliably measured during naturalistic enquiry. 
4.2.3. How have responses to awareness interventions been studied? 
The methods employed to assess changes in awareness of difficulties following 
awareness interventions are very similar to the ones used for assessing awareness of 
difficulties. The scant literature on awareness interventions has been reviewed in 
detail by Sohlberg, Mateer, Penkman, Glang and Todis (1998). The authors have 
found that awareness interventions are usually studied by either comparing 
participant's self-reports with those of a relative/rehabilitation staff or through 
comparing estimated abilities made by the patient with performance on a task/test 
scores. 
Both methods infer the level of awareness of difficulty change by analysing the 
observed differences between two sources. More recent research though suggests 
that self-report-performance methods may prove more useful to the clinician treating 
awareness of difficulties (Schlund, 1999). Self-report-performance draws attention to 
the subject's verbal report and the behaviour of interest in the rehabilitation setting. 
For example, Schlund (1999) studied the relation between self-reporting and 
remembering. Data collected over a number of therapy sessions were used to examine 
the effects of practice and feedback on reporting recall. The results of this study 
indicate that self-report-performance methods capture the relations of interest within 
a rehabilitation setting. In addition, feedback and review all contribute to altering 
awareness levels. 
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4.2.4. Limitations of the methods 
Fleming et al (1996b) have listed three limitations that the use of quantitative methods 
impose on the awareness of difficulties research. First, questionnaires and structured 
interviews, the authors explain, rely mainly on the individual's ability to understand 
verbal or written questions and to be able to verbalise that understanding. Second, 
questionnaires and structured interviews only evaluate intellectual awareness. As 
previous research indicates (Crosson, Barco and Veloza, 1989), people with brain 
injuries first develop the ability to acknowledge intellectually that certain difficulties 
exist. Questionnaires and structured interviews give partial information. Thus, there 
are tests for memory function, attention, language function, and the like. Cognitive 
functions are not independent of one another in natural everyday life. Rather, in the 
course of daily social interaction and experience, a range of cognitive functions is 
called for simultaneously. Thus, there may be considerable differences between the 
cognitive function as measured by tests and that revealed in everyday life. 
Third, the emphasis on verbal accounts only may result in behavioural aspects of 
awareness going unobserved. Deaton (1986) has indicated that some patients who 
show little awareness of their difficulties still participate appropriately in treatment. 
Further to these three points, some authors have indicated that it is dangerous to rely 
on others' perceptions when researching awareness of difficulties (Prigatano, 1996; 
McKinley and Brooks, 1984). The others' perceptions may not be reliable (McKinley 
and Brooks, 1984) and as Tyerman and Humphrey (1984) have pointed out, what is 
at stake here is the subjective impairment of the person, not the others' perception of 
such impairment. 
One final limitation is the fact that through the above approaches, one never really 
comes to understand people with brain injuries in their totality as persons living in the 
world. What are known are the scores in certain standardised tests of particular 
functions and the dysfunctions that are thereby revealed. Therefore, what is being 
investigated is how the brain injury affects a series of neurological functions as 
opposed to how it affects individuals living in the world. 
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4.2.5. Assumptions and implications underlying the methods 
As has been seen, the methods developed to assess awareness and measure awareness 
interventions have relied on a variety of sources. These sources range from the use of 
verbal reports of the patients, to the measure of a behaviour that implies awareness, 
to the perception of others of a victim's awareness, to the perception of others about 
behaviour that implies awareness. These investigations of awareness of difficulties 
following brain injury, in turn, rely on various assumptions. First is the assumption 
that awareness can be measured. Second is the assumption that patients' perceptions 
may be distorted and unreliable. Third, the use of self-report and perceptual data as a 
measurement of awareness assumes that perceptions are amenable to change if there 
is an underlying improvement in awareness (Sohlberg, Mateer, Penkman, Glang and 
Todis, 1998). Fourth, the use of behavioural observation as an indicator of a change 
in awareness assumes that it is possible to identify behaviours that are dependent on 
intact awareness (Sohlberg, Mateer, Penkman, Glang and Todis, 1998). 
These assumptions have serious implications and need a more careful examination: 
First, measuring awareness directly is difficult and has been done by inferring 
psychological and behavioural correlates (Sohlberg, Mateer, Penkman, Glang and 
Todis, 1998). Some of these correlates have been identified and used to develop 
methods that can be valid and reliable at the time of assessing the nature of awareness 
of difficulties. The problem is that no method may account for all the correlates that 
enter awareness. These correlates are, in research, static indicators of awareness that 
narrow down such research (Sohlberg, Mateer, Penkman, Glang and Todis, 1998) 
and consider awareness of difficulties as a single entity (Derouesne, Thibault, Lagha- 
Pierucci, Badouin-Madec, Ancri and Lacomblez, 1999). 
Acknowledging this problem some authors have suggested that global measures be 
used instead (Fleming et al., 1996b). If this was the case, it is argued here, global 
measures would still be too narrow as they are constructed on these static indicators 
of the phenomenon which occlude seeing awareness as a process. In other words, 
they would still seek to see how brain injury affects a series of functions as opposed 
to how it affects the everyday living of the people with brain injuries. 
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Furthermore, the objective of developing methodology to assess awareness of 
difficulties following brain injury is to be able to find instruments that validly and 
reliably can assess awareness of difficulties across clinical practices. This tendency to 
want to generalise is an underpinning from the positivist paradigm that characterises 
most research in psychology (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The assumption is that what 
is true for a group of people in one time and in one place needs to be true for other 
people in another time and another place. This assumption is very risky when studying 
brain injury for two reasons. First, trying to generalise may make the researcher 
overlook the clinical recommendations that people with brain injuries should be 
treated as single cases (Brooks, 1988). Second, it gives brain injury a uniformity that 
is not characteristic of brain injury. Banja (1999) for example, on talking about 
medical decisions that rely on assessing patient's degree of ability to communicate, 
understand reason, and exercise insight, notes that difficulties based in organically 
mental dysfunction are "spotty, patchy and inconsistent" (p. 422) or in Brooks (1988) 
own words "each patient has to be treated as an individual" (p. 42). 
Second, to assume in awareness of difficulties research that the views of the patient 
are distorted and unreliable has epistemological implications. It is a common clinical 
and research method to assume a division between the knower-researcher/clinician 
and the known-patient. Many reports indicate that participants provide inconsistent or 
biased information (Allen and Ruff, 1990) and that the reliability of subjects self 
report is doubtful as an indicator to the level of awareness (Sohlberg, Mateer, 
Penkman, Glang and Todis, 1998). 
This begs the question, when assessing awareness, how much awareness the 
researcher believes the patient should have? The assumption here is that cognitively 
unimpaired and judgementally intact people are aware. Researchers also forget that 
cognitively unimpaired and judgementally intact people can often be seen to make 
foolish and uninsightful decisions and choices. Equally, to assume that aware people 
behave reasonably, if reasonably is understood as choosing non-risk behaviours, is to 
inject research with value-laden connotations. That is, if the researcher understands 
aware people to be reasonable (i. e., reasonable people plan for the future, do not 
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gamble, and control their emotions) the participants will have to adopt such standards 
or demonstrate that they already have them. 
Value-laden research is rendered doubtful, according to Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
when the values that guide the investigations are not explicitly recognised by the 
researchers. Lincoln and Guba argue that researchers are not usually conscious of 
their own predispositions and that these are rarely examined systematically. In fact, 
the authors claim, accepting the position that research can be value-free brings about 
"numerous undesirable consequences" (p. 173). Amongst these numerous undesirable 
consequences what Lincoln and Guba call "the veil of objectivity" is perhaps the most 
relevant to this point. This refers to the belief held by some researchers that 
methodology guarantees objectivity, that is, it removes all possible contamination 
from value positions. This belief leads the researcher to overlook other possible 
perspectives and to run the risk of being fair to different points of view. If there is 
only one objective perspective, then, no others are worth considering. Lincoln and 
Guba explain that if knowledge is recognised as interested, then, a new imperative 
emerges for the researchers guidance. Once aware of the value implications implicit in 
the research, the researcher is under moral compulsion to take them into account. 
Similarly, Murray and Chamberlain (1999) argue that the research situation is 
constructed in interaction between researcher and researched. The researcher cannot 
be value-free and facts as well as theory are necessarily value-laden. Furthermore, the 
participants of research are seen as equally involved in these constructions through 
the interaction of their expectations and activities with those of the researcher. 
Murray and Chamberlain propose that any piece of research is constrained to be a 
construction determined by the possibilities and limitations of the environment, social 
and historical context. In which case, it is impossible for the researcher to adopt a 
value-free perspective and for the phenomenon under investigation to be separated 
from its context. Thus, in awareness of difficulties following brain injury, it is argued 
here, researchers dismiss too quickly what their participants have to contribute. By 
taking the view that the reliability of patients self-reports are doubtful indicators of 
their level of awareness, researchers are failing to see that they, themselves, are fixing 
a prerequisite level of awareness for their participants. 
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Third, to assume that perceptions change if awareness improves can imply that 
awareness causes perception. This implication may be seen as misleading awareness 
of difficulties research if and when other research into awareness and consciousness is 
considered. In fact, most literature and research into awareness and consciousness 
state that it is perception that causes or at least, correlates with, awareness and 
consciousness, not the other way round. Experiments in the neurophysiological 
sciences (see Libet, 1996, for a review), for example, show that conscious awareness 
of an input does not arise until at least 200 milliseconds (ms) after stimuli arrive at the 
cortical surface. The suggestion that consciousness of input is preceded by a period of 
preconscious processing is also supported by cognitive research. In information 
processing terms a stimulus has to be transformed into neural code, analysed and 
matched to memory traces before it can be identified (Neely, 1977). Complex stimuli, 
like sentences, also demand syntactic and semantic analysis and interpretation of 
meaning in verbal and physical context (Velmans, 1999). 
Equally, the literature states that many cognitive functions can still happen without 
either awareness or consciousness. A classical example would be that of "blindsight" 
produced by striate cortex lesions (Weiskrantz, 1986). In this case, individuals can 
direct their attention to an input stimulus, describe some of its properties and make 
correct identification responses. What they cannot do is experience the stimulus to 
which they are attending. 
In addition, and as already discussed in Chapter Three, Tulving in 1985 offered 
clinical observations made on an amnesia patient and suggested that conscious 
awareness is a "necessary correlate" (p. 5) of episodic memory. Tulving (1985) 
observed that his patient could learn a variety of new skills but could not remember 
anything. In the same vein, Glisky and Schacter (1989) did also offer evidence for 
learning without awareness. This study showed that, information that is not present to 
consciousness at the time of learning may update long-term memory and influence 
performance but may not be available for later recognition and recall. 
In terms that are more philosophical, the arguments are also in favour of cognitive 
activity preceding awareness and consciousness. Velmans (1999) indicated that 
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perception, memory, thinking and judgement could all occur without consciousness. 
Velmans (1999) argues that consciousness is the result of perceptual processes. If 
these perceptual processes do not operate, the world as experienced by the individual 
ceases to exist. Similarly, Giorgi (1995) maintains that humans sometimes learn 
incidentally but do not know about this learning until they realise that they have done 
so. This realisation only comes when one becomes aware of consciousness itself or of 
its contents: ideas, images, memories, feelings and so on. 
Fourth and finally, the use of behavioural observation as an indicator of a change in 
awareness assumes that there are behaviours that are dependent on intact awareness. 
The implication here being that "if you can't see it from the outside it doesn't exist! " 
(Velmans, 1996, p. 186). This assumption underlies the strong tendency of researchers 
to take a more behavioural approach to the study of awareness of difficulties 
following brain injury. This tendency has been criticised by Sohlberg, Mateer, 
Penkman, Glang and Todis, (1998). Sohlberg et al. (1998) in a study that examined a 
variety of awareness indicators in three individuals with brain damage found a 
disassociation between behavioural and perceptual indices of awareness. The authors 
argue that a prerequisite level of awareness is not necessary, as currently believed, to 
utilise adequate compensatory strategies following brain injury. Sohlberg et al suggest 
that people with brain injuries can be trained to use compensatory strategies even in 
cases where the patients do not understand why or believe that they need them. In 
fact, the lack of awareness of difficulties may indeed prevent them from inquiring why 
they need to use the strategies. The authors conclude that for some patients it may be 
more productive to tap into implicit learning than into declarative knowledge as to 
why these strategies are important. 
However, the most interesting finding made in this study was the inconsistency of the 
observers. Sohlberg et al. (1998) made use of caregivers ratings of subject's abilities 
on a global measure of each participant level of awareness. The observers, who 
collectively had chosen behaviours that they felt would indicate improved awareness, 
when those behaviours improved, did not indicate improvement in their global ratings 
of awareness. The observers did not link awareness with learning but instead they 
appeared to have linked awareness with open admission of impairments. 
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In this naturalistic enquiry, the researchers did not take into consideration that when 
observing a conduct the caregivers or observers appointed to rate the level of 
awareness of the participants were bringing their own preconceptions to the study. To 
increase their judged level of awareness they were expecting a causal explanation. 
Causal explanations, in ordinary life and according to Coulter (1979), play a part in 
the provision of excuses for conduct not for explaining their own or other people's 
actions. Thus, the description of behaviour involves appraisals, which are context- 
bound and open to different interpretations. If these appraisals and interpretations do 
not match up with those made by the participants the results of the research, yet 
again, may be misleading. 
4.3. A NATURALISTIC ENQUIRY: THE ONTOLOGICAL POSITION, THE 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL POSITION AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR 
RESEARCH METHODS 
As has been seen the limitations, assumptions and implications of such assumptions 
behind the methods employed to date to study awareness of difficulties following 
brain injury have resulted in many and disparate results. The uniformity and 
agreement that is often sought under a positivist paradigm (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) 
has evaded the subject and opened up opportunities for other methods to be used in 
the field. 
Arguably, one of the reasons why research has been so contradictory in awareness of 
difficulties following brain injury is that researchers have been looking in the wrong 
place. According to Velmans (2000) when studying conscious awareness examination 
of the brain from the outside can only reveal its physical causes and correlates. It does 
not reveal the experiences themselves. Examination of the brain alone can not lead to 
the discovery of an inner conscious life within an experienced body in a phenomenal 
world. Velmans reflects that a person's perspective is the only way to discover the 
inner phenomenology. As such, qualitative methods are used in this thesis for two 
reasons. One, to follow the recommendation of well known researchers in the field 
like Fleming, Strong and Ashton (1996b) and Crisp (1992), and two, as more 
effective ways of gaining a better understanding of awareness of difficulties following 
brain injury. 
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The explanations of awareness of difficulties following brain injury found in the 
literature are manifestations of the empiricist and positivist paradigms upon which 
modern science rests (Gergen, 1985). According to the empiricist paradigm, 
knowledge mirrors the reality of the world. According to the positivist paradigm, 
knowledge depends on inbuilt mechanisms of processing incoming perceptual 
information. It has been argued (Gillett, 1994) that both paradigms describe the 
person as a passive recipient of perceptual information with inbuilt cognitive 
processing and overlook the role of social interaction in the formation of knowledge. 
Thus, researchers have no other option but to account for awareness of difficulties by 
positing a short fall in the cognitive processes. 
However, and alternatively, theories of (social) construction of reality and 
phenomenology offer a very different perspective. For example, from a strong social 
constructivist perspective (discussed in more detail in Chapter Three), reality is not 
independent of human action but it is the product of interactions between people in a 
historical and cultural environment (Burr, 1995). Truth is considered an inter- 
subjective exploit, which entails processes of validation, negotiation and persuasion in 
specific social and cultural contexts. Further, speakers are not seen as disinterested 
individuals who are seeking to report objective observations of the world. Speech is 
seen as action, and interested participants explain behaviour, attribute responsibilities 
and validate concepts of the self and world through it. Research, then, within this 
social constructivist paradigm uses conversational and discourse analytic techniques 
to analyse speech and other texts as forms of social action (Edwards and Potter, 
1992). 
In addition, phenomenological theories, developing from Husserl's philosophy, can 
broadly be said to be concerned with an individual's personal perception or account of 
an object or event as opposed to an attempt to produce an objective statement of the 
object or the event itself (Smith, 1996). Phenomenological theories however, are the 
inspirational source from which the bases of social interactionism and social 
constructionism in turn (discussed in Chapter Three), emanate. It will be recalled 
then, that social interactionism argues that the meanings individuals ascribe to events 
should be of central concern to the social scientist and that those meanings are only 
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obtained though a process of interpretation. It also considers that meanings occur 
(and are made sense of) in, and as result of, social interactions (Smith, 1996). 
Psychologists influenced by these theoretical positions use a range of methods for 
their work and one of them, and the most relevant to the present work would be 
phenomenological and interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA henceforth) as 
the method of investigation. Following on the theoretical precepts of Smith (1996), 
IPA reflects the dual nature of this approach. The aim of the method, is to explore the 
participants' view of the world and to adopt, as far as is possible, an "insider's 
perspective" (Conrad, 1987) of the phenomenon under study. Moreover, while the 
researcher attempts to get close to the participant's world, it is acknowledged that 
researchers cannot do this completely or directly. Access is both dependent on, and 
complicated by, the researcher's own conceptions which are required in order to make 
sense of that other personal world through a process of interpretative activity. 
This emphasis in offering an "insiders' perspective" is most relevant when researching 
lack of awareness of difficulties following brain injury. These perspectives, which will 
be called qualitative methodologies, can then be used in this research to legitimise the 
first person accounts of the patients in the research and clinical assessment. Reporting 
how things look from the point of view of the patient and therefore, giving the victim 
responsibility for what has been reported can do this. More pragmatically, the 
methods can help elicit first person perspectives that can target various points. First, 
they can investigate the patients' reactions to the brain injury; second, they can ask the 
victim's reactions to the behaviour of others and third, they can inquire into the 
behaviour of others in the patients social world (Sabat, 2001). In addition, these 
techniques can be used to elicit knowledge about the person's difficulties and the 
implications of these difficulties for the person's everyday life. In other words, if we 
want to know what people with brain injuries are aware of, there is no better way 
than to ask them. This point, problematic for some, needs to be defended. In a field 
with a long tradition of working under the empiricist paradigm, such as awareness of 
difficulties, first person reports have been consistently rejected as distorted and 
unreliable. These reports can be legitimised first by accepting them and then can be 
used as the basis of analysis. For example, Georgaca (2000), in the area of delusions, 
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argues that instead of dismissing the accounts of patients these can be examined along 
three lines of enquiry. First, the accounts can be examined for meaningfulness, not 
because they can express views about the world or of the speaker but because they 
"employ culturally available discourses" (p. 232). Second, accounts can be seen as 
claims that are debated and negotiated in speech as non-brain injured individuals do in 
their everyday speech. Third, accounts can be seen as assertions about the self and the 
world whose truth or falsity cannot be established by studying speech only. 
Furthermore, accepting first person reports is problematic only when qualitative 
methodologies are viewed from a positivist paradigm perspective. In other words, if 
they are expected to lead to the same ends that quantitative methodology usually 
leads to: measurement of the phenomenon at hand and providing certain kinds of 
evidence for efficacy of interventions. This point, already elaborated in the literature, 
has led some theorists to argue that the application of traditional concepts to 
qualitative studies means that this kind of research is never legitimised (Lyons, 1999). 
Workers that are not familiar with the shift in paradigms when considering qualitative 
research will regard any materials produced by qualitative researchers as unreliable 
and not objective or if they are familiar they may not agree with them. 
As discussed in the first section of this chapter, assessing such an abstract term as 
awareness of difficulties has been done through inferences. These inferences are based 
on the idea that awareness can be studied from a third person perspective and 
ultimately because of the ontological assumption that there is an ultimate truth "out 
there". A qualitative paradigm is much better suited to study awareness of difficulties 
because it does not assume this ontological reality but the existence of multiple 
realities. These multiple realities are some times in conflict and may vary as 
reconstructions and understandings change (Gergen, 1999). Qualitative research 
assumes that the knowledge that is derived from such research is constructed by both 
the researcher and the participants (Lyons, 1999). Thus, what is problematic in the 
field of awareness of difficulties research when using qualitative methodologies is not 
how to assess and provide evidence of efficacy of interventions, for example, but how 
to accommodate the qualitative paradigm along the lines of health disciplines deeply 
embedded in the biomedical model. This accommodation may be facilitated if all 
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parties concerned, about what is expected of each paradigm, show an understanding, 
and more attention is given to a future integration. Accordingly, research questions 
need to be suited to one or other perspective. Harre (2000) for example, in talking 
about studies of consciousness, argues this point. Harre suggests that the study of the 
fields of intentional objects should be left to the domain of discursive psychology, 
while the study of enabling conditions for the existence of such fields is the province 
of neuropsychology (i. e. investigating the state of the brain and the nervous system). 
Thus, researchers working with the concept of awareness of difficulties under a 
qualitative framework should be concerned with the understandings and knowledge a 
brain injury victim has of the injury (Lyons, 1999). They should aim at eliciting 
knowledge, as opposed to making predictions and controlling the research process, 
while incorporating the social world into the research. This allows the researcher to 
give a better insight into the individuals perspective that otherwise would go 
unnoticed under quantitative methodologies (Lyons, 1999). 
This thesis adopts a constructionist position in that it sees the "reality" experienced by 
people with brain injuries as a product of their social, historical and cultural 
environment (Burr, 1995). It also adheres to an interpretative phenomenological 
position in that it is concerned with the individual's personal perceptions and the 
researcher's interpretation of the data. Studies using this position are said to enrich 
the literature of an area previously only studied quantitatively. Smith (1996) says that 
while employing different methods, drawing on different theoretical backgrounds and 
using different terminologies, the shared commitment to mind and cognitions allows 
for the possibility of quantitative and qualitative researchers usefully having dialogue 
with each other and quantitative and qualitative studies informing each other. 
However, the question of how qualitative research can help the problem of lack of 
awareness of difficulties following a brain injury needs a more precise answer. From a 
phenomenological angle, Smith (1996) remarks that phenomenology has always been 
concerned with the "individually diseased body" (p. 264) or in this case, injured body. 
Thus, while societal accounts may provide valid explanations for the distribution and 
transmission of illness or proneness to accidents, the individual body still provides an 
exemplary unit for determining the existence of, and possible boundaries, for the 
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illness or injury. Further, it is also a phenomenological assumption that people think 
about their bodies and what they have to say about their bodies in some way relates 
to those thoughts. For IPA, the body and its perception is an invaluable asset as a 
subject for research. The phenomenological researcher, while recognising the gap 
between an object and the individual's perception of it, is interested in elucidating the 
nature of this gap. Thus, the existence of entities such as bodies and injuries provides 
a useful background against which to compare different accounts of physical 
processes (Smith, 1996). 
What is then to be gained by employing these methodologies? The answer to this 
question may be found in the weak and strong forms that these methodologies can 
adopt (for a general introduction to weak and strong positions see Chapter Three 
with respect to emotions). In the thesis it is recognised that a strong social 
constructionism and interpretative phenomenological approach would lead to 
relativism and the conclusion that no one interpretation has a priority, or a closer 
claim to the truth than another. A weak constructivist and interpretative 
phenomenological approach however, adopted here, claims that there are criteria for 
judging between some competing accounts of a situation, and that rigour, careful 
attention to the material and repeated questioning by the researcher will lead to 
conclusions which are not only plausible and theoretically useful but whose veracity 
can be supported by others. Thus, adopting a social constructivist-phenomenological 
perspective, this thesis is about how people with brain injuries experience their brain 
injuries, and subsequent difficulties. That is, what messages are given by their bodies 
and society to these individuals and how are these messages interpreted. The 
objective is then to use people with brain injuries' experiences to inform theoretical 
development, in particular how does social interaction increase awareness of 
difficulties after a brain injury. 
4.4. RESEARCH DESIGN: TALKING TO THE PEOPLE THAT MATTER 
So far the methods used to investigate lack of awareness of difficulties have been 
based on clinical observations, experimental or psychometric testing. Although 
successful in their different ways as means to research into a difficult phenomenon, 
their results offer contradictory and inconclusive answers. Equally, the variety of 
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unacceptable theoretical frameworks suggests the need for a new theoretical 
framework and the development of new methodology. 
More recently, there has been a growing interest in exploring awareness of difficulties 
from the perspective of those most affected by it, namely the people with brain injury 
and their caregivers. Reflecting this new interest the present work introduces a 
qualitative design or naturalistic enquiry into the phenomenon of awareness of brain 
injury. Qualitative designs are naturalistic to the extent that the researcher does not 
attempt to manipulate the research process or its participants for research purposes as 
would be the case in an experiment. In this thesis the investigation comprises three 
qualitative studies: Study One, exploratory in character, is divided into two parts. 
Part 1 examines spontaneous complaints people with brain injuries make about their 
injuries and subsequent difficulties. Part 2 investigates how significant others explain 
these difficulties to the patients. The study looks at people with brain injuries within a 
community setting, years after the brain injury has occurred and official rehabilitation 
efforts have ceased. Study Two was conducted with the brain injured participants. 
This study asks how the participants' knowledge of their difficulties is constructed. 
That is, how do they make sense of their brain injuries and the challenges they face 
following their injuries. Study Three was conducted with non-expert health 
professionals at two day care centres that people with brain injuries participating in 
this research attend. This study examines how difficulties that can be experienced 
following a brain injury are understood, communicated and dealt with by this staff. 
Qualitative methods of inquiry were deemed appropriate in this context due to certain 
inherent characteristics in this form of empirical enquiry that make it suitable for the 
particular research phenomena. These characteristics (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; 
Silverman, 2001) are discussed in more detailed below and can be listed as the 
following: qualitative methods allow for contextual inquiry, they offer an array of 
qualitative methods for data collection appropriate to human inquiry, analytic 
induction and purposive sampling. The credibility of the present work is also assessed 
at the end of the section. 
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4.4.1. Contextual inquiry 
Research carried out under the qualitative paradigm suggests that inquiry must be 
undertaken in a natural context because phenomena of study, whatever their nature, 
take their meaning as much from their contexts as they do from themselves. The 
ontological position exposed in the above section of this chapter specified that reality 
constructions cannot be separated from the world in which they are experienced. No 
phenomenon can be understood out of relationship to the time and context that 
spawned, harboured and supported it (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Coming back to the 
present research, the different settings where awareness of brain injury develops were 
clarified in Chapter Two, i. e. hospital, rehabilitation, re-entering the community. 
Brain injury is then seen as occurring in various social settings and the ways in which 
people with brain injuries interpret and make sense of their injuries are understood as 
real-life events, which can only be examined in those contexts. Such a comprehensive 
approach is most useful when trying to understand the complexities of those life- 
events as opposed to more conventional ways of inquiry. For example, experimental 
research emphasises or insists in not having a natural setting in the name of control or 
internal validity (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Experimental inquirers create then 
contrived contexts that influence behaviour in ways that natural settings do not. Such 
studies may be successful in showing how participants behave in those contrived 
settings but almost never show how these participants behave in natural contexts. In 
natural settings the researcher cannot allow for the complexities of real-life events, 
therefore if anything may make a difference, then everything must be monitored. 
Further, the researcher must become so much a part of the context that she cannot 
longer be considered a disturbing element (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Thus, the 
reaction of the researcher in the present work to more conventional ways of 
investigating awareness of difficulties in brain injury was to take a comprehensive 
approach to the phenomenon. The research, throughout the investigation, was 
undertaken in naturalistic settings like day care centres and homes of the participants. 
The researcher, by becoming a volunteer at the day care centres where the research 
was going to take place, became at the same time part of the brain injury context. 
Further, by including in the investigation people that form part of the social 
environment of people with brain injuries, significant others and care givers (Zencius, 
& Wesolowski, (1999)), the project emphasised this comprehensive perspective. 
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4.4.2. Qualitative methods of data collection 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) assert that qualitative methods come more easily to hand 
when the "instrument" used to carry out the research is a human being. That is, the 
human-as-instrument is inclined towards methods that are extensions of normal 
human activities: looking, listening, speaking, reading and so on. The researcher will 
tend to interview, observe, read available documents and so on. The present work 
used interviews and vignettes to carry out the data collection relevant to the project. 
The theoretical background of interviewing will be discussed in the first place. 
4.4.2.1. Interviews 
According to Banister, Burman, Parker, Taylor and Tindall (1994) there are four 
main reasons for conducting interviews. First is a concern with subjective meanings 
rather than eliciting responses within a standard format for comparison with other 
individuals or groups. A concern shared in this thesis given the lack of subjective 
explanations in awareness of brain injury (Flemining, Strong and Ashton, 1996b). 
Second, and most relevant to the present work, interviews can permit exploration of 
issues that may be too complex to investigate through quantitative means. That is, 
given the quantitative methods tendency to simplify phenomena, they can 
misrepresent the nature of the questions under investigation. In this thesis, for 
example, this tendency has been described as problematic in the first section of this 
chapter. Presenting people with brain injuries with questionnaires and ratings scales is 
unlikely to provide research with sufficiently sensitive and incisive grasp of brain 
injured individuals' concerns. This may not be so much because the questionnaire or 
the scale does not address the correct questions, as because the views of the 
participants cannot be readily representable within this format. Third, doing 
interviews forces the interviewer to confront his or her own participation within the 
research. Conducting interviews demands consideration of reflexivity in the research 
process extending from the devising of the research question, to identifying and 
setting up interviews with participants, to the interview itself (i. e. role of the 
interviewer, how is the interviewer seen by participants). Fourth and finally, 
interviews are regarded by some writers as "conversations with a purpose". What 
purpose the conversation is pursuing is a point that leads to power relationships. 
While quantitative research methods view the people who form the focus of the 
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research as "subjects", the people who form the focus of the present work were 
invited to be "participants". This term reflects the researchers' attempts to do research 
"with" people with brain injuries rather than "on" people with brain injuries. 
Gathering data: semi-structured interviews and vignettes 
Returning to the second reason stated above, interviews allow for exploration of 
issues that would otherwise go unnoticed under other methodologies. In this thesis, 
interviews were carried out with people with brain injuries, significant others and non- 
expert health professionals. The interviews were carried out in order to explore how 
people with brain injuries made sense of their injuries and the challenges they have to 
face following their brain injuries. It was assumed in this context that what the 
participants had to say during the interviews had some ongoing significance for the 
participants, and that there was, though not transparent, a relationship between what 
the participants said and the beliefs that participants were assumed to hold (Smith, 
1995). At the same time it was recognised that meanings are negotiated within a 
social context and therefore, these interviews then draw also from a social 
interactionist position (Denzin, 1995). 
In order to investigate such issues all the interviews conducted in the investigation 
used a semi-structured format and Study Three included the presentation of two 
vignettes. Semi-structure interviews, in general, are used by researchers to gain a 
detailed picture of a participant's beliefs, or perceptions or accounts about a particular 
topic (Smith, 1995). Vignettes are used to further illuminate and redefine the issues 
under investigation. The two methods will be explored here but the use of semi- 
structured interviews over structured and unstructured interviews in the present work 
will be justified first. 
According to Smith (1995) and in general, the use of structured interviews shares 
much of the rationale of the psychological experiment. When using structured 
interviews the researcher decides in advance exactly what constitutes the required 
data and constructs the questions in such a way as to elicit answers corresponding to 
and contained within predetermined categories which can then be numerically 
analysed. This format is of limited use when exploring the nature of awareness of 
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brain injury due to the constraints the structured interview could put on participants 
and the situation. That is, it would deliberately limit what the participants could talk 
about, this having been decided in advance by the researcher. This limitation has 
already been observed and discussed in relation to the methodology employed by 
awareness of brain injury (see first section of this chapter) and therefore, it will not be 
expanded here. Suffice to say that the use of structured interviews would have 
impeded, in the present work, the unravelling of novel aspects of the area (something 
considered important by the participant but not for the researcher) and the unravelling 
of complexity in the participants' position. 
Unstructured interviewing, on the other hand, rejects the positivist assumption that 
both the interviewer and the interviewee are treated as objects. Instead, interviewer 
and interviewee are both involved in the research as participants. In this version of 
interview, both the type of knowledge gained and the validity of the analysis are based 
on "deep" understanding. This is because the "humanistic framework" from which this 
type of interview derives supports "meaningful understanding of the person and 
wholeness in human inquiry" (Reason and Rowan, p. 206,1981). For this reason, 
unstructured interviewing rejects prescheduled standardised interviews in favour of 
open-ended questions. Denzin (1970) offers three reasons for this preference: a) it 
allows respondents to use their unique ways of defining the world, b) it assumes that 
no fixed sequence of questions is suitable to all participants, and c) it allows 
participants to raise important issues not contained in the schedule. However, the use 
of unstructured interviews was rejected in the present investigation for two reasons. 
First, the passivity of the researcher could create a constraint on people with brain 
injuries to talk (as seen in psychotherapy and counselling research (Peräkylä, 1995)). 
That is, if the researcher maintains a minimal presence, asking few questions, this can 
create an interpretative problem as to what is relevant to the interview. Second the 
need to gain some uniformity in the data. That is, it is difficult for researchers to enter 
an interview situation without some structure in place which, in turn, can lead to 
some uniformity of answers. 
Semi-structured interviews were then considered more flexible than structured 
interviews and more directive than unstructured interviews. The researchers 
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employing this format still have a set of questions on an interview schedule but the 
interview is guided by the schedule instead of dictated by it. The interviewer then has 
the opportunity to follow up interesting avenues that emerge in the interview and the 
participant is able to give a fuller picture. In this context, the interviews conducted 
here were about what each study had set out to explore, but the course and the 
content of each interview itself depended on each participant. 
Constructing the semi-structured interviews schedules 
The four interview schedules used in the present work were devised to be exploratory 
and semi-structured. Exploratory because the researcher was interested in the 
accounts of the participants in each of the three studies, not in narrow responses to 
standardised questionnaires. Moreover, for this same reason the interviews had to be 
semi-structured. 
All the interviews followed a series of basic steps. First of all, the opening questions 
to the interviews were general, destined to gather demographic data and/or 
establishing an interview context rapport with the participants. Although with the 
exception of the participants in the second part of Study One the researcher was well 
known to all the participants. Second, the interviews were a combination of general 
and specific questions designed to elicit accounts on: 
- Study One (Part One): knowledge of brain injury, its subsequent difficulties and 
implications in brain injured participants. 
- Study One (Part Two): ways of communication of difficulties and implications 
by 
significant others. 
- Study Two. gaining knowledge and interpretation of difficulties, and their 
implications by people with brain injuries. 
- Study Three: understandings and experiences of lack of awareness of 
difficulties in 
people with brain injuries and ways of communicating about difficulties by non-expert 
health professionals. 
The questions were not intended as "catch-all" or as interrogations, they were 
designed to establish a conversation between the participants and the researcher. 
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Semi-structure interviews allow the researcher to guide and give direction to the 
interview without constraining the participants to one word answers with little depth 
or context. This method also allows the researcher to take participants through high 
degrees of exploration by firmly setting the agenda and limiting the topics for 
discussion. Further, the method also allows participants to contribute a considerable 
guidance in the path the interview follows. All interviews were tape-recorded and 
transcribed verbatim to gain in-depth knowledge, as a first step, from the data. 
Vignettes 
In conjunction with the semi-structured interview carried out in Study Tree, two 
vignettes were embedded in the course of these interviews. The use of vignettes as a 
methodological tool entails crafting a short, descriptive sketch of an incident and then 
presenting it to the informants to elicit their opinions and reactions to its contents. 
The vignette is carefully designed to depict a circumstance or represent a germane 
issue and elicit rich but focused responses from participants. The vignette is 
essentially a very short story that when carefully constructed and presented simulates 
real life experiences. After participants read or have been read the story, they are 
asked to respond to a few directed questions to further involve them in refining the 
subject under investigation. The creation of meaning and the capturing of attitudes 
brings the researcher a step closer to understanding behaviour. 
As a methodological tool therefore, there are certain inherent characteristics to this 
form of inquiry that renders it suitable for this particular study. First, while vignettes 
have certain common features (a brief and familiar hypothetical scenario followed up 
with questions), they can be modified to be consistent with the research topic of 
interest. In Study Three, the two vignettes presented were created to depict two 
different cases of awareness of difficulties in two different scenarios. Second, the 
story telling character of the vignette is relaxing, pleasant, interesting and may reduce 
the feeling of being overburden by the interview process (Kayser- Jones and Koening, 
1994). Finally, since these stories are hypothetical and generally involve a fictitious 
other, vignettes and follow-up questions can obtain information beyond the 
individual's current personal situation. Such depersonalisation is advantageous for the 
present research topic in two ways. For studies of social phenomena, removing 
105 
Chapter Four - Researching lack of awareness in brain injury: the methodology 
personal disclosure may ease difficulty or embarrassment. One of the aims of Study 
Three was to explore non-expert health care professionals observed experiences of 
lack of awareness of difficulties in people with brain injuries. The sensitive nature of 
some of these difficulties (as noted in Chapter Three), like disinhibition, makes this 
methodology particularly helpful in eliciting participants accounts about these 
matters. The second aim of the study, how non-expert health professionals 
communicate these difficulties to the patients, adapts to the second way in which 
depersonalisation is advantageous. The use of a vignette approach presents a medium 
through which to go beyond the discussion of individual life situations and towards 
the generation of accounts on a social level. Thus, presenting a vignette to non-expert 
health care professionals was a medium through which these participants could 
transcend their own particular experiences on to a more socially descriptive level of 
accounts. 
4.4.3. Inductive data analysis 
It is said that qualitative methods are particularly orientated toward exploration, 
discovery, and inductive logic (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Patton, 1987). The present 
work can be said to be inductive to the extent that the researcher made attempts to 
make sense of the phenomenon under investigation, lack of awareness of difficulties, 
without imposing pre-existent expectations in the research setting. Inductive designs 
like the one adopted here begin with specific observations and build toward general 
patterns. Categories or dimensions of analysis emerge from the data as the research 
comes to understand these data patterns. 
The method contrasts with the hypothetical-deductive approach of experimental 
designs that require the specification of main variables and the statement of specific 
research hypotheses before data collection begins. Qualitative analysis is guided not 
by hypotheses but questions, issues and a search for patterns or themes. 
Extrapolations emerge then when these themes are content analysed or analysed by 
conducting an inductive data analysis like IPA. 
Content analysis and inductive data analysis bear remarkable similarities but seem to 
work at different epistemological levels. For example, and on one hand, content 
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analysis involves identifying coherent and important examples, themes and patterns in 
the data and making the information explicit. The researcher looks for quotations or 
observations that go together, that are examples of the same underlying idea, issue or 
concept. The contents of the data are thus classified. Organising and simplifying the 
complexity of data into some meaningful and manageable themes or categories is then 
the basic purpose of content analysis. On the other hand, inductive analysis means 
that patterns, themes and categories of analysis come from the data; they emerge out 
of the data rather than being decided prior to data collection and analysis. The 
researcher in this case looks for natural variation in the data. That is, the researcher 
pays attention to processes of the phenomenon under investigation and the 
interpretation participants in the research give to that phenomenon. Therefore, both 
methods focus in a search of patterns or themes but while content analysis assumes 
that these themes are already in the data, inductive analytic methods assume that they 
emerge from the data. Thus, the methods disagree on the location of knowledge not 
on the nature of knowledge or the acquisition of knowledge. Therefore, the difference 
is neither methodological or epistemological but of method. 
This difference is important and relevant for two different purposes. First, and in 
general, to be able to distinguish between method, methodology and epistemology 
within the qualitative paradigm is an opportunity to develop the idea of a unitary 
qualitative paradigm (Henwood and Pidgeon, 1994). Second, and most relevant for 
this thesis, the difference allows the researcher to ask different questions within an 
entirely qualitative based body of research linked by the same epistemologies and 
methodologies. 
In this thesis, the questions guiding Study One referred to how often the participants 
talked about their brain injuries, difficulties and implications thus rendering the data 
appropriate to the classificatory nature of content analysis. Study Two and Study 
Three however, asked different questions. The focus of these two studies was on how 
participants make sense of this phenomenon. In other words, the interest lay in the 
phenomenology of the experience, not in classifying it. This change of questioning, 
from "what do they know" (content) to "how do they know" (process) integrates the 
two different analytical procedures or methods in the thesis. The change represents a 
107 
Chapter Four - Researching lack of awareness in brain injury: the methodology 
change of method to allow the researcher to ask different questions, not a change of 
epistemological position. 
4.4.4. Purposive sampling 
Sampling in qualitative methods is said to be quite different from the sampling carried 
out in more conventional, statistical methods (Patton, 1987). All sampling in 
qualitative methods is done with some purpose in mind. In statistical methods the 
purpose always is to define a sample that is in some sense representative of a 
population from which it is desired to generalise. In qualitative methods a purposive 
sample is selected with the aim of obtaining "information-rich" cases for study in 
depth. Information-rich cases are those which the researcher can learn a great deal 
about issues of central importance to the subject under investigation. In the present 
work, people with brain injuries, significant others and non-expert health 
professionals were selected as sources of information-rich cases. This selection 
however served various purposes. 
Throughout the investigation, the strategy for purposeful sampling aimed at capturing 
and describing the main themes cutting across a great deal of participant variation. 
For small samples like the ones presented in the present studies, a great deal of 
heterogeneity can be a problem because individual participants are so different from 
each other. This weakness however, was turned to be advantageous by utilising 
maximum variation sampling in the investigation. That is, any common patterns that 
emerged from heterogeneity or variation were of particular interest and captured the 
core experiences as shared aspects in the research. The point of the research was then 
not to focus on the similarities that could be developed into generalisations, but to 
detail the many specifics that give this context its unique flavour (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985). 
A second purpose was to generate information upon which the emergent design could 
be based. Emergent design means that in this project there was no a priori 
specification of the sample. The researcher recruited and selected participants into the 
project in order to obtain information and compare information (Study One), fill in 
information (Study Two) and extend information (Study Three). The original sample 
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was chosen for three reasons. First, the heterogeneity of the group fitted with the well 
known principle in brain injury literature that no two brain injuries are the same. 
Therefore, the sample was, in part, theoretically "guided". Second, easy access or 
convenience to the group since the researcher worked for the organisation where the 
participants were recruited. Third, to act as a base for successive samples. Such 
successive samples were obtained by personal nomination (in Study One participants 
were asked to nominate significant others) or were based on theoretical information 
(literature points to professional care givers as the second most important social 
interaction of people with brain injuries (Zencius & Wesolowski, 1999) and therefore, 
were used for Study Three). 
4.5. THE CREDIBILITY OF THE RESEARCH 
The use of qualitative research methods in brain injury affects the criteria by which 
research in this area is assessed. Traditionally, research in brain injury has employed 
quantitative methods which offer a well defined set of criteria which in turn, is applied 
to all research findings to evaluate the goodness of a particular study and its results. 
These criteria emanate from the positivist assumption that there is a truth out there 
that is defined as having some form of correspondence with reality. This assumption 
then allows questions about whether the research carried out under the positivist 
paradigm yields an accurate account of this reality (Smith, 1990). For example, 
questions about the reliability of the measurement process, questions about the 
adequacy of the measurement and its results (otherwise known as validity) can be 
asked. Further, and assuming that there is a reality out there that can be depicted, 
then research findings should be generalisable across different contexts. 
In contrast, concepts such as reliability, validity and generalisability are often seen as 
irrelevant in the evaluation of qualitative research (Lyons, 1999) as they are based on 
assumptions central to the positivist perspective. As stated previously, qualitative 
research concerns itself with meaning and because meaning in human experience is 
not considered to be universal, generalisation from qualitative research findings is not 
relevant (Zyzansky, McWhinney, Blake, Crabtree and Miller, 1992). Further, some 
qualitative research workers reject the standard of issues of reliability and validity in 
favour of 
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"An intensive personal involvement, an abandonment of scientific control, an 
improvisational style to meet situations not of the researcher's making" (Agar, 1986, 
p. 12) 
However, not all workers in the field share Agar's postulate because it is very difficult 
for any reader to take on trust any research findings made on such claims. Instead, 
within the qualitative research community, researchers look to aspects of the work 
such as credibility, dependability, trustworthiness, transferability and authenticity 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). These evaluation criteria do not decontextualise the data, 
on the contrary, qualitative research is firmly situated in a historical context (it takes 
into account the social, political, cultural, economic and gender antecedents of the 
situation). Further, the extent to which the findings stimulate action and change 
existing socio-political and cultural structures may also be examined (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994). For research findings to be dependable then, it is expected that 
different investigators using similar procedures will perceive similar meanings. This 
will be discussed further below. 
According to Guba and Lincoln (1994), researchers working within the constructivist 
paradigm have two sets of criteria. One circumvents the trustworthiness of the work 
and the other is authenticity. From this perspective, the present work on awareness of 
difficulties following brain injury emphasises participants' understandings of brain 
injury and their interpretations of the brain injury experience. The starting assumption 
is that there are multiple realities so no one true description will exist. Further, it is 
explicitly acknowledged that the researcher and the participants co-produce any 
findings that are derived within the present context of the research process, and the 
results provide a new and, hopefully, useful construction of the brain injury 
experience. This construction can then be evaluated for its trustworthiness, in terms 
of its credibility (to other researchers and people with brain injuries), whether it is 
dependable (would a similar construction be produced in similar contexts? ), 
transferable (would a similar construction be produced in different contexts? ) and also 
whether it is confirmable (do similar people with brain injuries have similar 
constructions? ). 
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In general though, no one set of evaluation criteria exists to evaluate all qualitative 
research. In many qualitative methods the concepts of credibility, dependability and 
confirmability are applied and are examined with the use of triangulation, reflexivity 
and independent audits (Banister, Burman, Parker, Taylor and Tindall, 1994). 
Triangulation involves approaching the data from different perspectives to gain a 
richer and more illuminating interpretation. According to Banister et al. (1994) there 
are three levels of triangulation such as data, investigator and method triangulation. 
Data triangulation involves collecting accounts from different participants involved in 
the chosen setting, from different stages in the setting and if appropriate from 
different sites of the setting. In the present work this point was addressed by not only 
collecting data from people with brain injuries, significant others and care givers 
participants but by collecting data from different sites of the setting (two day care 
centres). Investigator triangulation refers to the use of more than one researcher, 
preferably from other disciplines or perspectives, to talk through, comment and 
challenge the work at various stages of the research. The present work addressed this 
point by inviting other researchers to act as coders during the analytical stages of the 
data. Finally, method triangulation refers to the use of different methods to collect 
information. Since all methods have limitations, a danger of using only one method is 
that the findings may merely be an artefact of the method (this point was not 
addressed by the present research). 
These three levels of triangulation highlight the notion that there are various ways of 
"knowing", all of which can contribute to building a body of knowledge. However, 
the value of triangulation for evaluating research has been put in question amongst 
qualitative researchers, with some arguing that it rings too many "positivist criteria 
bells" (Lyons, 1999). Instead, these researchers suggest another set of methods for 
validating studies based on entirely qualitative data. Silverman (2001) for example, 
concedes that the use of inductive data analysis (discussed above) does not lead to the 
assumption, shared by many researchers, that the work is only exploratory or 
descriptive. Although inductive analysis demands no a priori hypotheses, the use of 
the method allows for generating and testing hypothesis "grounded" in the data. 
Fielding (1988) describes it like this: 
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"One case is studied to see whether the hypothesis relates to it. If not, the hypothesis 
is reformulated or the phenomenon redefined to exclude the case. While a small 
number of cases support practical certainty, negative cases disprove the explanation, 
which is then reformulated. Examination of cases, redefinition of the phenomenon and 
reformulation of hypothesis is repeated until a universal relationship is shown. " (p. 7- 
8) 
Thus, inductive data analysis boils down to two techniques. The use of comparison 
and the search of deviant or negative cases. Glasser and Straus (1967) suggest that 
the qualitative researcher should always attempt to find another case through which 
to test out provisional hypothesis. What this means is that the method involves 
inspecting and comparing all the data fragments that arise in a single case while at the 
same time seeking out and addressing deviant cases. In this context however, the term 
deviant case assumes a different meaning from that encountered in quantitative 
methodology. In statistical procedures, for example, the researcher turns to deviant 
cases when the existing variables will not produce sufficiently high statistical 
correlations or when good correlations are found but there are reasons to believe that 
these are "spurious". By contrast, the qualitative researcher should not be satisfied by 
explanations, which appear to explain all the variance in the data. In this context, 
deviant cases are identified on the basis of concepts deriving from a particular 
framework. Thus pieces of data are never intrinsically deviant but rather become so in 
relation to the approach used. In other words, in qualitative research every piece of 
data has to be used until it can be accounted for. Therefore, the approach to 
qualitative data is comprehensive in a way that quantitative methodologies are not 
always. This is another strength of the approach and addresses complaints that 
findings are: 
"Based on a subjectively selected, and probably biased, sample of cases that happen 
to fit the analytic argument. " (ten Have, 1998, p. 8) 
Such comprehensive data treatment can be aided by the use of appropriate 
tabulation, where the categories counted are derived from theoretically defined 
concepts. Silverman (2001) points out that simple counting techniques offer a means 
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to survey the whole corpus of data ordinarily lost in intensive, qualitative research. 
Instead of taking the word for it, the reader has a chance to gain a sense of the 
flavour of the data as a whole. 
For the purpose of this thesis, the standards of the qualitative research community 
were aimed to be met the following way. The research was situated in context and the 
procedure followed throughout the body of work was standardised and clarified. 
Accordingly, each step of the research was described in terms of specific rules and 
procedures. For this purpose, a detailed presentation is included in each of the three 
studies of the data collection, coding and analysis of participants' accounts. This 
renders the analytical process transparent and accountable. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
STUDY ONE - WHAT PEOPLE WITH BRAIN INJURIES TELL 
AND WHAT THEY ARE TOLD ABOUT THEIR DIFFICULTIES 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the first study of the thesis. The study examines: 
  The extent to which people with brain injuries participating in the study talked 
about their difficulties. 
  The way difficulties are communicated by significant others to people with brain 
injuries. 
The research addresses the possibility that, in some cases, awareness of difficulties 
following a brain injury may be increased during social interaction. As discussed in 
Chapter Three, the explanations about difficulties, and explanations of the 
implications for everyday living of these difficulties, given by others may play a role in 
the awareness process. The changes in awareness of difficulties may be a consequence 
of the recognition by the victims of the influence of evaluations and attitudes of others 
on the self. This influence depends on who those others are and on an open 
communication. On the part of significant others who care for brain injury patients, 
lack of knowledge about brain injury, its resulting difficulties and its implications may 
impinge upon this communication. 
As already seen in Chapter Two, advances in medical technology have meant that a 
greater number of victims of brain injury survive for longer than they would have 
done a few years back. These individuals experience the acute stages of their injuries 
in hospitals, they undertake official rehabilitation following the acute stage and finally, 
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they reintegrate into the community. This reintegration into the community often 
means going back to families that are more often than not naive as to brain injury and 
its possible consequences, which can be of a physical, cognitive and/or emotional 
nature. 
In addition, it has been pointed out that physical difficulties are usually the first 
difficulties that a brain injured person becomes aware of (Fleming and Strong, 1999), 
usually during hospitalisation. Cognitive effects include a range of difficulties that 
often take some time to make themselves felt. These can include problems with 
language and communication skills, intellectual difficulties, memory and learning 
difficulties,, attentional difficulties and difficulties in executive function (McKinlay & 
Watkiss, 1999). Emotional effects, which have been studied under the term of 
psychosocial changes, emerge in the weeks and months after the injury (McKinlay, et 
al, 1981). The most frequently reported are irritability and impatience, slowness and 
tiredness, bad temper, verbosity, lack of inhibition and change of character (McKinlay 
& Watkiss, 1999). The frequency with which these problems arise varies according to 
injury severity and the problems themselves can vary over time (McKinlay, et al, 
1981) plus they may be exacerbated by problematic social interactions. 
Recognition of physical, cognitive and emotional difficulties tends to emerge during 
rehabilitation and come into focus once the brain injured person reintegrates in the 
community. Prigatano (1995) notes that at this stage the patients want to return to 
work or school or to pre-injury activities. In the cases where they do return to 
previous activities, Prigatano observes, more often than not, they do not succeed in 
their attempt. This failure, sometimes, illustrates the difficulties to the patients and to 
those around them. Reactions to this discovery, not surprisingly, are manifest in an 
increase in emotional and behavioural difficulties during the first year post-injury. 
Neurological explanations for this increase could have been suggested but appear 
unlikely due to the nature of brain injury. Brain injury is not a degenerative disorder 
and recovery or some recovery of function is possible (cognitive functions in 
particular). Instead, explanations turn to the role of the family in pointing out these 
difficulties as time goes by and stopping making allowances for the patient, or to the 
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secondary nature of these problems, i. e. the patient exhibits these problems as 
secondary reaction to limitations (McKinlay and Brooks, 1984). Empirical evidence 
seems to verify the existence of these increases in emotional difficulties and 
emphasises the role of awareness of these difficulties, as well as awareness of physical 
and cognitive difficulties, as the necessary ingredient for adjustment to brain injury 
(Ponsford, 1995). This has led some researchers to point to the role of denial on the 
part of the relatives (Romano, 1974) as a coping mechanism and as part of a process 
in coming to terms with a brain injured relative. However, this may have alternative 
explanations, like the role of social interaction in adjustment to brain injury. 
As has been seen, the problems encountered by the brain injured person and their 
family, years after the injury, are due to the cognitive and emotional sequelae, as 
opposed to the physical sequelae of the brain injury (Blyth, 1981). Lack of awareness 
of some cognitive difficulties and lack of awareness of some emotional problems 
continue to be a cause of concern. Furthermore, some researchers have observed that 
denial may have been adopted as a negative defence mechanism by some patients 
(Prigatano, 1999). However, and as already stated in Chapter Two, the adoption of 
denial as defence mechanism does not explain why not all people with brain injuries 
react to the injury in the same way. An alternative explanation can be offered which 
does not assume that the brain injured person is responding to the difficulties caused 
by the injury in this way. This explanation refers to the discursive environments and 
the ways in which these may affect the understanding of difficulties and their 
implications by the brain injured person. 
Furthermore, and as discussed in Chapter Three, if the development of self-awareness 
depends partly on the views of others, the way these views are transmitted, received, 
interpreted and acted upon maybe crucial for the development of awareness of 
difficulties following a brain injury. The development of this awareness may be 
influenced by the accurate perception of how others see us which, in turn, depends on 
open communication. However, according to Shrauger and Schoeneman (1979), 
incongruences between self-appraisals and others' appraisals are often due to strong 
cultural sanctions against making direct appraisals, especially if these are of a negative 
nature and, by the same token, the way information is interpreted carries the same 
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importance as to how it is transmitted. Shrauger and Schoeneman, (1979) observe 
that people differ in their interpretation of others' feedback, particularly if the 
feedback is not explicit. The authors point to the individual's agency in interpreting 
feedback and to how this feedback is given more importance according to the status 
of the person that imparts the appraisal. Research from the social cognition field adds 
to this idea by pointing out that the speaker's status and memory play a significant 
role when interpreting information. Holtgraves, Srull and Socall (1989) investigated 
in three different experiments how the speaker's status affected memory of 
assertiveness. They found that under certain conditions the remarks of a perceived 
high status speaker were remembered as more assertive than those made by a 
perceived lower status speaker. These researchers provide evidence for the existence 
of a relation between how information is communicated (in this case assertiveness) 
and one interpersonal variable (speaker status). Furthermore, Holtgraves, Srull and 
Socall explain that their results demonstrate how social knowledge is implicated in the 
interpretation of communication. By this they mean that they have made explicit the 
assumption that many aspects of knowledge cannot be understood apart from the 
context in which the communication occurs (Levinson, 1983). In other words, what 
can be taken as a suggestion if spoken by a low status speaker can be constructed as a 
command if spoken by a higher status speaker. 
The research presented is the first step towards answering the thesis research question 
"Does social interaction increase awareness of deficits? " The present study then, 
divided into two parts, asks: 
  In Part One: Do people with brain injuries know about their difficulties? Do they 
know about the implications of having these difficulties? Do they think about them? 
and, How does having a brain injury affect the self? 
  In Part Two: Do significant others think their brain injured friends and relatives know 
their difficulties and implications? How do significant others explain these difficulties 
to the patients? 
In part one, 30 people with brain injuries attending two different day care centres 
were interviewed. All the individuals had sustained a brain injury for about a year or 
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longer previous to the study. The aim in this part of the study was to focus on the 
participants' talk about their difficulties and the implications of these difficulties. The 
study explores to what extent self-knowledge of difficulties is spontaneously salient to 
the person. This is important since according to McGuire, McGuire, Child and 
Fujioka (1978) when people are confronted by a complex stimulus, they selectively 
attend to and encode distinctive aspects of the stimulus. This selectiveness, argue the 
authors, affects the self-concept both directly and indirectly: directly, by our noticing 
our own distinctive features; indirectly, by others perceiving and responding to us in 
terms of our peculiarities and our adopting others' views of ourselves. Therefore, 
brain injury and possible difficulties that can be experienced following a brain injury 
were not addressed directly during the interviews unless the participants referred to 
the brain injury or their difficulties. 
In part two, 22 significant others, nominated by the brain injured individuals 
participating in the first part of the study, were interviewed. The aim of this second 
part of the study was to examine the extent to which the discourses to which people 
with brain injuries are exposed in their everyday lives can contribute to the 
development of awareness of difficulties following a brain injury. It was noted in 
Chapter Three that significant others sift the world to the person. It is these 
communications which make up the discourse in which people with brain injuries 
develop their self-knowledge. 
Part One of the chapter describes the techniques utilised to analyse the data from 
interviews with people with brain injuries and the results of this analysis. Part Two 
contains the techniques utilised to analyse data from interviews with significant others 
and the results of this analysis. The analyses carried out on the interviews sought to 
explore, illustrate and specify the elements involved in constructing brain injury. The 
interviews with the brain injured participants sought to capture the spontaneous 
complaints of their difficulties and the implications of these difficulties. The interviews 
with significant others sought to inquire into the knowledge of significant others 
about physical, cognitive and emotional difficulties observed in their brain 
injured 
relatives or friends. These were then matched to the brain injured participants 
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accounts of their difficulties. The study also explored how these difficulties were 
explained or not to the victims of brain injury. 
5.2. PART ONE: TALKING TO PEOPLE WITH BRAIN INJURIES 
5.2.1. Method 
5.2.1.1. Participants 
Thirty people with brain injuries, 8 females and 22males (age range 19 to 62), 
attending two day care centres in the South of England were invited to participate in 
the study. Individuals were admitted to the centres if they had suffered a traumatic 
brain injury (car accident, work accident, etc. ) or had an acquired brain injury (stroke, 
brain haemorrhage, etc. ). In some instances, the centres also admitted individuals with 
degenerative diseases (MS, Alzheimer's, etc. ). All participants had been suffering 
from brain injury for one year or longer prior to the study. Demographic 
characteristics of the sample and injury details are presented in Table 1. All data were 
self-reported and matched against the day care centres' files, GP records (where 
available) and relatives' information. 
5.2.1.2. Ethical considerations 
For the purposes of this part of the study permission was sought and obtained from 
the University of Surrey Advisory Committee on Ethics. In this study, sensitive data 
were collected from participants who had sustained a brain injury. The interview 
procedure was explained carefully to the participants. Participants were assured that 
their participation was voluntary and that they could end the interview session at any 
time. None of the participants ended the sessions early and only one appeared unduly 
distressed. In this case the interview was terminated and re-scheduled at the 
participant's request. Follow-up contact did not suggest that participants had been 
adversely affected by the procedures. 
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Table 1. Means and Standard Deviation for demographic data and injury 
details 
Variable Mean SD 
Age 
Education (in years) 
Time since injury (in years) 
Duration of coma (n=21) (in days) 
41.96 13.99 
11.92 3.38 
9.36 5.71 
61.83 78.95 
Status Married Single Divorced 
n=30 11 11 8 
Cause n 
Road accident 15 
Brain aneurysm 1 
Tumour 2 
Brain haemorrhage 2 
Lack of oxygen to the brain 2 
Stroke 5 
MS 1 
Work accident 2 
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5.2.1.3. Procedure 
Participants were interviewed at the day care centres they attended and interviews 
lasted between twenty minutes and half an hour. At the beginning of the sessions, 
participants were asked to sign forms of consent as to their agreement to participate 
in the research. Participants were also given information sheets as to the general 
terms of the research and contact telephone numbers to provide further information 
or advice on any matter related to the investigation. It was recognised also that the 
researcher could be perceived as a person with some authority or influence in the 
context of the interview. To this effect every effort was made to explain that this was 
not the case. The research was explained to the participants as being part of a course 
that the researcher was doing as part of a university degree. It was explained that the 
research was confidential and that they could end the interview at any time if they so 
desired. 
5.2.1.4. Interviews 
The interviews consisted of a semi-structured interview schedule designed to elicit 
different aspects of participants' descriptions of themselves and their daily lives. The 
questions were designed to focus on the participants' self-knowledge and to enquire 
about the effect of this knowledge on the individual. The schedule (see Appendix 1) 
covered six categories of interest: (a) daily activities of the participants (i. e. what 
activities do you do here? ); (b) health issues and ways of keeping healthy (i. e. do you 
consider yourself healthy? ); (c) employment status and goals for the future (i. e. have 
you always had the same job? ); (d) social life and relationships (i. e. do you feel people 
respect you? ); (e) general worries (i. e. how do you feel you cope with life at the 
moment? ); and (fl perceived changes in the lives of the participants (i. e. do you think 
your life has change for you? ). 
5.2.1.5. Doing content analysis 
The transcriptions from the all the interviews were analysed using content analysis 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). This approach, discussed in Chapter Four, in most 
cases involves searching for and identifying the key themes present in the data rather 
than having a set of pre-conceived hypotheses and using the data to confirm or 
disprove those hypotheses. The process of content analysis involves progressive 
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"sorts" of the data, firstly sorting the data into categories, and then re-examining the 
data thus categorised for commonalities or themes that can be identified. 
Part One of the present study underwent four stages of analysis. First, the content of 
the interviews was sorted by the researcher into the major categories on the interview 
schedule. Second, the researcher reviewed the transcripts and found that data for 
some key issues was spread across a number of the initial six categories, so developed 
three domains (Talking about difficulties, Reflecting on difficulties and Maintaining 
the self) to use as the framework for analysis of the data. A revised set of nine 
categories was then devised (see table 2). Third, the transcripts were re-analysed 
using this more detailed framework with each paragraph being coded and ascribed to 
one of the six categories. Code-re-code reliability by the researcher found a Kappa 
coefficient of 0.90 (0.70 is the recommended rate by Miles and Huberman (1994)) on 
six randomly selected transcripts. An inter-rater reliability rate of 0.92 was achieved 
between the researcher and a colleague independently coding four randomly selected 
transcripts, which is above the 0.90 level recommended by Miles and Huberman 
(1994). Fourth and finally, once the transcripts had been coded, the data in each 
category were examined for explanations or themes that were recurrent and therefore, 
significant. This was done by going through each code selecting the themes brought 
out by the coded text and checking its support across all the interviews in order to 
note down the theme of the quotation. In this manner, a record was kept of themes 
that were popular and themes that were less common. The organising principle in the 
selection of themes was simply that of counting frequencies, which did not quantify 
the analysis but provided a criterion for selection. That is, a theme selected by one 
participant could have been supported by another participant, while another theme 
may have been supported by five other participants. As it was, most themes were 
included in the study not only to capture the commonality of accounts but also to 
reflect maximum variation of accounts. For example, maximum variation involves 
looking for outlier cases to see whether main patterns still hold. The critical case is 
the instance that exemplifies the main findings. Thus, searching for confirming and 
disconfirming themes serves to increase confidence in conclusions (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). 
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Table 2. Domains, categories and coding guides. 
Domain Category Coding guide 
Talking about Talking about Reasons given for attending the centre, talk of activities carried 
difficulties brain injury out in and outside the centre, 
talk of activities carried out alone or 
in the company of others, abilities or current functioning, 
secondary changes (i. e. now unemployed). 
Talking about physical Reasons given for attending the centre, talk of activities carried 
difficulties out in and outside the centre , 
talk of activities carried out alone or 
in the company of others, abilities or current functioning, 
secondary changes (i. e. now unemployed). 
Talking about cognitive Reasons given for attending the centre, talk of activities carried 
difficulties out in and outside the centre, 
talk of activities carried out alone or 
in the company of others, abilities or current functioning, 
secondary changes (i. e. now unemployed). 
Talking about Reasons given for attending the centre, talk of activities carried 
emotional difficulties out in and outside the centre, 
talk of activities carried out alone or 
in the company of others, abilities or current functioning, 
secondary changes (i. e. now unemployed), 
problems with friends and family. 
Talking about Talking about health issues in the present 
implications of and in the past, 
physical difficulties ways of describing good health. 
Implications of Future goals (i. e. desire for a job), 
cognitive difficulties present abilities/need for help and future hopes. 
Implications of Talking about social behaviour, 
emotional difficulties problems with family/people outside family. 
Reflecting on Thinking about Thinking about their own health, 
difficulties difficulties thinking about activities 
and abilities, thinking about the self. 
Maintaining Continuity of the self Reports of change in the lives of the participants, 
the self experiences of changes in the attitudes from others, 
pre-injury/post injury circumstances. 
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5.2.2. Results 
Findings of key themes are reported here from nine categories. A number of verbatim 
quotes are reported to illustrate the kinds of statements underpinning the identified 
themes. Some quotes may not be grammatically correct, but all have been reproduced 
verbatim. 
Do participants know about their brain injuries and subsequent difficulties? 
Summary tables are presented here as to the frequencies of accounts of brain injuries, 
physical difficulties, cognitive problems and emotional problems found in the 
responses of participants to questions about reasons for attending the day care centre, 
living arrangements, activities carried out in the centre and outside of it, perceived 
personal abilities, employment history and social life. These categories are not 
mutually exclusive. 
Table 3. Participants accounts of brain injury, physical, cognitive and 
emotional difficulties. (n=30) 
ACCOUNTS FREQUENCIES 
Yes 
FREQUENCIES 
No 
Talking about their brain injury 20 10 
Mention of physical difficulties 20 10 
Mention of cognitive difficulties 14 16 
Mention of emotional problems 11 19 
It can be seen that the majority of participants (20 out of 30) talked about their brain 
injuries. These were mentioned in eleven cases as reasons for attending the day care 
centre where the investigation was carried out: 
"I come here because I crashed a car and had a bad head injury and this has helped 
to rehabilitate me and go back to a normal life. " 
to explain the loss of ability to perform certain functions (7 participants), 
"I just do, I put my pants the wrong way, I do silly things like that but I couldn 't tell 
you why, and again is all part of having had these strokes. " 
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to explain doing something by three participants: 
"At the moment I do exactly as my Doctor tells me. Which is, well, I have a list of 
things that I am not supposed to eat. It seems a long list to me, but it's mainly 
because it includes all the things I used to like. Like cheese and eggs, butter, 
anything with serious fat content I am not allowed to have I am on a very low fat 
diet, which is understandable. Well, lets put it this way, since my Doctor has told me 
very clearly that I shouldn't eat various things, I probably lost two and a half stone, 
which is fair enough. It overall makes me feel better, but to a large extent it has help 
to eliminate the fears of having another stroke, because I had two so a third one 
would be really, really, serious. " 
and to explain a change in the participant's life by five participants: 
"I had a brain aneurysm haemorrhage, but it did me good in some 
ways, it stop me drinking and I never had so much money in my life. " 
Of the ten participants who did not mention having had a brain injury, one did not 
know where he was but explained that he attended the centre to socialise and get 
better from heart problems: 
"I. " Why do you come to... ? 
R: I come here to get better, the things I do! 
I: Any other reasons? 
R: To get some work and get better, because I want to drive. 
I: How long have you been coming here? 
R: About a year or so. 
I What made you decide to come here? 
R: Well, so that I can talk to my friends, so that I can have somebody to talk to, 
because when I first came here I couldn't talk and then I started to talk. I was in 
hospital and then I went home and it happened again. 
I. " What happened? 
R: My heart, in the first date they gave me fifteen things, tablets. For the heart, liver 
and I had to have an operation and they put three things in here, I looked like an 
Indian. It was my heart. " 
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Two participants admitted in response to inquiries as to where they were and why, 
that they did know where they were but did not know the reasons why they attended 
the place. One of these participants did not mention any kind of brain injury, physical, 
cognitive or emotional problems throughout the interview. He answered all the 
questions in a jovial and matter of fact manner. The other participant explained that 
he had no idea of what was happening to him: 
"I have no idea, I don't feel upset or discontent in any way but apart from just 
having eaten something, I have no idea of what I am doing here or anything. I got to 
be honest and say that I don't know. My memory is that I live at X and live with my 
wife T and I got two children but I haven't seen any of them for years, as far as I 
know. I got no idea or understanding of anything. " 
The other seven participants did not mention having a brain injury but referred to 
having had accidents. Five participants said that they attended the centre because they 
had had car accidents. For the other two participants who also mentioned having had 
accidents, one explained that his work accident was the cause of his present inactivity: 
"Nothing, I try to do some things but I can't. I broke my back at work; I broke my 
back twice, the second time I was just sitting having a coffee. I felt pain but 
everybody thought I was moaning about the first injury and then they did an x-ray 
and found that I had broken my back in a different place. " 
and a second one mentioned being run over by a car in response to a question about 
life change: 
"I. When did it change? 
R: After my accident. 
I: Would you like to talk about it? 
R: I can't remember it but I know that it was all my fault. I got drunk and walked 
down the middle of the road and a car hit me. " 
Twenty participants referred to having physical problems but not always as a direct 
consequence of having had a brain injury. Four people did refer to their physical 
problems because of their brain injury: 
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"'I am fine in myself. The bleed that caused my stroke, followed by the stroke, I 
completely lost my right side of the brain and of course, it is the right side of the 
brain which controls the left side of the body, physically, and the left arm and the 
left leg are totally paralysed, but over the years I got my left leg working again, my 
arm is completely useless, the left side of my mouth is paralysed as well, that is why I 
dribble and I don't know I am doing it. " 
"I nearly went to ballet school, and then I nearly went to gymnastic school but now 
I can't do either because of my head injury has affected my balance, for walking, so 
I can't be athletic or dance. " 
while a further sixteen participants talked about their physical problems in two 
different ways. Participants either regarded their physical problems in their own right 
and separate from the brain injury (12 participants): 
"1 have trouble with wetting the bed but it goes in phases, two or three days 
and then nothing for weeks, so it is difficult but is not bad enough to warrant a 
catheter or anything. " 
or caused by reasons different to the brain injury, like medical skill (one participant): 
"When I was in hospital I had a lot of lumbar punctures. I can't tell you how many 
but a lot, and I often wonder if they did damage to my spinal cord, as some people 
were better at doing lumbar punctures than others, naturally. But there was one 
particular day when she kept pushing this needle in and out of my back, and I know 
that it sounds silly, but I could feel my spinal cord. I could feel it hitting it and 
pushing it to one side, and that happened several times, and I did not take much 
notice but in hindsight, I wonder if it did any damage to my nerves because it has all 
got to do with the nervous system. " 
or as a consequence of having had an accident (three participants): 
"After the accident I thought I had lost all me, all my fitness, I lost it all. If they 
asked me to walk, it would take me a couple of hours to walk up the road. After the 
accident, I was dragging my foot and I was conscious of it and thinking that 
everybody was looking at it. That got me but now I am fit, I can run, I do exercise. " 
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The ten participants who did not mention physical problems did not have any 
apparent physical difficulty except for two. One was in a wheelchair and another 
could not walk unaided. 
Cognitive problems were found to be related to the brain injury by the participants in 
three cases: 
"Because of the head injury, I forget names, so at home I got a little electronic diary 
and I record things, all my days and dates, so I check every morning to see what I 
have got to do. " 
while in nine cases cognitive problems were talked about as single problems, 
unrelated to the brain injury: 
"The only big problem I think I have got, as my father said to me today is, short-term 
memory is not something I am clever with. I don't know what happened, my father 
phones me up and says some thing and I have forgotten it by the following day. So 
as to whether I can change that, I would like to say, maybe, I don't know. " 
generalised and de-personalised as a single problem in one case: 
"Well, as I said, I do get some conversation. I also like talking to the volunteers to 
have some sensible conversation because with the best will in the world it is not the 
best conversation when you are talking to the members because, well, as you know, 
we all got memory problems and its just that some are worse than others. 
Unfortunately some people just can't handle themselves, I know this, they do repeat 
the same conversation. " 
or as consequences of having had an accident by one participant: 
"The problem is, after the accident, I lost a lot of memory and some of that memory I 
never got back. So, I am still hoping that one day, may be, I will get it all back, but I 
don't know. " 
Out of the sixteen participants who did not mention any cognitive deficit, only one 
reasoned that his problems were merely physical, not cognitive: 
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"X and I agree that this place is not addressing my needs, my needs are physical, not 
cognitive. I came here originally for rehabilitation, to socialise" 
The other fifteen participants did not refer to any cognitive problems. 
Accounts of emotional problems (11 participants) show that five participants related 
their emotional problems directly to having had a brain injury. One participant 
recounted problems with respecting people, being impatient, inconsiderate and his 
"unhealthy interest" in other people's personal lives: 
"One of the most incidental, ridiculous things like people's star signs and when they 
got married, what job have they got and things like that which I never worried about 
before or what their surname is, personal questions as well. I think my social graces 
aren't absolutely right. Like I upset a friend of mine, John the other month, well 
several months ago ............. 
" 
A second participant talked about using foul language and being angry and frustrated 
as a consequence to the accident while two other participants explained about "losing 
control of emotions" without knowing why: 
"So you can sit in there watching nothing in particular, it can be a news item for 
example, on television and you can sit in there quite upset. No particular reason, an 
item that you quite happily would have dismissed before the stroke, but now, for 
whatever reason, it just has an impact, which is sometimes difficult to cope. " 
One of these two participants also admitted to what can be seen as a contradiction: 
"It is also difficult to control the emotions, keeping temper wise, I have been quite 
amazed that that has not been the problem for me. " 
Further accounts by a fifth participant showed that losing the sense of humour was 
considered problematic. 
Six participants reflected on problems with depression not as a direct consequence of 
having a brain injury but because of the implications of having a brain injury: 
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"I know I have been worse, but I have been far better as well, so I don't think I cope 
very well at all. I get very, very low, very down, depressed about it, but I think its 
because it has been such a long time away, that I have been spending practically all 
my life in a hospital and away from my family, it's just awful. " 
"Since the accident I got more depressed. When I came out of prison I was trying to 
rebuild my life and now I am a cripple, I can do nothing, I can't walk long and my 
brain gets tired, I can't think or concentrate. " 
Nineteen participants did not mention emotional problems. 
Do participants know the implications of having a brain injury at a physical 
level? 
Summary Table 4 is presented here as to the frequencies of responses to questions 
addressing past and present health states of the participants and their ways of keeping 
in good health. 
Table 4. Frequency of responses to questions about health. (n=30) 
Talking about health Yes No 
Number of participants talking about their health excluding the 22 8 
brain injury 
Number of participants talking about their health including the 4 26 
brain injury 
Number of participants considering themselves healthy when 4 26 
excluding brain injury and unhealthy when including brain injury 
Twenty two participants talked about their health as something completely separate 
from their brain injuries: 
"I. " Do you consider yourself healthy? 
R: Except for my broken knees, I am overweight and I am trying to do something 
about it. One knee has a splint on, the other, I got to go and see a doctor in 
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September, because is gone as well. And they will operate in both knees because they 
are both bad, but I am walking and this is good. 
I: Would you say that you have always been healthy? 
R: No, I had always had asthma and I have broken my left cheekbone, fallen from 
bicycles when I was younger, but I mend. " 
Four participants talked about the brain injury as a disruption to their health: 
"I. " Would you say that you have always been healthy? 
R: I guess up until my injury I was healthy. " 
"Now, that is one thing that annoys me, am I allowed to say this? The only thing that 
annoys me about X is that, while most of the people here have had head injuries as a 
result of an accident, I got, well, is not exactly a head injury, I got a disability as a 
result of having a stroke and unfortunately most of the staff don't realise or don't 
appear to realise, that my brain does actually work quite well most of the time. OK, 
there are little bits where it needs a kick and a push and a bit of help, but most of the 
time, I accept that some of my ideas may be a bit different to most people, most of 
the time my brain is still working, even if the rest is crapped out, and that annoys me 
sometimes. My stroke is disability arising from an illness; I mean the illness itself. 
No doctor has given me clear guidelines on diet. Obviously, she told me about 
washing and exercising but as long as I stick to the diet, I know that things should be 
fine, so as far as I am concerned the stroke is the past. There may be another one 
sitting round the corner somewhere but I don't want to know about that, thank you. " 
and four participants made the distinction between the brain injury disrupting their 
health and health as separate from the brain injury: 
"I: Do you consider yourself healthy? 
R: Healthy in the sense that I have very few coughs or colds or flu, perhaps once a 
year, once every two years, in that way I am healthy, but I haven't had a convulsion 
since last Christmas. " 
131 
Chapter Five - Study One - What people with brain injuries tell and what they are told about their 
difficulties 
Do participants know about the implications of having a brain injury at a 
cognitive level? 
Summary Table 5 presents the frequencies of responses to questions about activities, 
abilities, job issues, desire to drive, and long terms plans and short term plans for the 
future. 
Table 5. Number of participants responses to questions about employment, 
plans for the future, daily activities and known abilities. (n=30) 
Responses to: Yes No 
Paid employment 0 30 
*Desire to drive 4 26 
Plans for the future 8 22 
Involvement in activities in and outside the 
centre 
18 12 
Knowledge of own abilities and limitations 14 7 
*Participants were not asked about desire to drive after the brain injury but this desire was mentioned spontaneously and included in 
this table. Desire to drive has been considered in the past literature as an indication of lack of awareness of difficulties. 
Although not one of the participants was in full time employment at the time of the 
study, three participants held voluntary jobs. Eighteen participants expressed a desire 
for a job and four participants specified that they would like to go back to the job 
they had in the past, before the brain injury: 
"Well, I worked in cancer research, worked with drugs which were convulsive drugs 
and making up specialised electrodes in London University. I would like to go up 
and visit the University and talk to my professor, see if anything could be 
arranged, but I have my doubts that I could ever work again. Well, it was a 
specialised job. I think I could do that work again. " 
Twelve participants saw the jobs they used to hold as their main ability: 
"I: What do you think you are good at? 
R: Building surveying I guess, identifying buildings, I did do a part-time degree.. the 
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fifth year I had this..........., what I am good at? Building surveying, yeah, I enjoy it 
immensely, doing specifications, writing all those out, contractors............ " 
while six participants considered the brain injury as no obstacle to going back to 
work: 
"I am just starting to look for employment. People won't let me get back to work, 
sounds daft but this is how it is. They say that I got to ask people if they will let me 
get back to my job but they have problems getting insurance for me. I would like to 
get back to what I was doing but my social worker is very reluctant. " 
Twelve participants did not express a desire for a job. Three participants were retired, 
two did not give a reason for not wanting a job, three did not consider themselves fit 
enough and thought of themselves as disabled, another participant thought that he 
was unemployable but did not give a reason as to why he saw himself as such. 
Another participant did not know what he could do, another one confessed to having 
no idea if he was looking for a job or not and another one professed to have a job as 
the saviour of the world. 
Although participants were not asked if they wanted to drive a car four participants 
expressed a desire to drive. The participants thought that driving would be a step 
towards the sort of life they used to lead before the brain injury. One participant 
focused on his physical difficulties and presented strategies to overcome those in 
order to be able to drive: 
"I used to drive a car and I would like to drive again. You see, we have an automatic 
car and I think I could drive it quite easily because I don't have to use the left foot, 
so I will apply to the DVLC. " 
When talking about the future, eight participants mentioned having a plan for the 
future. These plans were short-term and included taking holidays, moving house, 
going too see a football match and acquiring computer software: 
`Well, in theory we are supposed to be moving. My eldest son has said that the 
house is far too big for us, which it is, but John does not want to move and I got 
some great friends that live not very far from us, so it would be nice if we could 
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move closer to them, but we'll wait and see, it just depends what my husband wants 
todo. " 
Six people remarked that they did not have specific plans for the future but 
emphasised the importance of being active, to keep going. Fourteen participants said 
that they did not have plans for the future but some had aims towards improving (two 
cases): 
"I aim to improve all the time, everything I do is hard at the moment, the crash was 
in 91, which is nearly ten years ago now, then I was told I would be a vegetable all 
my life and now I live on my own and I do everything. " 
hopes of starting a new life (2 participants): 
"I have to start a new life, because of my divorce and that, you know, start a new 
life. " 
hopes of recovering lost memory (one case): 
"I lost a lot of memory and some of that memory I never got back, so, I am still 
hoping that one day, may be, I will get it all back, but I don't know. " 
and determination to get back to pre-injury self (one participant): 
"I am determined to rebuild myself back to what I was. " 
In addition, when asked about the organisation of their days and plans for the next 
day, twenty five participants described routine activities, four gave dismissive answers 
and only one participant did not know how his days were organised or what he would 
be doing the next day. 
Participants talked in their majority (18 participants) about their activities and how 
these were designed to counteract boredom: 
"I get very bored in my flat, but now that the fishing season has started I can go 
fishing and cycle rides, it's a day out really, it breaks up the monotony of the week, it 
makes the week go pass very quickly, I look forward to coming here and I am glad to 
get back to my flat.. " 
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two commented on doing nothing or very little: 
"Eating, smoking, sleep, I just go to sleep, nothing. " 
and seven viewed activity as a means to rehabilitation: 
`I find it very beneficial and I do think that all the sessions that I do here are very 
useful and also the contact with the other people in similar situations is very useful, 
so it is very good. " 
Two participants thought that their daily activities were better kept to a minimum to 
reduce the possibility of making their situations worse: 
"Not too much, well that is not totally true, I basically I do what is necessary. I 
really do mean necessary, in the course of day to day living, if it needs to be done I'll 
do it. If it is something that I can maybe do today or maybe tomorrow, the chances 
are, I'll probably leave it till tomorrow, to be honest I used to be scared stiff about 
having another stroke, because I had two, well, you know how rumours go around 
and the one about strokes is that if you have a third one you are left very, very 
seriously disabled or you may not come back and that did concern me quite a lot for 
about, oh eighteen months, and now I got to the stage that I think, what the hell! It's 
quite true, this is what I have come to. " 
Fourteen participants admitted to knowing that they had some limitations at the time 
of looking for a job or when carrying out certain activities. One participant mentioned 
not being allowed to cook: 
"No, not really, I can read, do basic things, I am not allowed to cook because I 
might burn myself which infuriates me. " 
another participant talked about being limited because of the loss of control of a 
part/s or the body: 
"I find it too difficult to, I always used to be good with my hands you see, 
engineering and modelling but I find it so complicated to do simple tasks now, 
because I can't control my left hand properly, so I can't really do anything. " 
and another participant referred his limitations to a memory problem: 
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"If I put my mind to it I can do whatever I want, it is only because of my memory, 
that is the only problem. " 
Some participants who expressed not knowing what they could do referred to not 
knowing why they could not do something (seven participants): 
"at one stage I couldn't come to terms with things that we were doing, and I don't do 
now, I just couldn't cope with them but I can not tell you why. " 
Nine participants doubted their abilities: 
I. " Are you seeking employment at the moment? 
R: No, I do not know what I can do actually, I'll probably get back to what I was 
doing before actually but I don't know, its debatable. 
I: What do you think you are good at? 
R: Building surveying I guess, identifying buildings, I did do a part degree.. the 
fifth year I had this..........., what I am good at? Building surveying, yeah, I enjoy it 
immensely, doing specifications, writing all those out, contractors............ 
I. Could you improve? 
R: I don't know about that, I doubt it very much actually. 
and one could not remember his activities and abilities: 
"Your questions carry some implications that I have been here before and carried 
activities here but as far as I am aware that is outside my memory or knowledge or 
anything. 
I got to say that I got no idea, I got to say that I got no understanding of what has 
happened to me or what effect is had on my mind, so I got no idea about what I am 
good at or defective at. " 
Do participants know the implications of having a brain injury at an emotional 
level? 
A summary of the responses to questions about social life and relationships is 
presented in Table 6. 
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Table 6. Participants' responses to questions about their social life and 
relationships. (n=30) 
ACCOUNTS Yes No 
Participants who admitted knowing when they 19 11 
had upset the other 
Participants who had experienced break up of 6 24 
relationships 
As it can be seen nineteen participants admitted to knowing that they had upset 
others. One participant commented that she upset others because they thought that 
she was not trying hard enough in her day to day rehabilitation process. Fifteen 
people did not give any reason as to why they had upset other people or how they 
knew that they had upset others; upsetting people in these cases was seen as 
something inevitable, part of life: 
"I am sure I do, again, not intentionally, certainly not, because as far as I am 
concerned I got no reason. I don't like upsetting people, so I know how it feels to be 
upset so I would not intentionally upset somebody, but I guess if they intentionally 
upset me I might hit back and do the same, but I hope I don't, that I don't have to. " 
One participant explained that, in the past, he only knew that he had upset another by 
the absence of other people who could have caused the upset: 
"In them days I was not very well and my wife used to cry, and I knew that it was me 
that was causing it, because I was the only one in the house. But I don't know how I 
was doing it, I needed help because I can't see X crying. I would never let my wife 
cry but somewhere along the line, it was happening. And I was the only one there. 
Only two participants explained that since their brain injury they seemed to upset 
more people: 
"I seem to upset a lot of my friends since I came out of hospital by asking them 
personal questions. " 
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From the eleven participants who replied that they did not know if they had upset 
anyone, only one commented on his problems as the cause of not knowing if he had 
upset others: 
"I think that by my nature, I don't think I do. I also feel, as I never seen any evidence 
of it, that there are aspects of me that are upsetting and I am surprised that I haven't 
seen more evidence of people's disquiet about it. " 
It is worth noting also that twenty five participants admitted to getting on with most 
people and only one person admitted to getting on with some people only sometimes 
In respect to questions about relationships, six people talked about the break up of 
relationships. In five cases the break up referred to a marriage and was seen as a 
direct consequence of the participant's having had a brain injury or accident: 
"When I got to the rehabilitation home, I got a court injunction. I was not allowed to 
see my children or my wife. I didn't know that she was going to divorce me. " 
Only one participant referred to a break up of a friendly relationship due to a lack of 
social graces, impulsivity and not "thinking properly": 
"I think my social graces aren't absolutely right. Like I upset a friend of mine, John 
the other month, well several months ago. I was cleaning up my fat and I had these 
comics, like Superman and Batman and I thought "Oh lets get rid of those ". They 
were old magazines and I thought, "Oh John will probable will like these ". Anyway 
so I gave them to him and he gave them to his son, and last month I thought "I want 
them back" and I phoned him and I said I want them back and he said "well, fine, 
have them back". So I went round and he was upset and said "it is not me, is my son, 
you know, when you say you give somebody something you mustn't ask for it back", 
"but you said I could have them back", and he said that he did not want to see me 
ever again after that. So I wrote a very corny letter about how long we have known 
each other and so on and I think he accepted my apologies. I was being impulsive, I 
don't think about things properly, I do it in the spirit of the moment. " 
Two other people who were divorced had done so before the brain injury. The eight 
divorced people in the sample indicated themselves as the most important people in 
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their lives (in three cases), their children (three cases), themselves, and their children 
in two cases. When talking about the people they disliked three participants indicated 
their ex-partners, two participants pointed at politicians and three other people 
commented on not disliking anybody at all. 
Of the twenty two participants who did not mention problems with relationships, one 
suspected that she might have a problem with her marriage due to her memory 
problems: 
"I. " Why don't they let you stay longer at home? 
R: I don't know if it is the hospital or my husband that does not want me to stay. I 
don't know who is the decision maker, and you know, I want to be able to ask why I 
haven't been home for a while. I suspect it could be a bit of both, but probably it is 
because my husband is not asking if I can come home. He is not putting the wheels 
in motion, you know, because normally, until a relative asks if the patient can come 
home it does not happen, so I guess it is because he is not asking. 
I: And why do you think that is? 
R: I just don't think he wants me home to be honest. I am a nuisance. I just basically, 
I don't know. I mess his routine, he has moved house and my husband's new house is 
not my home, it won't be for a long time. If Igo there I am not going to feel 
comfortable there, I don't know where anything is. Every time I have been home I 
just search everywhere for things and I can't find anything. None of my belongings is 
visible, they must be packed away in the loft and each time I mentioned it my 
husband gets stroppy. Basically, it is not my home because I have not lived there and 
there is nothing around to indicate that, you know, that I could possibly live there in 
the future, it is very stressful. 
I: Have you talked about this to him? 
R: Yes, but I just get negative vibes. I am not sure he really wants me to go back, it 
is the case that he feels that I will be a nuisance and I can understand that in a way. 
He will have to think about me all the time and won't be able to leave my side. He 
thinks that I can't cope on my own and I can't be trusted to do things on my own, you 
know, that I will have an accident and do something stupid, he does not trust me any 
more. 
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L What are you doing that is making him think like that? 
R: I think it's all excuses, he does not want me back. At the end of the day, I don't 
think he wants me back. I do have memory problems but I hope that I am improving 
and I have learned strategies to cope with it. I write things in my diary or post-it 
notes, anything, you know. " 
and another participant explained that he had decided to stay indoors as a way to 
keep out of trouble socially: 
"that is why I don't go out, that is why I feel so very, very bad. When I do go out, for 
the first ten minutes, I feel fine but after I feel that they are looking at me and I get 
angry. 'º 
Of those participants that were married (8 participants), one could not remember if he 
had a wife and the others designated wives or husbands as the most important people 
in their lives. In these cases, participants' dislikes turned towards people that were not 
seen as immediate part of their lives, like politicians, "queer" people in general or 
nobody at all. 
Single participants (11 cases) designated parents or close relatives as the most 
important people in their lives and only one expressed an explicit desire to meet 
members of the opposite sex: 
"I. " Given the chance, what would you like to do? 
R: Go out with lots and lots of men. " 
When talking about people they disliked three participants mentioned not being able 
to think of anybody they disliked. One mentioned a politician, one a particular friend, 
one the person that caused the accident, one a step-father, one said that he disliked 
everybody, one the people who "does not let you do it yourself' and another 
participant admitted to not liking himself. 
140 
Chapter Five - Study One - What people with brain injuries tell and what they are told about their 
difficulties 
Do participants reflect about their health, the things they do and themselves? 
A summary of responses to questions addressing thinking about health, thinking 
about activities and abilities, and thinking about the self is given in Table 7. 
Table 7. Frequencies of responses to questions on reflectivity on health, 
activities and self. (n=30) 
Reflexivity on Yes No 
Health 20 10 
Activities and abilities 20 10 
Self 13 17 
Most participants admitted to thinking about their health (20 participants). These, as 
above, reflected the understanding that the brain injury was considered apart or 
different from their state of health. Participants talked in terms of thinking about diets, 
exercise or drinking and smoking: 
"Yes, I do think about my health, specially smoking. I get pains occasionally in my 
chest, like last night, I always take a few heavy drags before Igo to sleep. In fact, 
that is the reason why I feel fitter now, I don't seem to smoke as much now. " 
One of the ten participants who commented on not thinking about health or being 
worried about it specified: 
"I don't think I think about anything, but as far as I know I have not spoken to any 
one about my health for donkey's years. " 
When talking about thinking about their activities and their abilities most participants 
said that thinking made them realise what they could not do or the abilities they had 
lost with depressing consequences: 
"Yes, it gets frustrating sometimes, specially when it is something that you used to do 
well. That is what I find most frustrating, such as DIY and stuff like that, I can still 
do things but it is twice the effort. Keeping control of whatever I am working on or 
whatever, everything is awkward and takes twice as long as it used to and twice the 
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effort, otherwise I do the best I can. I have not option, I can dwelt on it but one just 
makes oneself worse. " 
Two participants emphasised the need to think prior to carrying out activities: 
"Yeah, I obviously have to think about them, I have to gear my mind to do something 
so that I can do it as best as I can. " 
Participants who admitted to not thinking about what they were doing or the abilities 
they had did not give any particular reasons for not doing so. In some cases they 
expressed a desire to not think and just go ahead and do what ever it was that they 
wanted to do: 
"I: Do you think about what you do and what you can do? 
R: No, not really, I don't think about it, I just do it. " 
When it came to talking about the self, thirteen participants mentioned thinking and 
worrying about the self. Two respondents remarked on how thinking about the self 
brought home the realisation of the situation they were in: 
"it brings it home, how useless you are, and that is the worse part really, that is 
usually when you are on your own, for example, when I am with people, I don't get 
the time to think about it, so it does not matter, when I am on my own I get frustrated 
because I can't do something, it is a bit sad then. " 
Seventeen participants said that they did not think about themselves without giving 
reasons for not doing so. One participant admitted that he used to think about himself 
in the past but not at present and a second participant was surprised that he did not 
think or worry about himself: 
"Having sat and talked for this time, I am very, very surprised to find that I have not 
worried about myself. Just on what I do know, I feel I ought to be very worried or at 
least, concerned about what has happened to me or what is happening to me to 
follow things through. " 
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Continuity of the self 
A summary of the responses to questions addressing possible changes in the lives of 
the participants, perceived changes in the attitudes of others and temporal 
comparisons is given in Table 8. 
Table 8. Frequencies of responses to questions about changes in the lives of the 
participants. (n=30) 
ACCOUNTS Yes No 
Brain injury seen as point of change 27 3 
Life better before the brain injury 24 6 
Life better after the brain injury 6 24 
As can be seen, the majority of participants (27 participants) considered the brain 
injury as a point of change in their lives. Three people did not mention their brain 
injuries as a turning point when questioned about change in their lives. One 
participant did not know about any changes in his life, another one thought that the 
turning point was the day he was born and a third saw change as a constant in 
people's lives: 
"LDo you think your life has changed for you? 
R: I think it has slightly, but I think everybody could say that, you know, due to 
circumstances or whatever. 
I. When did it change? 
R: When we left Somerset and came back up to London, I was not aware that my life 
had changed, the change was very slow. " 
Out of these twenty seven people, twenty four felt that their brain injury represented a 
change in their lives and that these were better before the injury. One participant 
expressed a preference for the way he used to be before the brain injury and admitted 
that a return to the person he was had been his main objective just after his injury: 
"Is not better now being disabled. I much prefer to be like I was which was my 
original objective after the stroke. Back to how I was but I am only half a brain now. 
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Things are going to improve very, very slowly. The neurologist already said that my 
walking was not going to be that good. " 
another participant mentioned life was better in the past because there was no 
physical problems to be aware of 
"In the past. I didn't have a leg to be aware of, so definitively better in the past. " 
Six participants felt that the brain injury was a turning point in their lives for the 
better. Three felt that their lives had been changed since they had suffered brain 
injuries and they were much better people because of it: 
"R: Yeah, since the crash I feel that I am now a much nicer person. I don't swear at 
all at anybody, I like to be nice to people, I like to be helpful and that, and the 
people that annoy me I ignore. 
I. When did it change? 
When I had the crash. 
R: Would you like to talk about it? 
Before the crash, I used to go to pubs with friends and caused trouble and stuff but 
since the crash, I like to be nice to people and so on. " 
I: Is life for you better now or in the past? 
R: In the past, I had more friends but now, I enjoy it a great deal. I am more 
responsible now, so I am enjoying it better now, each week I manage to do 
something that I couldn't do before, it is nice to see all the improvement" 
One other participant felt that his life had been changed for the better because he 
could not remember what his life was like before the injury: 
"It is a bit more tolerable now, but the thing is, I can't remember before my 
accident, it is a blank, I didn't even know my own parents, after the coma. " 
For three participants the change in their lives was understood because of the injury in 
as much as this had affected their mobility: 
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"When I had the accident because I became so immobile. I can get from A to B and 
walk around, short distances, but I can't go shopping on my own without transport 
or help to carry it, I can cook and clean and things like that all right. " 
and a loss of independence (4 participants): 
"As soon as I was disabled for want of a better word, that is the worse part really, I 
am either pushed in the chair or I am driven from A to B, I lost my independence, I 
hate that. " 
For eleven people this change had meant a perceived loss of respect and rejection 
from others: 
"I. Do you feel people respect you? 
R: No, I just don't seem to see any respect shown by other people towards me. They 
probably do it and I just don't notice it, I just don't see it, then I probably didn't 
notice it before the accident, is probably just one of those things, I just can't see it, is 
not there. 
I: Do people upset you? 
R: Yes but not on purpose, I am just sensitive and sometimes people say things not 
intentionally to upset me but they say things that I take to heart and I take the wrong 
way and therefore that upsets me. " 
"I: Do you feel people respect you? 
R: No, you know, I never feel that people respect me, they just take me for granted, 
like my ex, you know, she was always taking me for granted, she expected me to do 
things that I couldn't do. At X is different, because everyone is the same here, but 
outside yeah, because of my head injuries, you know, they take the mickey. 
I. Do people upset you? 
R: Well, you know, they call me names, you know, I got to live with it. " 
Nine participants who did not perceive loss of respect felt that people respected them 
as before the injury and four people mentioned not knowing if others had lost respect 
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for them or not. One participant confessed to not caring about the respect from others 
and another one reasoned that he was respected depending on the values of the other: 
"Some, it depends on people's perceptions of me, some people only respect people 
with big jobs, big money and big houses. " 
Furthermore, five participants thought that they were perceived by others as disabled 
people and pitied: 
"I think people go around saying, "oh, she is disabled, bless her ", you know what I 
mean, in quite a patronising tone, whatever. " 
while eleven people said that they did not know how others thought of them and nine 
thought that they were perceived as nice ordinary people. One participant thought 
that how he was seen depended on the various perceptions of the other. 
5.2.3. Part One - Summary and discussion 
The main findings of this part of the study can be seen at a glance in Table 9 (n=30). 
Table 9. Summary of main findings for Part One of Study One. 
Accounts Participants 
Talking about brain injury 20 
Mention physical difficulties 20 
Mention cognitive difficulties 14 
Mention emotional disabilities 11 
Reflectivity about health 20 
Reflectivity about activities and abilities 20 
Reflectivity about self 13 
Brain injury as point of change 27 
In summary, Part One of the study found that: 
  Most participants referred to their brain injuries and physical difficulties in the first 
place, some mentioned memory problems and a few made references to a variety 
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of emotional difficulties. Participants who did not refer to their difficulties thought 
they were suffering from a different ailment (like heart condition), they did not 
know of or could not remember any afflictions or referred to having had car 
accidents. 
  Physical, cognitive and emotional difficulties were mentioned in most cases as 
difficulties on their own right, not as direct consequence of having had a brain 
injury. 
  Memory problems and concentration problems were the only cognitive difficulties 
discussed by the participants. 
  Some participants had observed some emotional difficulties (like mood swings) in 
themselves and from the time of the brain injury but did not know why they were 
experiencing such difficulties. Other participants felt their emotional difficulties 
(i. e. depression) were secondary to having had a brain injury. 
  Participants, overall, considered themselves healthy. Their brain injuries were 
viewed as separate from their state of health. Only a handful considered their 
difficulties as a disruption to their health and four made both distinctions. 
  Most participants, although all of them were unemployed at the time of the study, 
expressed a desire to find a job. Some acknowledged limitations but those who 
did not did not know why they could not get back to performing certain activities 
or seek a job. This group expressed doubts as to knowing what they could do and 
some were fearful that doing something would worsen their condition. 
  Most participants did not refer to any emotional difficulties and thought that their 
emotional responses were their natural behaviour, part of life. Those who 
acknowledged emotional difficulties did so after observing reactions of others 
towards their behaviour. 
  Thinking about their difficulties helped most participants realise their limitations 
and put their situations in perspective. Those who did not admit to reflecting 
about their difficulties felt that thinking was an activity best avoided in favour of 
just doing. One participant felt that he did not have any memories to reflect on. 
  The brain injury was considered by the majority of participants as a point of 
change in their lives and most thought that their lives had been better pre-injury. 
Surprisingly, a few participants felt that their lives were better after the injury. 
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In general, the findings of Part One of this study point to the brain injury and physical 
difficulties experienced after the injury as the most salient characteristics in the 
participants' accounts or narratives. This finding, which if interpreted as individuals 
focussing only on their brain injuries and physical difficulties is in accordance with 
past work in the field (Nockelby and Deaton, 1986; Prigatano and Fordyce, 1986a), is 
not surprising under a constructionist view of the self That is, what happens to the 
body is likely to be fundamental to a person's narrative. However, under this view 
(discussed in Chapter Three) it is also acknowledged that a wholesome account of the 
self is likely to allow constitutive roles both for the body and for non-bodily 
difficulties in the narratives of selves. Non-bodily or cognitive and emotional 
difficulties were found to be of low salience in the narratives of the participants in this 
part of the study. Participants whose narratives did not include these difficulties 
thought that they were suffering from something different from a brain injury, they 
did not know if they had any difficulties, could not remember them or did not mention 
brain injury and referred to car accidents and accidents instead. All of which, in turn, 
points to the role of confusion, communication, memory and self-presentation in brain 
injury. Furthermore, when the accounts of the participants incorporated expressions 
of their difficulties these were mentioned as individual, single problems not as 
sequelae of the brain injury. This finding can be interpreted in two ways. It may 
indicate compartmentalisation of difficulties by the participants in an effort to deal 
with their difficulties in a separate and pragmatic way, or a genuine lack of knowledge 
of brain injury and its consequences. The accounts of the participants offered no clear 
evidence for one or the other explanation. 
The finding that memory loss and concentration problems were the only cognitive 
difficulties mentioned by the participants is also not surprising. It supports most 
studies into long term rehabilitation of people with brain injuries that account 
acknowledgement of these two concrete cognitive difficulties as the most common 
cognitive difficulties self-reported by people with brain injuries (Fleming and Strong, 
1999). More abstract cognitive difficulties like perceptual and information-processing 
difficulties seemed to remain unacknowledged. This finding that can point to a 
difference in the degree of abstraction of these "invisible" difficulties could be 
interpreted in three different ways. First, people with brain injuries participating in this 
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study may not be affected by these more abstract difficulties. Evidence for this 
explanation was not sought during this study as diagnosis purposes are beyond the 
aims of this thesis. Second, if participants were affected by more abstract cognitive 
difficulties, they may not have had the self-knowledge to interpret them as cognitive 
difficulties and as consequences of their brain injuries. Evidence for the knowledge, or 
the lack of, that people with brain injuries have about difficulties that can follow their 
traumas will be sought in Study Two of this thesis. Third, people in the social 
environment of the brain injured may not have informed participants about these 
difficulties. This interpretation will be explored further in Part Two of this study and 
in Study Three. 
Similarly, the finding that a few participants had observed some emotional difficulties 
in themselves also corresponds with the literature. However, and in general, 
participants were able to distinguish between primary emotional difficulties and 
secondary emotional difficulties, with most participants accepting that they were 
affected by the latter. What is interesting though was that participants who had 
observed primary emotional difficulties in themselves did so in reaction to behavioural 
reactions from others or through being told that their behaviour was upsetting. This 
finding would then point towards the importance of the other emphasised in the 
symbolic interactionist tenet which is postulated in this thesis. However, and bearing 
in mind that these difficulties were the least mentioned and the most troublesome 
reported in the literature, it is possible to assume that emotional difficulties could 
have been more widely spread amongst the participants in the study. 
Furthermore, and in reference to participants talking about their difficulties it is worth 
mentioning that two participants did not make references either to brain injury or any 
kind of difficulty. One of these participants said that he did not know what was 
happening to him and the other declared that he could not remember anything. While 
the first participant's account indicates possible confusion, the second participant's 
account emphasises the role of memory in self-knowledge. The finding may be the 
first indication that individuals with brain injuries construct their post-injury identities 
in terms of what they can remember or know. This distinction, which will be explored 
further in Study Two, is important because it allows people with brain injuries to 
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learn about their difficulties during social interaction without really remembering 
them. This has practical implications for rehabilitation which will also be discussed at 
a later stage. 
Participants in general, showed poor understanding of the implications of their 
difficulties. Although a few participants mentioned explicitly that they did not know 
the extent of their difficulties, most participants considered themselves healthy and 
saw their difficulties as no obstacle to returning to work or pre-injury activities. For 
example, in most cases when participants talked about their health, brain injury was 
not included in their accounts. This finding could be interpreted in three ways. First, 
participants genuinely did not understand their difficulties and therefore could not 
foresee their implications (this interpretation will be explored further in Study Two of 
this thesis). Second, brain injury was not part of the participants' social 
representations of health. The concept of social representations, as used by Moscovici 
(1984), points towards the social nature of beliefs. That is, people do not merely have 
an individual stance or attitude towards something, they also partake of general 
beliefs and shared theories about the nature of the world. In this case, if the general 
concept of health does not include specifically not having had a brain injury, it may be 
that brain injury is not included into any possible concepts of health an individual may 
held. Third, participants were giving accounts of health excluding brain injury in order 
to present themselves as healthy individuals. This last interpretation is explained 
better by Radley and Billig (1996). According to these authors when people are asked 
about their states of health, their accounts construct states of health as part of their 
ongoing identity. This means that the accounts that are given of health, and illness, or 
in this case brain injury, are more than a disclosing of a supposed internal attitude. In 
offering views, Radley and Billig suggest, people are also making claims about 
themselves as worthy individuals, as more or less "fit" participants of the social world. 
In consequence, any shortfall in health has important implications for other areas of 
one's life (i. e. work, relationships) in terms of which people feel that they are 
evaluated. Accounts of health are therefore, more than descriptions of one's physical 
conditions and more than views about what people in society should do to avoid 
illness or injury. They also articulate a person's situation in the world and indeed, 
articulate that world, in which the individual will be held accountable to others. 
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Therefore, and in the interview context, the accounts of health given by most 
participants in this study could have been efforts to show "normality". Indeed, 
participants' expressed desires to return to work or pre-injury activities would support 
this interpretation. 
Another finding of this part of the study was the tendency to reflectivity expressed by 
most participants. When participants talked about thinking about health their thoughts 
reflected the understanding that brain injury was regarded as different from their state 
of health. Instead, their thoughts about health indicated the "normality" in which 
participants regarded their state of health by focussing on diets, exercise and healthy 
life styles (i. e. drinking, smoking). Thinking about what participants could do and 
were able to do were the main areas participants felt "brought home" the realisation 
that they could not quite do certain pre-injury activities, like their previous jobs, or 
that they had lost certain pre-injury abilities, like being able to do DIY. This 
realisation however, did not seem to lead participants to attribute their lost skills to 
particular difficulties. In addition, a minority only of participants admitted to 
focussing their thoughts on themselves. Thinking about the self gave participants a 
global perspective of their situations as opposed to perspectives of their difficulties. 
Interestingly enough, participants who did not admit to thinking about themselves 
were still conscious of declining to think about themselves. Only one participant 
remarked that he could not remember his thoughts, which would point yet again to 
the role memory plays in self-knowledge and awareness. 
Finally, and to another finding, even when participants in the study talked about their 
difficulties and the implications of these difficulties in a way that indicated that they 
constructed themselves positively, these constructions were negative in their temporal 
comparisons. For most participants it was found that the brain injury had not only 
provided the participants with a point of change in their lives but this change was seen 
in an unfavourable light. Surprisingly, for six participants the brain injury had 
represented a turn for the better. 
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5.3. PART TWO: SIGNIFICANT OTHERS TALKING TO PEOPLE WITH 
BRAIN INJURIES 
5.3.1. Method 
5.3.1.1. Participants 
All the participants in Part One of the chapter (N=30) were asked permission to 
approach a significant other, either a relative or close friend known to them before 
their brain injury. During this first study, participants were asked whom they 
considered the most important and close person to them in their lives. Twenty nine 
people with brain injuries appointed relatives as their significant other, one designated 
a friend. Of these twenty nine, sixteen lived with and cared for the brain injured 
person. Twenty-two significant others agreed to take part in the study. The criterion 
for participation was that the brain injured participant had appointed them as 
significant other. These included 4 fathers, 3 husbands, 6 wives, 1 sister, 1 son, 5 
mothers, 1 friend and 1 brother. The participants were aged between 17-73 years. 
5.3.1.2. Procedure 
Participants were interviewed in their homes, places of work or in the day care centre 
that the brain injured person attended. Interviews lasted between thirty minutes and 
an hour. The interview consisted of a semi-structured interview and the answers were 
recorded, transcribed and analysed using content analysis. The interview schedule, 
which was developed from the literature (see Appendix Two), targeted two areas: 
knowledge of difficulties and implications in people with brain injuries by the 
significant other, and interaction between the significant other and the brain injured 
person when faced with these difficulties and their implications. 
Observed difficulties and their implications 
In order to investigate the observed knowledge of difficulties and implications of 
these difficulties in people with brain injuries by significant others a series of general 
questions addressed: 
  Changes in the activities of the brain injured person (i. e. whether the brain injured 
person used to be viewed as active pre-morbidly, whether the brain injured person 
was considered as active after the injury). 
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0 Changes in the abilities of the brain injured person (i. e. whether the brain injured 
person was considered as able in daily activities as before the injury). 
  Knowledge of future plans of the brain injured person (Did the significant other 
know about future planned activities of the brain injured person? Possible return 
to work? ). 
  Changes in the social life of the brain injured person (i. e. whether the brain injured 
person keeps in touch with friends and vice-versa, how much did the person 
socialise before/after the injury? ). 
  Character changes (Did the significant other notice any character changes in the 
brain injured person? ). 
  Motivational changes in the brain injured individual (i. e. whether the brain injured 
person was considered a motivated person in the past, what was the motivation 
then, and was the person motivated in their daily activities after the injury). 
  Understanding of difficulties in the brain injured person from time of injury to 
present time (i. e. whether the significant other thought that the brain injured 
person understood about the injury just after it had happened/in the present). 
  Understanding of implications for the brain injured person from time of injury to 
present time (direct question). 
  Perception of changes in reflective processes in the brain injured person (i. e. was 
the person inclined to be thoughtful pre-morbidly and post-injury). 
Observed complaints made by significant others in this part of the study were 
compared with the spontaneous complaints made by the victims of brain injury in the 
Part One of the study. Each reported problem was characterised as either physical, 
cognitive or emotional. 
Explanation of difficulties and implications 
In order to investigate the discourses that the significant others used to explain 
difficulties and the implications of these difficulties, a series of questions addressed 
how significant others explained the following: 
  Physical difficulties (how do you talk/explain about physical loss/complaints? ). 
  Cognitive difficulties (how do you talk/explain about memory/information processing, 
etc, complaints? ). 
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  Emotional difficulties (how do you talk/explain about mood 
swings/verbosity/depression/lack of inhibition, etc.? ) 
5.3.2. Results 
A summary of the responses to general questions addressing observed knowledge of 
brain injury, difficulties and implications of these difficulties in the brain injured by 
significant others is given in Table 10. 
Table 10. Frequencies of responses to questions regarding knowledge of brain 
injury, difficulties and implications of these difficulties in people with brain 
injuries made by significant others. (N=22) 
Questions about: Yes No Don't know 
Changes in activities 21 1 0 
Changes in abilities 17 3 2 
Changes in social life 15 6 1 
Character changes 18 3 1 
Motivation changes 11 10 1 
Understanding of difficulties 15 4 3 
Understanding of implications 10 7 5 
Reflectivity 16 2 4 
It can be seen that the majority of significant others had observed changes in the 
activities, abilities, social life, character and motivation of the brain injured person. 
The majority of significant others also thought that the brain injured persons 
understood their difficulties and the implications of these difficulties. 
Twenty one significant others thought that the brain injured person had undergone a 
change in the level of activities carried out after the injury compared with the 
activities carried out before the injury due to the trauma: 
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"Yes she was, always on the move. She was always a girl that got up to all sorts of 
stuff, she was a competitive sailor, now she still sails but it is restricted mainly 
because of her sight. She cannot see very well, she gets tired very quickly and easily. 
I think the knowledge is still there, you know. The mechanics of sailing are still there 
but she is just limited by sight and tiredness, I think. " 
Only one person thought that the brain injured individual was as active in his daily 
activities as before the injury: 
"No, he worked very hard but I don't think he was an active person. " 
Similarly, the majority of significant others had observed a change in the abilities of 
the brain injured person due to the consequences of the brain injury: 
"Sport, football, cricket, he was good at school, reading spelling, he had an 
analytical mind, especially for historical matters. 
His problems now stem from his memory deficit. He is still very astute, he could still 
come up with an answer and see through something, just like that. But, you ask him 
to consider say a piece of history and then to ask him to comment; that is difficult 
for him. So it is the memory that is the problem. I don't think his sharpness has been 
affected by that, which I think is quite unusual in brain injury. I heard that people 
lose that ability to perceive things clearly. F is not like that at all, is just his memory 
which does not allow him to get the whole picture and does not allow him to make a 
proper judgement of it. 11 
Significant others who did not perceive any ability changes in the brain injured person 
reasoned that the brain injured person was as able as before the injury: 
"I. What do you think used to be good at? 
R: Figures, spelling, predicting the Man United results. 
I. What do you think 
_ 
is good at now? 
R: He is still good at spelling, he watches a lot of quiz programs, he knows about 
60-70% of the answers, figures is still reasonable, word searches he loves. 
I: In you opinion, is there room for improvement? 
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R: No, I think he has reached a level, which is not much less that what it was before 
the accident. " 
Two participants who did not know of any changes in the abilities of the brain injured 
person did not know because, in one case the brain injured person had sustained the 
injury at a young age so there was no established ability to compare with. 
"He was ten years old so it is difficult to say anything in particular. He was sporty 
and a normal child growing up. " 
and a second participant did not feel that she knew the brain injured person well 
enough before the injury: 
"His job, figure work, he used to be good at his job, the rest of the time he sat on a 
chair. I wish you were not recording this but I think that he was quite lazy and still 
is, before and after. I am on the go all the time, he sits down and that is a lot of his 
trouble. If I go back, I only got to know him because he bought a house about twenty 
yards from here, and it wasn't ready but he got his job and needed somewhere to 
stay. I got a bed and breakfast and he stayed with me for three months. I didn't get to 
know him well then because he was very quiet. " 
With respect to social life, fifteen significant others had observed changes in the social 
life of the brain injured person as a consequence of having had a brain injury: 
"I don't think that his friends see him as the man/boy that he used to be. They don't 
come around as much, they don't talk to him in quite the same way, some of them 
treat him like a charity case, which is depressing. I think that he is very aware of 
that, although he tries to deny it, but I think that he is aware. " 
Five significant others who had observed no change in the social life of the brain 
injured person explained that the brain injured person did not have much of a social 
life before the injury: 
"Not really, he spent a lot of time on his own and now he still does. He goes down 
the pub, smokes too much, drinks too much, the same as before. He always wanted to 
get married and have kids but know I think that he knows that because of the brain 
injury his chances of that happening are reduced. " 
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One participant explained that the brain injured person had managed to maintain the 
same social life as before the injury because of the ability she had of "putting up a 
front": 
"most people don't realise she has had a stroke. She is very good at hiding it 
naturally, but I think that there is an element of purpose as well. She knows that she 
can give herself away, she gets tired, and then she will try to explain what her 
problem is but not in brain terms but in high blood pressure terms. She will talk 
about her father and having inherited high blood pressure from her father, in a way 
she is minimising her problems. " 
One participant did not know of any social life change in the brain injured person due 
to the young age at which the injury had been sustained. This significant other did not 
feel that he had any basis to compare with. 
Eighteen participants in this study found that the brain injured person had undergone 
a character change due to the brain injury: 
I. " Do you think has changed since the injury? 
R: Yes. 
I: How has changed? 
R: She is a different person. I mean, she is really OTT about, you know, she will ask 
anybody anything than comes in her mind She talks, I mean the one good thing, in a 
sense, is that somehow she is confident now. She does not feel any embarrassment 
and she will talk to people. Before she would not talk to anybody, not to start a 
conversation herself, but now she is extremely friendly. Children and old people love 
her, she will talk to anybody in a wheelchair, she will wave at them, she is good with 
people. The social skills seem to have improved but sometimes it is too much and we 
know more people now because of her than ever before. Because she is good with 
people, she knows that she lacks inhibition and thinks it is good. 
Significant others who had not observed any character change saw the brain injured 
individuals as they were before the injury: 
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"He has lost confidence, but it is not a character change. He has lost his confidence 
because he is aware of his own disability. He does not speak as easily as he used to 
do. He finds it difficult, when he meets new people he just freezes, and he often 
complains "I don't know how to make new friends". With people here he is fine, with 
the family he is great. " 
One participant did not know of any character change in the brain injured person due 
to the young age at which the injury had been sustained. 
Eleven participants felt that the brain injured patient had lost motivation after the 
trauma: 
"His only motivation is the taxi that comes to take him to Y two days a week, his 
visits here, Saturday morning visits. When he moved, it was awful. He knew that he 
was moving on a Saturday and we gave him some cardboard boxes three days before 
for his books. I went to do some of it a day before the move and his plate was on the 
floor, next to his chair. In the morning of the day of the move, his plate was still on 
the floor next to his chair, the washing up was sitting in the sink, when he knew that 
he was moving. And he sat there with the TV on and us doing the moving. When he 
got to his new home, he sat in front of the Tip and left us to do all the work again. He 
didn't do a thing, he didn't prepare a thing. " 
Ten significant others explained that they had not observed any change in motivation 
in the brain injured person after the trauma: 
"Daily living, he was very disciplined before and he has not lost that. He asks me 
what we are doing during the day and so on. " 
One participant didn't know of any changes in motivation because she was not in 
regular contact with the brain injured individual. 
Fifteen significant others had observed that the brain injured individuals had 
understanding of the difficulties that afflicted them: 
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"She does, she gets very depressed and she has had this relapse and her legs had got 
worse and she said to me, not long ago, "before long a shall be in a wheelchair". 
You know, so she does realise and gets very depressed about it. " 
Significant others who felt the brain injured person did not understand their 
difficulties (four participants) reasoned that the aims the brain injured individual had 
set for themselves were unrealistic: 
"I think he thinks that he is going to go back to work, then he wants to drive and then 
he gets fixed ideas in his mind about what he is going to do. His GP said to him that 
he could not go back to work and he could not drive either so he thinks of other 
things he can do" 
Participants who did not know if the brain injured person understood their difficulties 
explained that memory problems made understanding difficult: 
"I don't know, he knows it, he knows that there is a lot of his We missing because of 
it. ºº 
Ten significant others thought that the brain injured person understood the 
implications of the difficulties encountered as a consequence of the brain injury: 
"He knows that he will not do what he wanted to do before the injury. I mean the 
very fact that he comes to Y, and he accepts that, shows that he does know. Because 
he never would have come to a place like this. Obviously, any young person does not 
want to be seen dead in an institution. He is getting rather fed up with coming here, 
he would like to have a job. But this is a difficult subject because he is on benefit 
and any job that he did would have to be very secure and well paid as, as soon he 
had a job, he would lose the benefit and it is difficult to get it back. Head injuries 
are not very well understood by social services. But he is capable, if it is supported, 
he needs someone to tell him what to do. He does show a certain amount of initiative 
now but it is still leaning on me. 
Seven significant others thought that the brain injured individual did not understand 
the implications of their difficulties. One participant explained that the invisibility of 
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the difficulties made it difficult for the brain injured person to understand the 
implications: 
"Not really because it is not physical. He can't see it so he can't understand it. He 
seeks pity and sympathy from others. He says that he has no confidence. He was in a 
five year relationship and his girlfriend could not take it anymore. In the end he 
attacked her, knifed her because she wanted to leave. And that is what he does if he 
cannot have his way. He has to have his way. He seems a bit better now because he 
attends the day care centre and has a new job but his bad temper will not allow him 
to keep his job. " 
Another participant explained that the brain injured person did not understand the 
implications of the injury because no one had talked to her about it: 
"No, I don't think she knows how awful it can be. I would not like to put that in her 
mind However, I hope that it will not happen to the degree that it can happen, why 
make somebody more frightened? You know, you should enjoy each day at the level 
it is, I am sure, because it can get worse, obviously. " 
Three participants who did not know if the brain injured person had an understanding 
of the implications of difficulties explained that the complexity of the person made it 
difficult to judge the understanding of the implications of difficulties: 
"I don't know, not knowing how his brain works or not, how does anybody know? he 
is very cunning, he is very good at disguising things, other people don't know, he 
went to this centre and his eyes were poorly then, they gave him a test to do in which 
he had to read the instructions, he couldn't do the test, but he couldn't do it because 
he couldn't read the instructions and made up that he could, at that time he didn't 
have his glasses, he couldn't read the instructions and then the people there said that 
he could not follow instructions, they did not notice that his eyes had got worse, he 
could not read, so you see, sometimes people are very stupid. It is very hard to know 
how much he knows, how much he disguises, how much he plays. " 
Two participants said that they did not want to talk about the subject so as not to 
discourage the brain injured person: 
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"I am never sure that he is fully aware of his problems and I don't want to dwell too 
much either because I want to keep his hopes up that things are going to get better. I 
keep quiet for his sake. " 
Sixteen significant others had observed changes in reflective processes in the brain 
injured person. Most of these changes meant that the brain injured person had become 
more self-centred since the brain injury: 
"She is thinking all the time on the things she can do or would like to do and on how 
to do them. I think she thinks a lot about what she is going to do, before she does it, 
and of course, she goes ahead, and when it comes the time to do it she has forgotten 
half of it. She remembers everything she has to do until she comes to doing it, then 
she forgets about it. " 
However, two significant others did not think that the brain injured person had 
become more self-centred but obsessive: 
"He worries now, he gets what I call obsessions in his head and he will get 
something in his brain and he will not get it out. " 
Four participants who explained not knowing if the brain injured person had become 
more self-centred pointed to the fact that memory problems made it difficult to judge: 
"Is hard to say, because he is always in this feeling of 'just come round". I think that 
is partly why he does not expect to do too much, " 
In general, observed brain injury, physical, cognitive and emotional complaints are 
summarised in Table 11. 
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Table 11. Percentages of complaints made by significant others (Part Two, 
N=22) and people with brain injuries (Part One, N=30). 
Complaints Significant other People with brain 
injuries 
Mention of brain injury 77.2% 66.7% 
Mention of physical 77.2% 66.7% 
difficulties 
Mention of cognitive 81.9% 46% 
difficulties 
Mention of emotional 81.9% 36.7% 
difficulties 
In general terms, it can be seen that significant others made more complaints about 
cognitive and emotional difficulties, brain injury and physical difficulties, in that order, 
than people with brain injuries made in the previous study. 
It is also useful to compare complaints about brain injury, physical, cognitive and 
emotional difficulties made by significant others with the spontaneous complaints 
made by the brain injured participants of the Part One of the study on an individual 
basis (Table 12). 
Table 12. Number of brain injured participants who mentioned brain injury in 
Part One compared with their significant others who mentioned brain injury in 
Part Two. 
Mention of brain injury in 
Part One 
Mention of brain injury in 
Part Two 
Yes No 
Yes 13 4 
No 4 1 
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Of the twenty people with brain injuries who mentioned having had a brain injury in 
Part One of the study, three significant others declined to participate. Of the 
remaining seventeen, thirteen mentioned brain injury in the present study. 
Twenty brain injured participants made physical complaints in Part One of the study. 
Of these twenty, four designated significant others refused to take part in this study 
and twelve talked about physical difficulties. Four significant others did not mention 
any kind of physical difficulty (Table 13). 
Table 13. Number of brain injured participants who mentioned physical 
difficulties in Part One compared with their significant others. 
Mention of physical difficulties 
in Part One 
Mention of physical difficulties in 
Part Two 
Yes No 
Yes 12 4 
No 5 1 
Fourteen participants in Part One of the study mentioned cognitive difficulties. Eight 
designated significant others in this part of the study talked about cognitive 
complaints, two did not mention cognitive complaints and four declined to participate 
in the study (Table 14). 
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Table 14. Number of brain injured participants who mentioned cognitive 
difficulties in Part One compared with their significant others. 
Mention of cognitive difficulties 
in Part One 
Mention of cognitive difficulties in 
Part Two 
Yes No 
Yes 8 2 
No 10 2 
Eleven brain injured participants of Part One of the study made emotional complaints. 
In this part of the study, five designated significant others made emotional complaints, 
one did not mention any kind of emotional complaint, four declined to participate and 
one died before the interview. 
Table 15. Number of brain injured participants who mentioned emotional 
difficulties in Part One of the study compared with their significant others. 
Mention of emotional difficulties in 
Part One 
Mention of emotional 
difficulties in Part Two 
Yes No 
Yes 5 1 
No 13 3 
In summary, significant others made more spontaneous complaints about brain injury, 
physical, cognitive and emotional difficulties in the people with brain injuries than 
those made in Part One of the study. 
164 
Chapter Five - Study One - What people with brain injuries tell and what they are told about their 
difficulties 
How do significant others explain difficulties to people with brain injuries? 
A summary of the responses to questions asking how significant others addressed 
physical, cognitive and emotional difficulties is given in Table 16. 
Table 16. Number of significant others who explained physical, cognitive and 
emotional difficulties. (N=22) 
Difficulties Explanations in terms 
of brain injury 
Other 
Physical 4 16 
Cognitive 3 13 
Emotional 4 14 
As can be seen only a minority of significant others tried to explain physical, cognitive 
and emotional difficulties in terms of the brain injury. 
Four significant others explained to the brain injured individual about physical 
difficulties in terms of the brain injury: 
"She keeps saying about the driving test, that she will take the disabled person one. 
Whether it is a longing rather than a feel that she can do it, I am not sure, because 
she has lots of ambitions in her own way, overconfident. I am not sure that she 
realises that she can't do things. Lately she has come up saying that she wants to do 
this or that and I think its mad and I had to say to her that she has to realise that she 
has a brain injury, a slight one, but a brain injury, and she has taken this on board 
and now when she does something stupid she apologises and says, well, I am sorry, 
but I have a brain injury. Whereas before, she never admitted that she had a brain 
injury, the fact that she went to a day centre for brain injured people was incidental 
for her. When it got too much I said, well, it is because you have a brain injury that 
you are going there and you have to realise your limitations. " 
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Sixteen significant others did not explain physical difficulties in terms of the brain 
injury. Five thought that it was better to give the brain injured person things to do 
instead of talking: 
"I just tell him to get off his backside. Sometimes I tell him that something needs 
doing and he looks at me and says "I can't do it yet". I want the bathroom decorated 
and things like that. After his stroke I wanted my bedroom decorated so to make him 
do something I emptied the room and started I made him do it but he is a 
perfectionist. It is not how he likes it done, because I went on painting above him 
and below him and he came behind me to do it all. But because he is a perfectionist 
if he cannot do it properly he won't try. He gets into his head that he cannot do it 
and he does not bother to do it. My daughter's hair drier broke down and she said 
"Oh Dad will fix it" he used to fix things like that so I gave it to him and said "This 
needs fixing go and do it". Because it took him two days, it was not good, or so he 
thought. But he fixed it. " 
Four assumed that the brain injured person knew about physical difficulties because 
they were obvious and somebody else had explained them to them: 
"The first thing he remembers, he thought that he was in hospital because he had 
had an asthma attack. That is what he thought he was in hospital for. Then when we 
spoke to him afterwards we realised that somebody in the hospital had told him that 
he had had an accident and that he was going to be disabled for the rest of his life. 
And he seemed to accept it, you know, he does not remember much. He remembers 
quite a lot about his childhood and everything but there seems to be a blank about 
eighteen months before his accident and about a year after his accident. So he is 
missing two and a half years of his life. I think that a psychologist at the hospital 
explained everything to him. We never had to talk about it, we thought that it was 
obvious. " 
Five significant others thought that it was better not to talk about physical difficulties 
so as not to make the brain injured person focus on them and that it was better to 
listen and encourage the brain injured person: 
"We don't talk about it very much because I feel that if we talk about it he focuses on 
it too much, I don't know whether that is right or wrong". 
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"He manages most things and he does it without complaining. He is not very 
amenable to having advice given. I suppose his difficulties are not that great that I 
had to say "Why don't you do it this way or that way? ". He picks up the kettle with 
his right hand, and sometimes with his left hand and does a peculiar movement to 
compensate for his right hand and I say "why don't you use that hand? " and he says 
because it is easier with this one, so I try to encourage him to use that hand. " 
One significant other was afraid of the consequences of talking about the physical 
difficulties: 
"He asks me the reasons of his failures but he does not always like the answers that I 
give him and he gets very nasty and angry. If I am frank he gets nasty and thinks 
that we don't want to help him so we have to be careful and tell him that we are 
supporting him but if he does not see immediate results he gives up. He is hard. We 
guide him and when he does not want to do something, he does not do it. " 
another significant other thought that it was better not to talk about physical 
difficulties but to treat those with a bit of humour. 
Three significant others talked about cognitive complaints in terms of brain injury 
with the brain injured person when these inquired into their cognitive difficulties: 
"Well, I keep going over things really. We have got a white board in the sitting room 
and another one by the bed, with a list of things, its got about five questions that he 
asks over and over again with their answers. I have printed those on paper so that I 
can put it in the car and other places so that he can go over them, but basically I just 
tell him what happened, briefly. If he goes into "where was I? " and that sort of thing, 
I do tell him. We spend most sort of time having the same conversation. " 
However, thirteen significant others did not explain cognitive difficulties to the brain 
injured person in terms of brain injury. One mother and one son felt that the brain 
injured person did not wanted to talk about their cognitive difficulties: 
"Well, I say to him "Hey, this shows that your memory is improving" and he will 
often say "can we not talk about this please? ". He does not like me talking about it. I 
think he is thinking about it so much himself that he does not want to have anyone to 
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confirm it, and yet I am not confirming it, I am trying to look ahead. Its possible that 
he is thinking that if no one talks about it, it does not exist, I am not sure. " 
One wife did not talk about cognitive difficulties because she was afraid the brain 
injured person would focus on these too much: 
We don't talk about it very much because I feel that if we talk about it he would focus 
on it too much. 
Five significant others felt that there was no need to explain cognitive difficulties but 
giving things to do to the brain injured person minimised these difficulties: 
"She does not really ask. We just say, you know, try and concentrate, read that 
again, would you stop talking. She will do it for a few minutes and then she is bored, 
we try to tell her to do things instead of explaining, we try hard most of the time and 
then we give up. " 
Three significant others assumed that the brain injured person knew their cognitive 
difficulties because someone else had told them about them: 
"I don't explain, the medical personnel, the doctors, have explained what is going 
on, she has by and large accepted that, I left it to the professionals. " 
A wife and a father felt that it was better to listen and only talk about positive things 
in the life of the brain injured person: 
'By talking about all the positive things that are in his We. There is no point in 
talking about negatives. " 
Four significant others explained to the brain injured individual that the emotional 
difficulties experienced were a consequence of the brain injury: 
7just say that he has been very ill and Igo through the business of explaining what 
happened and tell him how lucky we are to have him. I tell him that he is getting 
better. I try to be optimistic about this getting better, but realistic when he asks 
about getting his memory back, I say, well, it will get better than what it is now, it 
wont get back to what it was. " 
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However, fourteen significant others did not explain emotional difficulties in terms of 
the brain injury. Two mothers preferred to tell their brain injured sons what to do 
instead of reasoning: 
"I say 'Come on snap out of it" 
Four significant others thought that it was better not to mention the subject so as to 
help self-acceptance: 
"No, I feel is best to let him get on with his life as he is now, not to keep thinking 
back and try and tell him what he was like. I think that that is unfair to A. because he 
has got to accept life as it is now, not what it was like sort of twelve years ago. " 
Three thought that it was better to listen and not say anything: 
"I don't, I just listen. If I know he wants to argue I leave and I go up to my room. In 
the past, a strategy that he has used is to go out for a walk. " 
Three significant others did not mention the subject because they assumed the brain 
injured person knew about the emotional difficulties: 
"I think she knows because when she gets into a mood I tell her to go away and come 
back when she is different and that really winds her up. She calls me everything and 
then the following day is all calm. Sometimes Igo out and come home, you know, 
and go out to get the newspapers and she is OK but when I come back she is in a 
mood, something has happened. " 
One husband who did not mention explaining about emotional difficulties explained 
that employing a different strategy, like using humour to refer to difficulties, was a 
better way to deal with problems: 
"There are changes, she has put on weight, significantly, and she does not like it and 
we have a quiet chuckle about that. Medication has a bearing on it. She is 
remarkably cheerful which you have to appreciate, but that is due to the fact that she 
is taking an anti-depressant. This anti-depressant is being reduced, slowly, whereas 
it was a tablet a day, now is a tablet every other day. " 
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and one wife found that trying to explain emotional difficulties in the past had not 
been successful but a change of subject was a better strategy: 
It is very difficult. I used to put his arm round and try to make it better, talking to 
him but now I just change the subject and I find that is easier. Get his mind thinking 
of something else. " 
5.3.3. Part Two - Summary and Discussion 
  Significant others reported having observed cognitive and behavioural changes, 
alongside character changes, changes in social life and loss of motivation in the 
brain injured individuals they supported. 
  Most significant others thought that their brain injured friends or relatives 
understood the nature of their difficulties and their implications. A minority of 
significant others, however, reported unawareness of difficulties and lack of 
understanding of the implications of these difficulties based on the unrealistic 
expectations observed in the brain injured, their lack of memory, the invisibility of 
the difficulties and lack of communication. 
  Overall, significant others made more complaints about cognitive and emotional 
difficulties in the brain injured individuals they supported than those brain injured 
individuals made about these two areas of difficulty. 
  Only a minority of significant others had tried to explain the difficulties and 
implications to the brain injured. Overall, significant others actively avoided 
approaching these subjects. 
In general, and in contrast with the results of Part One, the results of Part Two of the 
study were very much in accordance with past literature on the outcome of brain 
injury (Prigatano, 1999). Significant others reported cognitive and behavioural 
changes, alongside character changes, changes in social life and loss of motivation in 
brain injured individuals. A minority of significant others reported unawareness of 
difficulties and lack of understanding of the implications of the difficulties that follow 
a brain injury in their brain injured relatives or friends. Most significant others, 
instead, expressed the view that their brain injured relatives or friends seemed to 
show an understanding of their brain injury related difficulties and of the implications 
that these difficulties posed for their everyday lives. An observed tendency to become 
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more reflective or self-centred was also expressed. However, when comparisons were 
carried out across both studies it was found that significant others reported more 
complaints about brain injury, physical difficulties and cognitive and emotional 
difficulties, in that order, than the brain injured people they supported did. This is also 
consistent with previous work in the field (Santos, Castro-Caldas and Sousa, 1998). 
Thus, and although the correspondence found between the accounts in Part One and 
Two of the study provides some evidence for the importance of communication in 
awareness of difficulties following a brain injury, the disparity of accounts does not. 
This disparity of complaints could support on one hand the hypothesis of denial of 
difficulties by people with brain injuries. On the other hand however, it could point to 
a lack of communication between significant other and patient about these particular 
difficulties due to a variety of reasons. These reasons could be enumerated as follows: 
1) information is not given by significant others so as not to discourage the 
rehabilitation attempts of people with brain injuries; 2) memory problems in people 
with brain injuries, in some cases, means that patients forget information when given; 
and 3) significant others lack of information about cognitive and emotional difficulties 
that can follow a brain injury. In addition, "invisible" difficulties like cognitive and 
emotional difficulties, due precisely to their invisibility could be judged by some 
significant others as difficult to understand and therefore, they avoid talking about 
them. 
Further, and although reasons one and two were found in Part Two of the study, no 
significant other complained about lack of information about difficulties that could 
follow a brain injury or lack of understanding of such difficulties. On the contrary, the 
accounts of some significant others implied knowledge and implied understanding of 
cognitive and emotional difficulties, and believed them too difficult for people with 
brain injuries to understand. 
However, the findings that are more relevant to this study are those related to 
explanations of difficulties and implications given by significant others to people with 
brain injuries. Overall, significant others did not try to explain brain injury related 
difficulties and implications to the patients in their everyday interactions. This was 
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observed across all physical, cognitive and emotional reported difficulties. Significant 
others who reported physical difficulties experienced by the patient gave a number of 
reasons as to why they did not explain these difficulties. Significant others thought 
that: when it came to physical difficulties it was better to keep the person occupied 
and active instead of talking; that talking about physical difficulties would just bring 
the difficulties into focus for the patient; that not talking about difficulties would be 
interpreted as a sign of encouragement and support by the patient. In addition, some 
assumed that the patients knew about these difficulties because they were too obvious 
and others were afraid of the negative reactions explanations would have in the 
patient. Significant others who did not explain about cognitive difficulties and 
implications explained that: it was better to explain only if asked; some assumed that 
the brain injured person did not want to talk about difficulties; that talk would make 
the patient think about these difficulties; that it was better to talk about positive things 
only and others assumed that the brain injured person knew about cognitive 
difficulties because someone else had told them about them. Emotional difficulties 
were not explained either because significant others thought that it was better to keep 
the brain injured person occupied instead of talking; silence was seen as a help to self- 
acceptance and that listening was considered better than talking. Significant others 
felt that explanations would upset the brain injured person, diminishing the problem 
was better than talking about it and some assumed that the brain injured person 
already knew about the emotional difficulties experienced. Lack of communication 
seems to be due, then, to two reasons: the visibility of physical difficulties and the 
active avoidance of the subject or subjects. 
Visibility of physical difficulties is analogous to the adage "A picture is worth a 
thousand words". The finding that significant others avoid explaining physical 
difficulties because these are obvious comes as no surprise. The phenomena of people 
with a brain injury knowing about and focusing on physical difficulties has been 
assumed clinically and in the literature to arise from the obvious. That is, physical 
difficulties are hard to deny, being visible and demonstrably present (when they exist), 
and that such difficulties are arguably more acceptable to the patient. In addition, the 
neuropsychological literature offers plenty of evidence in support of the idea that 
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awareness of physical difficulties is the first awareness that develops in the patient 
following the trauma of brain injury (Fleming and Strong, 1999; Prigatano, 1999). 
However, social psychological research into active avoidance of communication has 
shown that when adverse events occur in life, family and friends rally to restore a 
person's self-esteem by focusing on the positive qualities of the person or situation 
(Taylor and Brown, 1988,1994). The link between physical difficulties (including 
changes to the body) following brain injury and self-esteem has been empirically 
demonstrated by Keppel and Crowe (2000). In a study with stroke patients, the 
authors indicated that self-reported body image was associated with significant 
reductions in all measures of self-esteem. Significant others in this study, using 
perhaps what could be called "common psychology" chose to avoid talking to people 
with brain injuries about physical difficulties. This silence, in some cases, was 
supposed to be interpreted by the brain injured person as a sign of encouragement and 
support. The implication being that normative social interaction, or in this case the 
lack of it, would encourage if not positive self-evaluations, at least realistic ones. 
Similarly, studies on communicating negative information (Tesser and Rosen, 1975; 
Todd and Shearn, 1997; Finlay and Lyons, 1999) indicate some reasons for avoiding 
this sort of communication. These are that the role relationship between the people 
communicating counts at the time of transmitting negative information, that the 
content of the communication can be considered unimportant, that communicating 
negative information is unnecessary, that the information may upset the recipient of 
the news and that communicating negative information may not be practical for the 
everyday dealing with difficulties. Four of these reasons correspond to the reasons 
given in this study. Significant others thought that communicating positive 
information was more important than negative. In some cases, significant others tried 
to diminish the importance of the communication. In other cases, significant others 
thought that the brain injured person would get upset if difficulties and implications 
were talked about and in addition, some significant others felt that it was another 
person's responsibility to tell the brain injured individual about these matters. 
Furthermore, Tesser and Rosen (1975) also explained that denial on the part of the 
recipient, that the communicator would be evaluated negatively and that it would 
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cause the communicator to experience negative feelings, could count as reasons for 
actively avoiding communicating negative information. Of these further reasons, only 
one of them applies to this study. That is, significant others assumed that people with 
brain injuries would not want to talk about brain injury difficulties and their 
implications. 
Nevertheless, this study found additional explanations for actively avoiding giving 
negative information. First, some significant others reasoned that giving explanations 
would only make the brain injured person focus on his or her difficulties. This reason 
can be interpreted as trying to keep the person away from the self and it offers 
support for Duval and Wicklund's (1972) theory of objective self awareness. Duval 
and Wicklund (1972) argued that contact with the ideas of others would serve as a 
stimulus that would cause objective self awareness (objective because the self is 
considered an object for these authors) as far as these ideas are different to the ones 
held by the self Second, some significant others thought that keeping the brain 
injured person active was preferable to giving explanations. This reason, keeping the 
brain injured person active, offers support for the idea of "imposition". Imposition is a 
form of behaviour outlined by Kitwood in 1998 in what the author called "malignant 
social psychology". This malignant social psychology is described as an assault on the 
person's feelings of self worth, leading to the person being depersonalised. Imposition 
is then conceptualised in this context as the forcing of the person to do something 
without allowing choice on the person's part. Imposition, Kitwood explains is not 
intentional but rather, an innocent consequence of the often daunting and exhausting 
task of caregivers. The quotes below are examples of how significant others practise 
imposition: 
"I tell him to go and walk around so his legs will get some exercise. " 
"I just tell him to get off his backside. Sometimes I tell him that something needs 
doing and he looks at me and says "I can't do it yet". I want the bathroom decorated 
and things like that. After his stroke I wanted my bedroom decorated, so to make him 
do something I emptied the room and started I made him do it but he is a 
perfectionist. It is not how he likes it done, because I went on painting above him 
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and below him and he came behind me to do it all. But because he is a perfectionist 
if he cannot do it properly he won't try. He gets into his head that he cannot do it 
and he does not bother to do it. My daughter's hair drier broke down and she said 
"Oh Dad will fix it" he used to fix things like that so I gave it to him and said "This 
needs fixing go and do it" . Because it took him two days, it was not good, or so he 
thought. But he fixed it. " 
'My approach is entirely different, it is more 'for God sake K, get on and do it". I 
am quite nasty to him some times, because he comes to see me once a week, but the 
next week he'll come and thank me. It makes me so mad, I mean, there was a time 
when we got him to cook himself a meal once a week. Since he has been ill he has 
had meals on wheels but they don't come anymore. So we said, OK, why don't you 
cook something for yourself and he will say: "Oh, I don't know if I can" and I said, 
'you can if you plan it". For several weeks he did it but one day he came and said 
that he had not cooked and that the social worker had said that if he didn't feel like 
it he shouldn't do it. It made me so mad. I used to walk him on Saturdays but that 
has stopped also. " 
Third, another reason given by significant others for not explaining difficulties and 
implications is that it is better to wait for requests for information. This reason 
supports Goffman's (1955) idea that negative evaluations are only given when directly 
solicited, and then, if they are solicited it is because negative self-evaluations have 
already been carried out. In other words, the brain injured person would have needed 
to have carried out some sort of self-evaluation before approaching the significant 
other for information. By implication, if self-evaluatory mechanisms are not in 
working order or used or only positive self-evaluations are made, the brain injured 
person will not request further information and an impasse may be reached with the 
significant other which would prolong ignorance of difficulties and the implications of 
these difficulties. 
Finally, the assumption that significant others had about others having already given 
explanations about difficulties to the brain injured victims needs a closer look. More 
concretely, significant others assumed that hospital and rehabilitation staff had already 
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dealt with explanations. This result adds to the finding (Tesser and Rosen, 1975) that 
the role relationship between the two relevant people is inappropriate. That is, 
significant others felt that it was not up to them to provide this sort of information. 
However, this "buck passing" can be better understood if the level of complexity that 
explaining about brain injury would require is taken into consideration. Although not 
one participant in this study complained about lack of information on brain injury 
research into this area shows that this is a common problem. Swift and Wilson (2001) 
investigating the lack of knowledge and misconceptions concerning brain injury 
among the general public found that the public not only held inaccurate and 
inadequate knowledge about brain injury but inaccurate beliefs about recovery time 
and extent of recovery, lack of awareness of the problems it can cause, 
misconceptions about the capabilities of the brain injured person and misidentification 
of the brain injured person as mentally ill or learning disabled. 
The findings in this study add to a body of research that shows that people tend to 
inhibit direct communication of all types to others (Blumberg, 1972). The findings do 
not, however, explain the salience of knowledge of some difficulties that follow a 
brain injury and their implications; which were demonstrated by the brain injured 
individuals in the first part of the study. A variety of factors may have contributed 
then to the latter findings. For example, the fact that all the participants in this study 
were appointed by the people with brain injuries as significant others may correspond 
to what Swann (1987) calls self-verification. This concept suggests that people select 
others for interaction if these others are perceived as supporting one's views of the 
self. 
In addition, and from a social constructivist perspective, the self is dependent on the 
concepts available in a culture to construe a person (Harre, 1987b). Within a culture, 
there is a variety of perspectives on social actors and phenomena. That is, within the 
"culture" of brain injury there is a variety of perspectives ranging from the medical 
profession talking about brain injury, to families affected by brain injury, to 
rehabilitation staff, to the general public, to the views expressed by carers at day care 
centres. These perspectives would help construe the knowledge of people with brain 
injuries. If, out of all these perspectives, people with brain injuries are in regular 
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contact with one or two (the social network of people with brain injuries is usually 
reduced to family and rehabilitation staff, (Zencius and Wesolowski, 1999)), these 
may serve not to construe but to maintain the level of knowledge acquired while in 
contact with medical staff and during more professional settings (i. e. during 
hospitalization). Empirical research points to the fact that people tend to remember 
what speakers with perceived high status say more than what speakers with perceived 
low status say (Holtgraves, Srull, and Socall, 1989). The salience of the difficulties 
experienced by the brain injured person found in the first part of the study needs to be 
seen, then, as the product of social interaction with perceived higher status significant 
others (memory permitting) and maintained by significant others, of varying degree of 
perceived level of status, by actively avoiding contravening these ideas. This would 
explain the finding in this study (and previous others (Santos, Castro-Caldas and 
Sousa, 1998)) of significant others observing more cognitive and emotional 
difficulties than their brain injured relatives or friends. If people with brain injuries 
have been instructed on difficulties by health professionals, usually following a 
biomedical model which focuses only on the body and because the physical difficulties 
are most salient in the early stages after the trauma, then the more invisible 
psychological difficulties that can follow a brain injury would remain obscured and 
therefore, less well acknowledged by the patient. Further research into the ways 
health professionals communicate with people with brain injuries will be conducted in 
Study Three of this thesis. The study will attempt to establish the role these 
professionals play in awareness of difficulties following a brain injury. In the 
meantime, Study Two will address directly how people with brain injuries come to 
know about their difficulties. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
STUDY TWO - THE EMERGENCE OF KNOWLEDGE AFTER 
BRAIN INJURY: FINDING THE MISSING PIECES OF THE 
PUZZLE. 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
Part One of the first study of this thesis examined the salience of the brain injury and 
the difficulties that follow the brain injury in the narratives of people with brain 
injuries. It was seen in the study that most participants referred equally to their brain 
injuries and to their physical difficulties. Cognitive difficulties and emotional 
difficulties were referred to in second and third place respectively. The results also 
indicated that although some participants understood the limitations imposed by their 
difficulties most participants did not. In Part Two of the same study, most significant 
others showed reluctance to give information to people with brain injuries. This was 
in view of the physicality of some of the difficulties and in favour of protecting the 
person they supported and as a caring practice. 
The low salience of cognitive and emotional difficulties found in the accounts of 
people with brain injuries was explained in terms of lack of communication that was 
received from significant others in Study One. Thus, and as illustrated in the review of 
the literature, if the major source of self-knowledge is the coming into contact with 
the ideas of others and people with brain injuries vary in the extent to which they 
receive, attend to, understand, interpret or remember the information provided by 
others, then it is clear that some will not have this source of input into their self- 
knowledge. This is a possible explanation for the low salience of cognitive and 
emotional difficulties. 
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However, the low salience of cognitive and emotional difficulties together with the 
indication that some participants did not seem to understand the limitations imposed 
by these difficulties would support another interpretation. These results could be 
evidence of denial. That is, participants were aware of these difficulties and the 
implications of these difficulties and these then had been evaluated negatively for the 
self Hence, during the interviews, people with brain injuries avoided describing their 
difficulties and only used these descriptions when talking about the reaction of others 
and the situations they were in. This interpretation is difficult to contradict because, 
by definition, it refers to mechanisms that are hidden. Therefore, it could be applied to 
any situation whereby participants had not shown any concern for their difficulties or 
traumatic events occurring in their lives. In addition, the interpretation of denial 
would require the assumption that people with brain injuries were consistent with this 
strategy since it would have to be assumed that people with brain injuries both 
recognise the importance of their difficulties and their implications and avoid 
acknowledgement of them, across the physical, cognitive and emotional contexts. 
This consistency nevertheless was lacking throughout the interviews with these 
participants. More evidence is then necessary to support the explanation that the low 
salience of cognitive and emotional difficulties in the narratives of people with brain 
injuries is due to other reasons rather than motivated denial. Therefore, a second 
study was carried out to clarify how people with brain injuries gained knowledge of 
their difficulties, and to find out how they constructed these experiences. This study 
explored how information relating to the brain injury and subsequent difficulties was 
given and when and whether this information was remembered or known by people 
with brain injuries. This distinction is an important one to make since memory has 
been found to be an essential component in awareness (Chapter Three). To propose 
this distinction however, requires explaining the relationship between knowledge and 
remembering. It was described in the review of the literature (Chapter Three) that 
individual representations of the self are articulated and differentiated in memory. It 
was seen then that cognitive science has classified these representations in memory 
into two types of knowledge: semantic personal knowledge and episodic personal 
knowledge (Tulving, 1989). Semantic personal knowledge refers to information that 
has been abstracted from memories of the self in specific events (Tulving, 1989). 
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Semantic personal knowledge of traits may include the facts that a person is 
generous, active, unable or lazy. Episodic personal knowledge refers to memories of 
specific events involving the self (Tulving, 1989). Episodic personal knowledge of 
traits includes those instances in which behaviour was generous, active, unable or 
lazy. 
It was also seen that empirical evidence has examined the relationship between these 
two kinds of trait knowledge about the self. Research has consistently supported the 
view that in the field of trait knowledge, semantic personal memory and episodic 
personal memory are functionally independent. In other words, functionality of 
semantic personal memory does not require the functionality of episodic personal 
memory (Kihlstrom and Klein, 1994). Klein, Loftus and Plog (1992) for example, 
utilised the concept of transfer-appropriate processing in a study of recognition 
memory traits to show that different processes are involved in accessing the two types 
of memory. Klein, Loftus and Burton (1989) applied the principle of encoding 
variability in a study of recall for traits and found that the type of information made 
available by accessing semantic personal memory was different from that made 
available by accessing episodic personal memory. 
Thus, the remember-knowing distinction is of particular relevance to this study. The 
distinction may help underline that an individual may have knowledge of difficulties 
following a brain injury without having the memories from which to infer that 
knowledge. As already illustrated, in a study carried out by Levine, Black, Cabeza, 
Sinden, Mcintosh, Toth, Tulving and Stuss (1998) the authors found that 
remembering episodes from one's personal past is not possible in the absence of 
awareness of one's self. Using the remembering-knowing paradigm on a brain injured 
participant, the authors found that the participant's behaviour was driven by generic 
information about how he should behave, rather than by the goals and intentions that 
could arise from his own identity. Furthermore, Cermak and O'Connor (1983) 
reported the case of another patient with amnesia who spontaneously provided what 
initially appeared to be descriptions of memories but which, on further investigation, 
turned out to be well-established narratives that the patient was in the habit of relating 
during social conversations. Thus, knowing about difficulties may indicate that some 
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people with brain injuries may have learned to "narrate" their difficulties without 
really understanding them. 
This study was carried out in order to clarify the extent to which people with brain 
injuries participating in the research knew about their difficulties and the implications 
of these when asked explicitly. This is important when it comes to understanding the 
relationship between self-knowledge and others. Study One investigated the 
references made to their difficulties in descriptions of the self and the social 
environment without participants being prompted to describe their difficulties. Whilst 
providing evidence of the salience of their difficulties, it did not actually investigate 
whether participants would refer to their problems when asked about them. In terms 
of denial, this is important to know. If this is the case it will provide additional 
evidence for the interpretation that difficulties are not salient for other reasons than 
motivated denial, since the extent brain injured participants talk about their difficulties 
will be related to the relationship between representations of the self, communication 
and memory-knowledge. 
6.2. METHOD 
6.2.1. Participants 
All the participants of the first part of study one (N=30) were invited to take part in 
this study a year after the first interviews. Of the original participants, two had died 
and four had moved away. Twenty four people with brain injuries, 7 females and 17 
males (age range 19 to 62), attending two day care centres agreed to participate in 
this study. 
6.2.2. Ethical considerations 
The research ethics committee of the University of Surrey reviewed the proposal for 
the study. In this study, data were collected from participants who had sustained a 
brain injury. The interview procedure was explained carefully to the participants. 
Participants were assured that their participation was voluntary and that they could 
end the interview session at any time. Follow-up contact did not suggest that 
participants had been adversely affected by the procedures. 
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6.2.3. Procedure 
Participants were interviewed at the day care centres and interviews lasted between 
twenty minutes and half an hour. At the beginning of the interview, participants were 
asked to sign forms of consent as to their agreement to the participation in the 
research. The interview consisted of a semi-structured interview and the answers 
were recorded and transcribed verbatim. 
Each interview inquired about the precise difficulties mentioned by the participants in 
the first interview, i. e. if the participants had mention, memory problems or mood 
swings, the researcher focused the questions on these specific difficulties in this 
interview. 
The interview schedule (see Appendix 3) was designed to cover a defined spread of 
topics: 
  Emergence of knowledge - In order to elicit information to establish a time 
progression from injury to realisation of difficulties, questions addressed knowledge 
of physical, cognitive and emotional difficulties during hospitalisation, rehabilitation 
and reintegration into the community (i. e. whether the patients knew what was 
happening to them physically/cognitively/emotionally while in 
hospital/rehabilitation/home). To elicit information as to how this realisation came 
about, questions addressed pre-morbid knowledge of brain injury and brain injury 
difficulties which may have helped recognition of difficulties (did the participants 
know brain injury victims prior to their own brain injury? ). Questions also addressed 
the way in which the patients realised their difficulties (i. e. was it through own 
observation, were they told about them), which situations made their difficulties more 
obvious, their reaction to this knowledge and their actual situation (i. e. did they think 
that they knew about all their difficulties at the time of questioning? ). 
  Role of the other in emergence of knowledge - In order to inquire about the role of 
the other in increasing awareness of difficulties and implications of these difficulties, 
questions addressed who gave information to the participants about physical, 
cognitive and emotional difficulties, who explained to the victim the possible 
implications of having had a brain injury and what he/she could do to help these 
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difficulties. Participants were also asked with whom they discussed their difficulties 
on a daily basis (i. e. with whom do you talk about the difficulties you have in your 
daily life? ). 
  Remember/knowing paradigm - The remember/ knowing distinction was introduced 
in the interview by explaining to each participant such distinction. The researcher 
asked each participant to remember an important event in his/her life and invited 
him/her to describe it. Similarly, the researcher asked the participants a general 
knowledge question (i. e. what is the capital of France? ) and invited a response. Once 
the distinction was clear to the participants the researcher inquired about their 
particular problems in relation to remembering or knowing (i. e. whether the 
participant could remember or knew about difficulties following the brain injury and 
whether this distinction had always been the same since the time of the injury). In 
addition, the participants were asked to explained how the brain injury had occurred 
or been diagnosed and were asked if they could remember or knew about the event. 
6.2.4. Analysis 
Data from the interviews were analysed following the steps of the interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (IPA) method prescribed by Smith, Jarman and Osborn 
(1999; also Smith, Flowers and Osborn, 1997) and with the help of the qualitative 
research computer program NVIVO. Transcripts were analysed for recurrent themes. 
Themes emerged within individual interviews and across different interviews. The 
process of identifying themes involves several steps. Each transcript was read a 
number of times. Consequently, the analysis of each transcript began with initial 
thoughts, possible codes and anything of particular interest being highlighted. These 
were then coded with a key word or phrase that captured, broadly, the essence of the 
content. These represented emergent themes. The process was repeated for each of 
the transcripts. Following this, repetitions of these recurrent themes between the 
transcripts were taken to represent shared understandings. Each theme was then 
selected for more intensive analysis. This involved going back to the transcripts for 
further examination. First, all the transcripts were examined to identify all the extracts 
pertaining to each theme and make sure that text previously not selected was 
included. The next stages of analysis were all directed to determine what exactly 
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constituted the shared aspects of the participants' experience in relation to each 
theme. This involved looking at the extracts for each theme and re-coding them. Once 
this coding scheme had been created, each extract was then re-labelled. The next 
stage was to group the extracts according to these new coding categories. These 
categories were then used to explore patterns and relationships within and between 
the conceptual groups, thinking how different themes come together to help 
understand the participants experiences. 
6.2.5. Results 
Although the participants in this study varied in background, characteristics of brain 
injury and present life situations, they articulated several common themes in their 
accounts of their past and present experiences. Three main themes were found to be 
relevant for understanding participants' sense of self finding the bits of the puzzle, 
filling the holes in memory and redefining the self 
Finding the bits of the puzzle 
The expression "finding the bits of the puzzle" is used here as a metaphor to help 
describe the virtual detective work that participants had to undertake in order to put a 
picture together. This picture is one of a traumatic event, the brain injury, and the 
challenges that participants had to face because of having had a brain injury. 
The progressive character of knowing about the difficulties one can experience 
following a brain injury was a theme common to all the participants. Participants, 
when asked about their recovery process most mentioned becoming aware about 
some of their difficulties. Joel said when talking about his time in rehabilitation, "I 
was beginning to realise then that I had something wrong with my memory". To refer 
to this realisation of difficulties participants often used terms associated with 
discovery. Tony, for example, used the phrase, "I have discovered that I have these 
problems, I have discovered them because of the amount of trouble they are causing 
me". Thus knowing about one's difficulties following a brain injury was for 
participants in this study like trying to fit "discovered" bits of a puzzle together. 
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The progression was experienced in different stages. The stages can be easily 
compartmentalised as the knowledge acquired in hospital, during rehabilitation and 
knowledge acquired during their return home to the present day. During their time in 
hospital, the majority of participants explained that they did not know what was 
happening to them. A few awoke after coma or operations to observe physical 
difficulties, some suspected that there was something wrong with their memory and a 
few found themselves being more aggressive than they thought usual for them. When 
participants talked about this time spent in hospital, they described themselves as 
being trusting. For example, Miriam accepted treatment without quite understanding 
why she needed it: 
One day at the hospital I asked for a pillow and they said no, that I had to lay flat. 
Then B came and saw me and told me that I was dead in all my left side. Then the 
physio came up and gave me exercises. So I thought, "well, I must be dead in one 
side if I am doing these exercises" so I did them. 
Miriam accepted the treatment because she assumed that the experts would help her 
"to get better". 
This trust seemed to decline as participants explained their experiences during 
rehabilitation. At this stage, most participants explained that they knew about their 
physical difficulties, some about their cognitive difficulties and some about their 
emotional difficulties. Trusting was still a characteristic of participants that did not 
know about their difficulties at this point: 
I did not know what was happening, therapist kept trying to move my legs and so on 
but I did not know why. 
But it declined for participants that had some knowledge of what was happening to 
them: 
Yes, because I always asked people why I was doing what I was doing. 
On their return home, trusting had changed into an effort to get things back to pre- 
injury days or to try to become independent. A typical example was found in Tom's 
account: 
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after working with my Dad, we decided that I would go and work on my own. My 
Dad was not making enough money to keep us both. I looked in the paper and found 
a job in the garden centre. I applied there and I got the job then left and found the 
job I got now. 
Thus, getting things back to normal or attaining independence was the goal to which 
participants aspired. The equivalent of having completed the puzzle. 
Searching for bits. In the early stages of the brain injury, most participants did not 
know what was happening to them. They found themselves with no memory of what 
had happened to them and/or where they were and why. At this stage, all the 
participants relied heavily on the information received from others. A member of their 
family told some participants about what had happened to them: 
No, when I came round after three months I asked my wife what was I doing in the 
hospital. She told me that I had been involved in a car accident and that I was going 
to be moved to another hospital. 
Medical staff told others: 
It was described to me by my consultant as pouring acid on the foam. You can 
imagine what that does, it dissolves it away, the foam. 
Both, medical and family members told two participants. A minority was not told they 
had had a brain injury at all. Tom stated, "I was not told that I had a brain injury at 
all" 
In these early stages, learning about physical difficulties that were likely to follow 
their brain injuries meant relying on the information received by others. Some 
participants recalled learning about their physical difficulties from their families: 
I guess that it happened when I realised that I spoke with a slur and I was limping. 
In fact, it was my family who told me I was doing both. 
Others received the information from their doctors: 
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After a few months, the reality hit me and talking to the doctors, they told me that 
there was no cure, that I was going to be a vegetable. 
In some cases, the information was received from both families and medical team. 
Information about cognitive difficulties, on the other hand, was received at later 
stages, usually during rehabilitation, and was imparted in a few cases by a member of 
the medical team, a family member or staff at the rehabilitation centres. However, this 
information was not always communicated directly to the patient. Amy said: 
someone told me not to drive anymore so I knew I had some sort of cognitive 
problem. 
In other occasions, the medical team had communicated the information to the family 
and thus the family was left in charge of passing on this information: 
The doctor told my husband and my husband told me. 
Some participants received no information about the cognitive difficulties that could 
follow a brain injury. In a few cases, the information was generalised, leaving the 
patients to draw their own conclusions: 
No one really but a speech therapist that was trying to get me to talk properly 
mentioned that I would probably forget things because people that had accidents 
often had memory problems. She did not say memory problems were a consequence 
of brain injury, she said people who had been involved in accidents. 
This lack of information was more obvious when participants were asked about their 
emotional difficulties. Most participants did not know that emotional difficulties could 
be experienced after a brain injury. Members of their families told a few participants 
who experienced emotional difficulties about those on their return home: 
At home I was really nasty to my mum but I did not know until my mum died and my 
sister told me that mum was terrified of me. 
These explanations, in general, may have sounded reasonable to the participants but 
they were more readily accepted when they came from medical staff: 
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Because he was a specialist and I thought "I got to do what they say because they 
know what is all this about". He was a neurologist so he must have all the 
qualification and gone to college and everything. So I had to believe him. 
Information received from the family was attended to but cultural perceptions and 
fear of hidden motivations influenced the degree to which it was accepted. For 
example, Doug when talking about his wife said, "I can't always do as she says 
because in a marriage it is the man that is in charge", while John explained: 
being my wife, I find that I can't readily accept what she says because she is my wife 
and she has something to work for and something to work towards. A medical person 
has a different approach. They are not working for the same reason, for the same 
purpose. The medical people are experts. She is working to the same end but from 
another angle not necessarily with the same understanding and all the rest of it. 
Searching for more bits. Incomplete information meant for the participants that they 
continued to look for more detailed information. Some participants found that their 
familiarity with brain injury helped them to recognise the difficulties observed in 
somebody else in their own cases. These participants were familiar with brain injury 
because their pre-injury jobs involved dealing with people with brain injuries or 
because a member of their family had suffered a brain injury or because they had 
academically studied the physiology of the brain: 
I was surprised but because I had studied neurophysiology at length, I understood 
what had happened. 
The obviousness of the visible injuries was another clue that help participants gained 
knowledge of their difficulties: 
To me the broken bones was all there was anyway. The broken bones were an 
obvious side, but I couldn't see anything else. 
When the obviousness of the physical difficulties was not enough, external objects 
served as point of references for acquiring knowledge of their difficulties: 
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I discovered that my leg was shorter because of the shoes I had to wear. They were 
shoes with heels and I didn't like them but for a long time I didn't think that my leg 
was shorter. Now I wear boots. I want to be like everybody else. 
These external objects aided the acquisition of knowledge for the less visible 
difficulties too: 
The last year that I can remember in any way at all is 1997 and in my diary, it says 
that the year now is 2001. I am puzzled by this. I feel my memory up till 1997 is the 
same as everybody else's. 
However, activity was the biggest clue to acquisition of knowledge pointed at by 
most participants. For some participants undertaking an activity was an attempt to 
going back to normal life: 
When I went back to work, I noticed that I couldn't concentrate on anything for long. 
Certain aspects like memory and concentration were suffering. At home, it was the 
same; I could not pick up where I left. I was forgetting things. 
For other participants, activity was a situation they found themselves in, out of their 
control: 
I was discharged home and the hospital knew that I lived alone and had no one to 
care for me. They still sent me home, so I supposed it was as soon as I got home. 
Then I saw that I was not much good at doing anything. 
Social situations offered also an opportunity for realisation of difficulties. Tony said: 
In social situations, when I am about to go out to meet people, as I say the social 
situations. I find myself asking questions from people that I should not ask and I 
know that I should not ask them. I am impulsive, I don't think before I open my 
mouth. I got a bad curiosity and want to know private things from people. I don't 
know why I do it. I know is wrong but I am still doing it. I want to know how much 
people earn, their sexual habits, their horoscope. Some people get very, very 
annoyed with me when I start asking the questions, especially if they don't know that 
I have a brain injury. 
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Thus, putting the picture of their brain injuries and the challenges they had to face, 
together involved bits of information given by medical and family members. When this 
information was found wanting participants found other bits of information in their 
everyday lives. The time spent in hospital, and in some cases the duration of the 
coma, provided the frame to this puzzle. Participants used this information to evaluate 
the gravity of their conditions: 
During three months, I was out for the count. For three months, I did not know what 
had hit me, was that bad. 
Filling the holes of life. 
The "holes of life" was an expression that one of the participants used to refer to the 
blanks in her memory. Memory loss or difficulties with memory is one of the most 
common consequences of brain injury (McCarthy and Hodges, 1995). Although this 
memory loss usually affects short-term memory or/and long term memory, the term 
here was used by the participants in an autobiographical sense and to describe 
difficulties with short-term memory. 
All the participants in this study obtained some knowledge about their injuries and 
difficulties. Information received in the early stages of brain injury however, was used 
to fill the memory loss created by the brain injury. This information could not be 
contrasted with the happenings in memory to verify the information because for most 
participants the memory was not there: 
I don't remember what happen to me, but my mum told that I had had an accident. I 
was in the back sit of a car and the driver went round the corner too fast. I was 
clobbered; big time, smashed up totally. This is what I have been told anyway. 
However, these participants were able to give coherent accounts of what had 
happened to them. Thus, the stories and hearsay that was given to them by families 
and medical staff had filled the hole left in memory by the injury. They had found 
some missing bits of the incomplete puzzle. 
Similarly, when information about the difficulties that were likely to be experienced 
after the brain injury was given to the participants, blanks in knowledge seemed to be 
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filled. Barry said, "I was in no condition to remember or understand what was being 
said to me. It was like if they were telling me a fairy story, I would not have been able 
to dissociate the story from the truth". However, this filling in the blanks with 
information led the participants to know what was happening to them but to no real 
understanding of what was being explained to them: 
I had to stay in hospital for tests. Yes, but I did not understand what they were 
saying, it had no meaning for me. The doctor told me what was wrong with me but I 
did not understand what it meant. I did not know why I was walking weirdly. I had no 
idea. 
Acquiring knowledge in this way made participants believe that they knew about 
some of their difficulties in the early stages of the injury. Blanks of knowledge were 
filled with names of conditions that did not exist in their everyday language. Peter 
explained, "those problems I can't understand, they don't exist in my vocabulary". 
While for others it meant that they could recall their difficulties with no memory of 
them: 
I know I have a memory problem but I can't remember it. 
The process of learning about their difficulties was one that was considered by most 
participants as incomplete. These participants did not feel that they had managed to 
put all the bits of the puzzle together. Some participants felt at the time of the 
interview that they knew about of their difficulties and could put a name to them. 
Most participants however felt that the blanks were not filled and were a major 
obstacle in the continuity of their self while making them feel insecure in their 
everyday actions. Colin said, "the whole picture is not there, only parts of it stay". 
Redefining the self 
Although most participants learned the names of their conditions and had filled some 
holes in memory during the recovery process, many, at the time of interview, felt that 
this knowledge was not enough for understanding their present self Most participants 
knew that their present situations could be explained by their brain injuries, by causal 
relations with the brain injury. Some participants made use of this knowledge in 
different ways. A few did not refer to or refused to use such knowledge. 
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Attributing behaviour to the brain injury. Some participants in this study explained 
some behaviour as a result of their brain injury. These explanations were usually given 
when relating incidents about a behaviour that was not intended. Then, the causal 
relationship appeared as a disruption between intention and action by creating an 
outside agent that participants felt they could not control. This agent was talked 
about as something they could not understand. 
For instance, Tony mentioned various times that his brain injury accounted for 
difficulties in his life. He stated that the unnatural curiosity he experienced hindered 
his reintegration into society: 
I have discovered that I have these problems, I have discovered them because of the 
amount of trouble they are causing me with my friends. I seem to upset everybody 
and anybody. 
He thought that these difficulties were beyond his control. To overcome them he 
relied on outside help. He said, "some people get very, very annoyed with me when I 
start asking the questions, especially if they don't know that I have a brain injury. My 
friends have to explain to people that I have a brain injury so they will understand". 
Here, Tony explains his inadequacy with his brain injury but the assistance of his 
"friends" relieves him from blame for annoying people. 
Similarly, other participants believed that their brain injuries were the main cause of 
their difficulties in life. However, this belief led them to recognise that something they 
could not understand was controlling their behaviour. Sarah said, "I do ask intimate 
questions to people but I do not know why I do it, it is like my brain is ahead of me". 
This, in turn, made it hard for these participants to assert themselves: 
I know I am uninhibited too because my mum tells me. I have no choice but to accept 
what my mum tells me. Why no choice? I can't argue with my mum. 
From the preceding example it can be seen that when people with a brain injury 
believed that their behaviour may be caused by their brain injury, they cannot be 
totally confident in their control over their own behaviour. Other people are perceived 
then as having better judgement than they have. 
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Not attributing behaviour to the brain injury. Not all the participants in this study 
explained their behaviour as a result of their brain injuries. Some participants 
explained their behaviour in terms of specific difficulties as opposed to general brain 
injury. These explanations were given to describe loss of skill or management of 
memory loss. The example below illustrates the point: 
I had cognitive problems but I was not thinking that they were so because of the 
stroke. I didn't know that they were the consequence of the stroke. 
What do you do about them now? 
I live with them, for my memory, I use a diary and I try to be very organised. I follow 
a set routine and I try to stick to it. 
A few of these participants, and as seen in the example above, pointed out that the 
causal relationship between their specific difficulties and the brain injury had been 
unknown to them for some time. The causal relationship had then been either 
discovered, "when I got the booklets I was telling you about before I was able to 
make the connection" or explained to them by staff at the day centre they attended. 
Two participants described not being able to remember their difficulties. 
Some participants thought that the brain injury could not be used as an excuse for the 
difficulties they experienced. Adrian, for example, said when talking about being told 
of his physical difficulties, 'Whatever I wanted to do, I would do. There isn't such a 
word in the English dictionary as "I can't"'. Adrian seemed to have regarded the 
causal explanation as a feeble excuse to avoid the difficulties he had to face. 
Other participants thought that ignorance was more to blame for not accepting the 
causal relationship as a more self-evident fact. Tom explained, 
Nobody, ever, actually sat me down and talked to me at all about brain damage. 
What happens is, and this is my impression anyway, they try to get you to act normal 
or what is supposed to be normal. Without explaining, when you come out from the 
hospital and just make your way back to what is supposed to be normal without 
telling you: "You are doing this and this is why you are doing this ". They tell you to 
stop doing things but do not tell you why. They are not saying why you are doing it, 
they just say "Stop it" and not giving a reason. 
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Tom implies here that leaving people with brain injuries in ignorance is a tool that 
society uses to control people afflicted by these injuries. However, while this may be 
true it discounts the possibility that something, the outside agent mentioned above, 
maybe responsible for his behaviour. Thus, when participants chose not to explain 
their difficulties in terms of the brain injury, the cause of mistakes and inadequacies 
was attributed: a) to personal characteristics and/or b) specific difficulties which, 
although were not perceived to be connected to the brain injury to begin with, had 
come to be understood as a consequence of their brain injuries. In two cases 
however, memory impairments did not allow participants to remember this 
information and/or understanding. 
Furthermore, causal relationships showed how participants made sense of their self in 
the present. Participants' narratives, in some cases, suggested ways on how the self 
was protected during earlier stages of the recovery process. Gaining knowledge of 
difficulties meant the realisation that certain abilities had been lost. This loss was 
perceived as a threat for the self in all cases. The perspective towards this differed 
among different individuals. 
Accepting but avoiding. Some participants explained how on gaining knowledge of 
their difficulties they had avoided situations that would remind them of these 
difficulties. This avoidance was not associated with denial of their difficulties but with 
accepting the loss of abilities that made them look bad or feel bad, in other words, 
self-presentation. For example, Andrew said, "one person asked me to write things 
down but my writing was so messy that I didn't bother. It made me feel worse". This 
perspective often led the participants to seek privacy and not ask for assistance. 
Andrew said, "I try to sort my problems on my own". Andrew resorted to 
comparisons with a pre-injury self that used to believe that he was responsible for his 
life and actions: 
If I have a problem trying to do it on my own then I think back and realise that I 
used to do a lot of things on my own. It bugs me a bit. 
Buying Time. Other participants mentioned realising their memory problems and not 
communicating them in the hope that the self would be restored to its former glory. 
194 
Chapter Six - Study Two - The emergence of knowledge after brain injury: finding the missing 
pieces of the puzzle 
Participants were hoping the problem would cure before any further damage to the 
self could be done (like, admitting it in public). For instance: 
I admitted to myself that I had a memory problem but not to anybody else. I didn't 
want to tell anybody because of pride. I was hoping that my brain would get itself 
better so that my memory problem would go away and there wouldn't be a problem 
any more. Of course, the new brain would not carry on as before. 
Participants who bought time for their selves accepted their difficulties and eventually 
sought assistance: 
I have to think to my self if I know about something about my deficits first so that I 
can remember them. I am not shy about asking people what is the matter with me 
and the neurologist told me everything. 
Accepting and improving. Most participants found that gaining knowledge of their 
difficulties, although damaging for the self, was the requirement needed for self- 
improvement. Paul said, "Well, I try to do what I have been told to do by the rehab 
staff and so on. I want to improve myself, I know perhaps I never will but I want to 
do as much as I can". 
Thus, when participants accepted their difficulties they sought and accepted 
assistance to overcome their functional challenges. However, accepting difficulties 
was not always enough, personal characteristics influenced the meaning of this 
acceptance. 
6.3 DISCUSSION 
The participants' accounts in this study show that gaining knowledge of the challenges 
to be faced after a brain injury entails what amounts to detective work. For these 
participants acquiring knowledge was a process that required passive acceptance of 
information from others sometimes, actively seeking information from others at other 
times and interpreting clues from their everyday lives. Putting together these bits of 
information and clues was equated to putting together bits of a puzzle. How these 
bits were then put together was then the key to redefining the self 
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The process to which some participants referred to as a process of "discovery" was 
described as a product of individual, social and physical environment. For the 
participants in this study the process started during the patient's stay in hospital. At 
this stage, the discovery of having had a brain injury seems to have come in some 
cases from medical staff and/or family. In other cases the information given to the 
patient by family, wittingly or unwittingly, did not refer to brain injury but to other 
causes, like having had a car crash. This explanation, which not only leaves the 
patient in ignorance as to the actual consequences of having had a car crash in terms 
of brain injury, gives the first indication to the patient that the injuries suffered are 
merely of a physical nature. Either way, at this stage participants described 
themselves as passive receptors of an information that in some cases they could 
hardly understand. The next stage in the process of discovery takes place during 
rehabilitation for the people who had undergone this phase or on their return home. 
During rehabilitation participants found that their knowledge of some difficulties, 
mainly physical, was clear to them but were beginning to inquire of rehabilitation staff 
about more invisible difficulties. Cognitive difficulties, and in a few cases emotional 
difficulties, were explained by rehabilitation staff in general terms and often left the 
patient to draw their own conclusions. On the patients return home armed with some 
information and after or while attempting to return to previous to brain injury 
activities, these patients begin to discover further difficulties which had not been 
previously envisaged or explained. These new difficulties, ranging from problems with 
reintegration into the family to coping with work to doing DIY, made the participants 
actively engage in seeking answers to questions probably better explained by the 
professionals that they had left behind. Instead, the questions were asked of relatives 
and significant others that were not entirely perceived by the brain injured as the 
appropriate people to answer them. Cultural prescriptions and fear of hidden 
motivations in the people surrounding the brain injured were the reasons behind these 
perceptions. In this way, the bits of the puzzle that some people with brain injuries 
actively come to seek are not entirely put together years after they have suffered their 
brain injuries. 
Furthermore, this puzzle was described by the participants in this study, as incomplete 
at the time of the interview. Memory loss was regarded as another obstacle to 
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constructing the complete picture of the puzzle. When the holes experienced by 
memory loss were filled with explanations in the early stages of recovery, these were 
found to be lacking in understanding by a majority of participants. At the time of the 
interview however, and as seen in Part One of Study One, some names and some 
explanations of their conditions had been incorporated into their accounts. 
Nevertheless, most participants felt unsure that they really knew all about their 
conditions, which in terms of denial would mean that these participants could hardly 
deny what they did not know. 
However, the expressed knowing without remembering, which according to Tulving 
(1985) can be interpreted as lack of awareness, indicates here that some people with 
brain injuries learned to express their difficulties and insecurities about those 
difficulties during social interaction. Indeed, if the brain injury experience occurs in a 
social context (hospital, family, day care centre), thoughts and forms of understanding 
may be appropriated from conversations and internalised in individuals' memories and 
emergent understandings. Tulving's (1985) model of memory suggests that there are 
different varieties of memory that make possible the utilisation of acquired and 
retained knowledge. But they differ in the kind of knowledge they handle, and in the 
ways in which different kinds of knowledge are used. 
Tulving differentiates between three kinds of memory: procedural, semantic and 
episodic. Procedural memory is concerned with how things are done, semantic 
memory has to do with symbolically representable knowledge and episodic memory 
mediates the remembering of personally experienced events. The relationship between 
them is one of "class-inclusion hierarchy" (Tulvin, 1985, p. 2) in which "procedural 
memory entails semantic memory as a specialised subcategory, and in which semantic 
memory, in turn, entails episodic memory as a specialised subcategory" (Tulvin, 1985, 
p. 2-3). According to this model, it is impossible for an organism to posses one 
without the other, although, Tulving explains, they can exist independently of each 
other. 
Empirical evidence for the independence of function between semantic memory 
(which reflects knowing) and episodic memory (which reflects remembering) provides 
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support for Tulving's experiential approach (Gardiner and Conway, 1999). Studies 
with Alzheimer's disease (Dalla Barba, 1997) and autistic participants (Bowler, 
Gardiner and Grice, 1998) not only have shown a disassociation between 
remembering and knowing but an association between decreased remembering and, in 
some cases, an increased knowing. 
For the purposes of this study, some of the knowing responses encountered here 
seem to be in line with long term learning studies of just knowing (Conway, Gardiner, 
Perfect, Anderson, and Cohen, 1997). Conway et al. (1997) described a very large 
scale naturalistic study of changes in awareness during the acquisition of knowledge 
by psychology undergraduates. In their study, students answered questions featuring 
information that they should have acquired in a series of lectures. For each question 
the students were required to indicate whether they knew the answer, they could 
remember the answer, the answer was familiar or if they were just guessing. The 
results demonstrated that there is a remarkable remember-know shift in the awareness 
that accompanies the acquisition of knowledge. Similarly, the comments made in this 
study by a minority of participants point to a similar shift in the remember/knowing 
distinction: 
"I know about them, I don't have the feel for my problems, I remember not being 
able to walk but now I know that I have problems with my legs. " 
Conway et al. (1997) explains this shifts as a reflection on the schematisation of 
conceptual knowledge in semantic memory. Initially gaining access to newly acquired 
knowledge depends largely on episodic memory, but with repeat encounters 
knowledge becomes more abstract, more schematised, and gaining access to it no 
longer involves remembering specific learning episodes. The role of episodic memory 
is to facilitate conceptual learning. Superior episodic memory results in a greater 
ability to remember. Poor episodic memory makes this more difficult but not 
impossible. Tulvin, Hayman and Macdonald, (1991), demonstrated that conceptual 
learning was possible with amnesia patients. Thus, the accounts of the majority of 
participants in this study that expressed just knowing about their brain injuries and 
their difficulties seem congruent with learning without awareness clinical theories. 
That is, if the participants' injuries account for impairment to episodic memory, thus 
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not being able to remember the event and the experience of difficulties, semantic 
memory would still allow the individual to learn about the event and subsequent 
difficulties. Repetition of narratives in contextual social interactions would facilitate 
this learning and encoding in semantic memory. 
Nevertheless, learning about one's own difficulties or filling in the holes in memory 
and acting according to this information are two different things. Understanding the 
implications of the participants discovered difficulties entailed a redefinition of the 
self. Redefining the self was described by these participants as a combination of 
behaviours that participants could not control, physical difficulties, loss of skills and 
what was remembered or not. 
On the one hand, participants described behaviours in terms of their brain injuries. 
However, this attribution was only used to explain some behaviours that were not 
intended and judged by others as unacceptable. Participants created then an outside 
agent, something participants could not understand and could not control. On the 
other hand, when the narratives of participants did not explain behaviour as a result of 
their brain injury, behaviours were then explained in terms of specific difficulties or 
personal characteristics. In these instances, difficulties which had come to be seen by 
participants as consequences of the brain injury or difficulties not attributed to the 
brain injury were used to describe loss of skills that participants were striving to 
manage. In a few cases however, memory impairments did not allow participants to 
remember this information and/or understanding. Furthermore, these difficulties 
referred mainly to cognitive difficulties or physical difficulties while behaviour 
explained in terms of the brain injury described emotional/behavioural difficulties. 
Thus, the finding that specific difficulties were not always connected to the brain 
injury helps explain why in Part One of Study One some participants talked about 
their difficulties as independent of their brain injuries. Participants may have known 
about the causal relationship existing between difficulty-brain injury at the time of the 
first interviews. However, participants may have been used to refer to their 
difficulties, for practical purposes, as independent of their brain injuries. Time until 
the "discovery" of the connection could mean that participants had incorporated in 
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their narrative references to their specific difficulties without having to refer to the 
brain injury. The difference here is then dialectical not attributional. Moreover, and 
although this finding may be considered evidence towards learning about difficulties 
without awareness of those difficulties, it leaves other questions unanswered. For 
example, it does not explain why some behaviours were explained in terms of brain 
injury and therefore, out of the control of participants, and not others. Arguably, the 
way these difficulties are addressed by professionals in the social environment of 
people with brain injuries may influence these perceptions. This possibility will be 
explored further in Study Three. 
Moreover, despite the frustrations of dealing with this combination of uncontrolled 
behaviour, loss of skill, memory loss and in some cases, physical difficulties, most 
participants indicated that they strove to maintain a positive attitude towards their 
difficulties. Overall, most participants maintained a realistic attitude about the future 
(i. e. attending the centre, using strategies for their memory loss, undertaking 
physiotherapy). Some researchers have identified the role that positive thinking plays 
in helping patients cope with their brain injuries (Herbert and Powell, 1989; Malia, 
Torode and Powell, 1993). 
While adapting to a new normal, participants struggled with desires/wants and 
physiological requirements by accepting their difficulties. In brain injury, and whilst 
the trauma is not a degenerative disorder, recovery or some recovery of function is 
possible. Participants dealt with their difficulties by implementing strategies, 
dissipating own false beliefs about their difficulties (i. e. my memory loss is going to 
cure) and reframing these difficulties within as normal a life context as possible. This 
tendency to engage in a normalising process was continually balanced against the 
negative experiences consequent upon the brain injury. Or in other words, the 
completion of the puzzle. 
Implications for rehabilitation 
The implications of both accounts concerning the acquisition of knowledge and 
redefining the self, for rehabilitation practice will be discussed below. 
200 
Chapter Six - Study Two - The emergence of knowledge after brain 
injury: finding the missing 
pieces of the puzzle 
Constructing the puzzle during rehabilitation. Although the literature on brain injury 
often reports loss of sense of self as a consequence of brain injury, there was very 
little in the accounts of the participants in this study that could be described as loss of 
self. On the contrary, efforts to contribute to a continuity of the self and self 
presentation were observed. However, the continuity of the self was obstructed by 
memory loss. This memory loss represented blanks in autobiographical memory and 
difficulties with short-term memory or the inability to learn and retain new 
information. 
Rehabilitation professionals need to consider this loss. More specifically, loss of 
certain memory function does not automatically mean loss of self Therefore, 
professionals should open up their scope of interventions for memory changes 
accompanying brain injury. This could be achieved in three different ways. First, 
professionals could avoid thinking of memory dysfunction as yet another disorder of 
brain injury. Instead, they could centre on its practical aspect for treatment. 
According to Meltzer (1983) and in agreement with the participant's accounts in this 
study, problems with short-term memory cause uncertainty in the self Rehabilitation 
professionals may not be able to solve these problems but they can help fill in the 
"holes". Rehabilitation professionals can provide detailed information, repetitive 
information and help prioritise the importance of remembering certain things over 
others. 
Second, rehabilitation professionals need to consider enlisting the help of families in 
the use of these strategies. Rehabilitation professionals and family members, together 
and separately, could play a role in putting together the person's puzzle. 
Third, reconstructing memories may not be the sole aim of rehabilitation but 
supporting clients in creating new memories may be another aim during rehabilitation. 
Many people with a brain injury may feel anxiety relating to memory loss during the 
early stages of recovery. This anxiety may interfere with the rehabilitation process 
itself. Alleviating this anxiety may help with the recovery process. 
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Redefining the self after the brain injury. Accepting the challenges that a brain injury 
brings may be a first step towards using causal relationships between difficulties and 
the brain injury. Using these causal relationships is useful for the self-understanding of 
the brain injured person and it protects their self-esteem. However, by explaining their 
mistakes and inadequacies in this way the brain injured person is positioning 
him/herself as helpless. The brain injury dominates the self and therefore, the brain 
injured person sheds responsibility for the consequences of the brain injury. 
According to Shotter (1984), and in more general terms, accounts that explain 
deviant behaviour (i. e. dishinbition) are important in social interactions if the accounts 
are to be acceptable as strategies for protecting self-esteem. If the accounts are 
accepted, Shotter argues, the person causing the deviant behaviour is then accepted in 
society. Nevertheless, and according to Sabat (2001), what these people are also 
doing is positioning themselves within the dynamics of social interaction. In other 
words, by explaining their mistakes and inadequacies as causal relationships with the 
brain injury, they are situating themselves in roles that make their actions intelligible 
and relatively determinate as social acts. Such roles can lead to not only explanations 
of behaviour consistent with the persons positioning, but also to the development of 
expectations about and the interpretation of the person's subsequent behaviour. 
For instance, and for rehabilitation purposes, if professionals position the brain injured 
as being dysfunctional, it is more likely that in future situations in which a variety of 
explanations of behaviour are possible, professionals will opt for the explanation 
based on the initial positioning. However, if the positioning is initially carried out by 
the person him/herself, professionals may consider helping the individual to use this 
positioning to his or her advantage. This could be done by teaching people with brain 
injuries to use causal relationships when engaging in social situations. For example, if 
a client needs over the telephone services, the client can be taught to communicate 
difficulties with, say, information processing, and ask the receiver to speak at a slow 
pace. Similarly, if the explanations of behaviour of people with brain injuries put too 
much emphasis on the individual, rehabilitation professionals may help these 
individuals to re-position themselves. Attribution literature often remarks on the 
negative consequences of attributing life difficulties to personal characteristics. Thus, 
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helping the individual to attribute unfavourable situations to something one can 
change may help empower the individual. 
6.4. REFLECTION 
In this study, a small sample of people with brain injuries was studied by entering and 
participating in a natural setting, the day centre. The researcher, myself, was well 
known to these individuals as a caregiver. The data was obtained using semi- 
structured interviews which resembled conversations. However, the method of IPA 
requires that the researcher acknowledge possible bias and attributions that could 
have influenced the investigation. 
The interviews in this study were design by me to tap ideas about brain injury and 
subsequent difficulties. What was reported and analysed in the study was what people 
with brain injuries said to me and these narratives formed, in the end, the focus of the 
investigation. And yet, to focus on these narratives alone would miss out on the fact 
that the narratives emerged from relationships situated in time and place. 
During the interviews, the fact that I was a healthy, non-brain injured individual, 
talking to people with brain injuries made me feel like I was putting my participants in 
a restricted situation. That is, the scope they had to talk about their difficulties felt 
narrow as they could tell me about behaviours and capacities more effectively in other 
ways. For example, they could show me their work at the centre they attended or I 
could observe their behaviours during their time at the centre. Effectively, I felt that I 
was putting my participants in a situation where they had to present themselves to me 
as healthy as possible or in other words, as non-brain injured as possible. 
However, what perhaps affected the study the most was the emotional labour of the 
interviews. Emotional labour is a type of work that involves feelings and can be 
contrasted with physical or task-orientated labour (Phillips, 1996). It involves the 
management of feelings while undertaking a job or task. In this study, the task of 
interviewing my participants included what I would say was a fair amount of 
emotional labour. This study required that I interview people-with brain injuries with 
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whom I had worked as a carer, who had participated in my research previously and 
with whom I had developed a working experience. Therefore, by the time these 
second interviews came round I could say that I knew my participants relatively well. 
Managing feelings during these interview situations then involved two actions from 
me: managing risks for participants and managing my own emotions. 
The emotional risks of participants during research is now a widely recognised issue 
(Lee, 1993) and in this instance, it required of me to adhere to ethical guidelines more 
strictly during this part of the research. For example, because of my previous 
experience in the first round of interviews I was more vigilant in anticipating problems 
and more ready to render appropriate support. If a participant broke down during the 
interview, I offered rest breaks, suggested therapeutic intervention when available or I 
arranged for appropriate referrals. At the end of each interview I debriefed my 
participants as carefully as I could and made sure that they understood the role they 
played as co-researchers in the investigation. On the whole, there were no major 
problems during the interviews but my efforts to be as professional as possible were 
perceived in many cases as more extensive that indeed they were. By this, I mean that 
a good number of my participants thought me capable of discussing brain injury issues 
and to be in possession of counselling skills. Empathy at the end of the day was the 
only thing that I could offer and to remark that my presence at the centre was due to 
the research of which they, themselves were co-authors. This reminder not only had 
an immediate positive effect on the participants but later when I went back to talk 
about the investigation with them, they commented how beneficial participation in the 
research had been for them. However, their conversations had the potential, and 
indeed did, arouse various emotions in me. 
Managing my own emotions was the second action that I had to undertake during this 
part of the research. While listening to people with brain injuries, some of the 
negative and powerful feelings (like anger) and moods displayed by the participants 
were occasionally transferred on to me. I found that my participants did pass their 
depressions on to me on a great number of occasions. This, in turn, could have had an 
effect on my approach to transcribing and the analysis of their data. Similarly, there 
were some interviews, which I undertook with a sense of disgust towards the person 
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participating in the research. I experienced these feelings only on a few occasions and 
mainly towards participants well known in the centre for their disinhibitions or 
rudeness. In either case, the interviews were spent trying to hide my feelings as well 
as trying to appear professional which I think resulted in me showing less interest for 
the person and therefore perhaps, in poorer data. Alternatively, most times during or 
after interviews I felt a great impulse to help the participants in this investigation. 
Most times, there was a struggle for me between doing research and helping these 
individuals. The outcome of the struggle, more often than not, was the realisation that 
I could do both at the same time by completing my work. The idea may have driven 
the research towards presenting my participants in a more positive light than perhaps 
they were. Overall, awareness of these difficulties meant that there was an attempt to 
engage in what is call bracketing (Giorgi, 1985) of these feelings and biases. In 
addition, I put all my efforts into ensuring that the emerging themes and 
interpretations were grounded in and supported by the data. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
STUDY THREE - THE OTHER IN AWARENESS OF BRAIN 
INJURY: NON-EXPERT HEALTH PROFESSIONALS TALKING 
TO PEOPLE WITH BRAIN INJURIES 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
The first study of this thesis offered some explanations for the low salience of 
cognitive and emotional difficulties found in the accounts of people with brain 
injuries. These explanations were given in terms of the visibility of complaints, lack of 
communication between significant others and people with brain injuries in favour of 
protecting the person they supported and as a caring practice. The second study, 
compared the acquisition of knowledge about difficulties by people with brain injuries 
to a process of discovery and explained this process as a product of actor, social and 
physical environment. Furthermore, participants described understanding the 
implications of their difficulties as struggle between what they could control, what 
they could not control and what they could remember or not. However, and as 
discussed in Chapter Three, self-knowledge is socially constructed and therefore it is 
important to extend the search for explanations of self-knowledge in people's social 
environment. The aim of this study is then to investigate how information referring to 
sequelae of brain injury (cognitive and emotional in particular) is communicated to 
people with brain injuries by non-expert health professionals (i. e. day care centre 
workers). 
As illustrated in Chapter Three, the development of the self depends partly on the 
views of others. The ways these views are transmitted, received, interpreted and acted 
upon have been discussed in relation to their importance to the development of 
awareness of difficulties following a brain injury in the mentioned chapter. However, 
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it is important to remind the reader here of two points. First, the way information is 
interpreted has been seen to depend, to some extent, on the importance given to a 
speaker. Second, how relevant the information is made to be by the person receiving 
it is also a factor in the interpretation of information from others (Garcia, Metthe, 
Paradis and Joanette, 2001). Conversation has been discussed as a collaborative 
process, usually between two people, whose target is to identify and respond to each 
other's intentions (Grice, 1975). To uncover this target, however, inferential 
processes must be at work in order to get at the true message and only then can 
relevant contributions be made. When communication lacks coherence, as in many 
cases after neurological impairment, the responsibility for determining relevance lies 
entirely on the healthy conversational partner (Garcia, et al., 2001). This may happen 
when "the partner with a neurological impairment is unable to identify the healthy 
speaker's intentions due to an incapacity to use contextual information" (Garcia, et 
al., 2001, p. 18). 
Further, identifying the speaker's intention is only one step. Judgements about the 
relevance of the content of the conversation must be made in order for a conversation 
to take place. Garcia, et al (2001) point out that the collection of such information 
depends on certain cognitive capacities, like attention and memory, which may not be 
entirely intact in certain populations with brain damage. When this happens, the 
healthy conversational partner may need to compensate for the speaker with the 
neurological impairment so that relevance may predominate. However, Sperber and 
Wilson (1986) propose that a speaker is interested in communicating only what the 
hearer needs to know to make the speaker's message relevant. And, according to 
Sanders (1983), what is relevant depends entirely on the hearer's ability and 
willingness to infer or invent a reason for the speaker's having made the statement. 
However, interaction goals are only one example of factors that condition attention to 
one class of information rather than another. Factors that affect information in 
interpersonal encounters are also important, as emphasised in Chapter Three. 
Interaction context, which may be defined by such things as the power relationship 
existing between interactants or by the presence in the interaction of a particular 
category of persons, may play a role in regulating social interaction. For instance, 
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Kleck, Ono and Hastorf (1966), in an experimental situation, engaged participants in 
a brief interaction with a person who was physically handicapped, or they met a 
person who showed no sign of physical difficulty. It was found that participants ended 
the interaction more quickly when they were interacting with the handicapped person 
than when they were interacting with the non-handicapped person. Similarly, Farina, 
Allen and Saul (1966) gave participants a task to work on with a person they were 
led to believe was mentally ill or with a person about whom no such information was 
presented. The researchers found that participants talked less and initiated less 
conversation and expressed opinions less representative of their beliefs when they 
worked on the task with the supposedly mentally ill than did participants who worked 
on the task with the person who was not labelled mentally ill. More recently, Mwaria 
(1990) in a study of families of the severely brain injured reported that such patients 
found themselves in socially ambiguous and isolated positions due to the lack of 
cultural guidelines that dictate how to interact with these patients. Mwaria observed 
that medical caretakers and family members were often uncertain as to how to 
respond in the presence of these patients. 
Finally, another factor that has been seen as influencing the communication between 
people with brain injuries and others is the content of this communication. Despite the 
prevalence of brain injury, it is a common complaint from victims of brain injury, their 
carers and professionals who work with people with brain injuries, that there is a lack 
of understanding of the problems of brain injury both amongst members of the general 
public and health professionals with no experience in this area. Research investigating 
misconceptions concerning brain injury amongst the general public and non-expert 
health professionals has revealed that inaccurate and inadequate knowledge about 
brain injury is common amid the general public and amongst health professionals 
without expertise in the field of brain injury (Swift and Wilson, 2001). Hux, Walker 
and Sanger (1996) examined the readiness of 494 school based speech language 
pathologists to provide services to students with traumatic brain injury. The survey 
responses provided evidence that school based speech language pathologists hold 
many misconceptions concerning traumatic brain injury and its consequences. 
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Hence, the study reported here examined the extent to which the explanations given 
by non-expert health professionals to people with brain injuries in their care, can 
contribute to explaining the struggle that coming to terms with difficulties represents 
for the patients. The term non-expert health professionals refers to health 
professionals who do not have specialist knowledge (i. e. academic or clinical) about 
brain injury but whose practice brings them into contact directly with people with 
brain injuries on a day to day basis. The material constitutes vital information for 
rehabilitation practice in the context of contemporary community-based services. 
7.2. METHOD 
7.2.1. Participants 
Five individuals took part in one interview each. Participants were selected on the 
basis of having professional experience of brain injury (traumatic and/or non 
traumatic). Four were managers of three day care centres for people with brain 
injuries. The other was a deputy manager in one of the centres. Four were parental 
caregivers to people with brain injuries. The professionals all worked on a day to day 
basis with people with brain injuries, providing day care assistance and support for 
families and carers. The participants were aged between 40-70 years. Four were 
female and one male. 
7.2.2. Procedure 
Participants were contacted in the first instance by telephone, and a date for a face to 
face interview was arranged at their convenience at the day care centres or homes. 
Each participant was interviewed separately and audio-recorded. The length of the 
interviews varied from 30-45 minutes. Each interview consisted of both semi- 
structured questions and the presentation of vignettes. 
The schedule (see Appendix 4) consisted of two sections, one concerning the 
experience of the non-expert health professionals with people with brain injuries 
facing cognitive difficulties, and the other addressing the experiences of non-expert 
health professionals with people with brain injuries facing emotional difficulties. 
Experiences of non-expert health professionals with people with brain injuries facing 
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physical difficulties were not addressed in this study. This type of difficulty is usually 
the first that people with brain injuries become aware of (Fleming, 1996) and it is not 
considered a problem by the time people with a brain injury attend day-care centres. 
Two vignettes followed by semi-structured follow up questions were also used to 
elicit focused responses from participants. Vignettes or scenarios are descriptive 
sketches of incidents presented to participants to elicit opinions and reactions to their 
contents (Schoenberg & Ravdal, 2000). When carefully constructed, these simulate 
real life experiences. After participants have been read the stories, they are asked to 
respond to a few directed questions to involve them further in creating meaning. 
In this study, the vignettes (see Appendixes 5 and 6) used were hypothetical and 
concerned fictitious others. Such depersonalization is considered advantageous in 
studies of social phenomena (Wolfson, Handfield-Jones, Cranley Glass, McClaran, & 
Keyserling, 1993) as removing personal disclosure may ease difficulty or 
embarrassment. For the purposes of this study, Vignette 1 introduced a brain injured 
person with memory difficulties. In Vignette 2a story of a brain injured person with 
emotional difficulties was presented. Both Vignettes represented examples of lack of 
insight and were developed by the researcher, who drew from her own experiential 
and academic background to create context-sensitive, realistic scenarios. In addition 
to consulting existing literature, this background included long periods of voluntary 
work with people with brain injuries, leading to familiarity with the life circumstances 
of the brain injured, their carers and non-expert health professionals. This familiarity 
extended also to language, kinship patterns and relevant medical conditions. The 
vignettes were pre-tested on adults, colleagues of the researcher, for clarity, accuracy 
and relevance. 
7.2.3. Analysis 
All the interviews were transcribed and subjected to Interpretative Phenomenological 
Analysis (IPA) to identify recurrent themes. Central to IPA is an attempt to 
understand the content and complexity of beliefs and constructs being explained or 
suggested by participants, to investigate the meaning to the participants of the 
phenomenon in question. Themes emerge within individual interviews and across 
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different interviews. The process of identifying themes involves several steps. Each 
transcript was read a number of times. Consequently, the analysis of each transcript 
began, with initial thoughts, possible codes and anything of particular interest being 
highlighted. These were then coded with a key word or phrase which captured, 
broadly, the essence of the content. These represented emergent themes. The process 
was repeated for each of the transcripts. Following this, repetitions of these recurrent 
themes between the transcripts were taken to represent shared understandings. Each 
theme was then selected for more intensive analysis. This involved going back to the 
transcripts for further examination. First, all the transcripts were examined to identify 
all the extracts pertaining to each theme and to make sure that text previously not 
selected was included. The next stages of analysis were all directed to determine what 
exactly constituted the shared aspects of the participants' experience in relation to 
each theme. This involved looking at the extracts for each theme and re-coding them. 
Once this coding scheme had been created, each extract was then re-labelled. The 
next stage was to group the extracts according to these new coding categories. These 
categories were then used to explore patterns and relationships within and between 
the conceptual groups, thinking how different themes come together to help 
understand the participants' experiences. 
7.2.4. Results 
The findings in this study centre on three interrelated themes. The first theme, p jay 
theory of awareness of difficulties, refers to the experience of observing difficulties in 
people with brain injuries time and time again. The second theme, addressing 
cognitive difficulties and normality refers to how non-expert health professionals help 
people with brain injuries with cognitive difficulties and the perceived normality by 
people with brain injuries of emotional difficulties. Finally, the third theme, limiting 
rp ogress, refers to factors that hinder the rehabilitation efforts of people with brain 
injuries. 
A lay theory of awareness of difficulties 
The first theme relating to commonality of experiences of difficulties draws on the 
observation that awareness of cognitive and emotional difficulties in people with brain 
injuries, or the lack of it, was a common occurrence for the participants. Most 
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participants observed that it was not a matter of knowledge about difficulties that 
created problems for people with brain injuries. Lack of knowledge and something 
more, like depth of knowledge, was problematic. That is, knowing about difficulties 
was not considered enough to come to terms with the challenges people with brain 
injuries had to face following their injuries. Most participants called this lack of 
knowledge and something more, insight or awareness or feeling. Ana commented: 
I actually, personally, don't think that there are many head injured people who 
actually have insight into their deficits, physical, emotional or mental or whatever, 
but I don't think that they have, and I am not a medical person so I don't understand 
why but I think they lose the finer edge on the understanding and the recognition of 
their disabilities. 
The observation was also made that insight or awareness could have different levels, 
and in the case of people with brain injuries, some of these levels may not be there. 
Again, Ana said: 
Well, awareness is knowing but awareness has many levels and head injured people 
have not got the finer edge of awareness. The depth is not there to emotionally hold 
on to that. 
This lack of depth was considered a natural protection for people with brain injuries 
by these participants, something that stops people with brain injuries from really 
knowing the bleak reality of their situations. Ana explained: 
I think if someone has, if you took one of our members, if you and 1 thought that we 
were going to be in that position, we would be totally devastated. I haven't come 
across a head injured person who is as devastated as, or not many who are as 
devastated, as you and I would be in our normal minds. I think that mother nature 
takes care and doesn't make them totally aware of their problem. It is a protection. 
However, this protection acted differently according to the nature of the injuries 
sustained by the individuals. Some participants had observed that traumatic brain 
injuries (i. e. injuries to the brain caused by accidents) showed less 'insight' than 
acquired brain injuries (i. e. injuries to the brain caused by tumours, strokes or 
Alzheimer's). Ana said: 
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I think we are talking about traumatic brain injury? Because acquired brain injury is 
totally different. People with acquired brain injury have much more insight, I think it 
takes traumatic brain injury to lose the insight. Most of the traumatics, they can 
verbalise what they have lost and they can say, you know my life is shit because I am 
not the same person I was. But the emotional bit isn't the same with the acquired. 
You can actually pick out which ones are the acquireds and which ones are the 
traumatics. The acquired, if they know about what is happening to them they get 
emotional. The difference is very subtle but I can pick them out. The traumatics get 
emotional too but, they don't go on about it. They can verbalise it, but the intense 
emotional bit isn't there. After a brain injury, the traumatics cry as quick as 
possible, they get cross as quick as possible and they bring back all the emotions but 
the edge isn't there. If you look at our members, the traumatics, P., A., M, and P. and 
then you look at C., C. just whinges all the time. The traumatics just want to get back 
into the world, the others just want to sit around and moan. They don't help 
themselves. There are exceptions obviously. The acquired are totally different to the 
traumatic and I am not medically trained or anything like that but I can pick them 
out. In fact, I can even pick out the focal damaged ones to the diffuse ones. It was 
years before I could recognise that but there is a vast difference. 
This protection was found to change by most participants with the passing of time. 
That is, lack of insight could be ameliorated with the passing of time. As Tom 
explained "I think that insight can be developed over a period of time with certain 
people. With an increasing insight the chances of coming to terms with the situation 
increase and therefore, able to plan a new life". 
The biggest variability of lack of insight was found to be among the two most 
common difficulties, cognitive difficulties and emotional difficulties. Most participants 
observed that for people with brain injuries not to know about cognitive difficulties 
was fairly common. Not knowing about emotional difficulties seems to affect most 
people with brain injuries. This will be discussed below: 
Cognitive difficulties. Most participants in this study found that by the time people 
with brain injuries attended the day care centre most individuals were "half way" to 
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knowing their cognitive problems. Zoe explained, "Those that come here to the 
centre are sort of almost half way to acknowledging the fact that there is a problem 
that we can help them with and try and improve things". Other people with brain 
injuries knew or suspected their difficulties at the time of admittance, but did not want 
this knowledge confirmed. Zoe remarked, "Some of them have some knowledge, 
probably, some deep down do, but do not want it confirmed". Other people with 
brain injuries were found by the participants to deny any involvement with the brain 
injury. Tom explained when talking about two members of the day care centre: 
They regard themselves as volunteers at our centre, they do not see themselves as 
head injured at all. They are there to help other head injured people and they 
consider themselves to be volunteers. For us it is part of their rehab because they do 
actually help other people. They don't take on responsibilities as many of the other 
volunteers. 
Uncertainty of knowledge was also observed by the participants in some people with 
brain injuries. Zoe said: 
For some, I think that they are wavering, sort of not sure whether there is a problem 
or not. If they see someone else and they can actually see in that person problems 
that they have been experiencing, I think that sort of helps them recognise the fact 
and acknowledge it. 
Other participants pointed to external factors, like severity of injury, as influencing 
the level of knowledge people with brain injuries have about their cognitive 
difficulties. Severity of injury means that memory problems sustained as a 
consequence of the brain injury do not allow the individual to retain knowledge. Zoe 
said about one of the centre's members: 
I think that his memory problems are so severe that, I genuinely think that he can't 
remember that he has got this problem. Which is why he needs to ask people 
frequently and which is why we try to get him to use his diary to reflect back and he 
has got photographs in there. I genuinely feel is not lack of insight, his memory is so 
severely damaged he can't remember that he has got a memory problem. 
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Living at home or living alone was also pointed at by some participants as influencing 
the level of knowledge people with brain injuries had of their cognitive difficulties. 
Zoe compared: 
Some of them are less aware because if they don't have to do a lot of planning and 
organising in their lives, particularly those that, I think, particularly those that have 
gone back home and are living with parents and the parents continue to organise 
their lives, but not being unkind about it, but they think they are helping but they 
take over that role. They don't let the individual do it so, therefore, the individual 
himself does not have to worry about, you know, getting the washing and ironing 
done, making sure that they keep appointments on time, planning what they are 
going to have for dinner, making sure they have budget skills, you know. They do not 
have to do that; it has been taken over by the carers or the family. That is where 
there are problems sometimes because they cannot see that they have a problem, 
because they never have the chance to see it in a practical sense. I think that, I am 
trying to think of those that live independently, whether they are more aware of their 
problems that they have. Because they live independently, they have to face them. It 
is probably too general and there is no sort of research to say that someone that 
lives independently actually has greater awareness. 
Thus, the knowledge that people with brain injuries had about their cognitive 
difficulties was perceived as being influenced by internal and external factors. 
However, for two participants in this study it did not mean that people with brain 
injuries even when aware of their cognitive difficulties, could understand them. That 
is, two participants thought that people with brain injuries were only verbalising their 
difficulties. Ana said, "It is the same as with physical deficits, they can verbalise them 
but no, they do not understand about them". Nevertheless, knowing about cognitive 
difficulties was regarded by all the participants as an advantage at the time of working 
with and developing strategies with people with brain injuries. For them it meant that 
the brain injured individual could progress further in rehabilitation. Zoe said, "For 
some of them the confirmation is good, because they think, "well, I am not going mad 
after all, yes it is a problem and it comes from my head injury and I can work on it". 
In other instances, knowing about cognitive difficulties was a first step to emotional 
reactions like depression and loss of motivation. Continued attendance at the centre, 
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however, meant for the participants that people with brain injuries had perhaps other 
reasons for attending. Ana said, "they may know, they maybe able to verbalise what 
problems they may have but don't do anything about them. They come here to 
socialise". 
Emotional difficulties. All the participants in the study thought that most people with 
brain injuries had but did not know about their emotional difficulties. However, all 
participants observed that these difficulties were not considered a problem by people 
with brain injuries because, for them, it was their normal behaviour not a consequence 
of the brain injury. Tom commented: 
I can think of a hundred and one examples of such behaviour but I don't think they 
see it as a consequence of their brain damage, it is just normal to them. 
Addressing cognitive difficulties and normality. 
Most participants observed that they could discern which people with brain injuries 
possessed knowledge of their difficulties because people with brain injuries talked 
about these difficulties. Participants when referring to talking about difficulties of the 
brain injured referred to cognitive difficulties. Emotional difficulties, participants 
remarked, tended to manifest behaviourally. 
Cognitive difficulties were discussed with people with brain injuries members of the 
day care centres. These difficulties focused mainly on memory loss. Participants 
remarked that they were able to explore more difficulties once the brain injured 
individual had started to talk about them. Zoe commented: 
Some of them will come out right and say "1 have got problems with this, this and 
that" and that makes it so much easier in the very beginning. You can start working 
on it straight away. Others are, may come and may not be able to tell that the 
memory is not that brilliant or they may be aware that the memory is not brilliant 
and perhaps they have already started to use a strategy without realising it and it is 
only when it is pointed out to them that the reason why they are using that is because 
they can't remember something. 
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Exploring more cognitive difficulties experienced by people with brain injuries 
involved inference work from these conversations. Memory loss is only one disorder 
in cognitive functioning. The term itself, memory loss or memory problem, is 
commonly found in vocabularies. Other cognitive disorders, however, are not so well 
known and people with brain injuries can describe difficulties without using the 
terminology. As Zoe explained: 
I can get a lot of information when they say "I forget" or "I can't think of what I 
need to use" or "I need to use a list to go shopping". They phrase things and I pick 
them up and also I may ask them about leisure activities and I can get so much from 
talking in a relaxed atmosphere just talking about their daily activities. They will not 
say "Oh, yes, I have problems with processing information" they will say "I can't 
work out that bus time table" and they will give you examples of what they are not 
able to do. I have not known, apart from the terminology of memory and 
concentration, they do not use words like processing information. What I tend to do 
is, I explain to them what it means, because sometimes with certain exercises they 
are given certain information and they have to formulate a response, whatever that 
is and you know, I try to explain that processing information is the speed. But they 
are not used to the terminology, they will say they have trouble with their memory 
and they will say that they cannot concentrate but will not say that they have got 
'poor planning skills". They use different terminology to recognise the problems 
other than memory. 
Similarly, inferring difficulties from listening and conversing with people with brain 
injuries helped some participants empower brain injured individuals. That is, while 
talking to the brain injured, participants felt that the information received came 
directly from people with brain injuries, not via parties such as doctors, rehabilitation 
staff or family. When the participants needed to explore further the difficulties 
experienced by people with brain injuries they let this information guide their work: 
What I always try to do is pull out what they have said and if they have been able to 
give a situation as well and just recount it back to them. I find that works because 
instead of me just saying "right, you have got problems with this or that " if I say 
'you told me that you had problems with this" I can put it into a more practical 
situation. If they have given me that situation and then explain that what we aim to 
217 
Chapter Seven - Study Three - The other in awareness of 
brain injury: non-expert health 
professionals talking to people with brain injuries 
do is work with them in that area. I always try to use what they have said, it works 
better, unless they have memory problems, where they can't remember what they 
have said. 
Communicating difficulties in this area was thus subtle and discreet. Tom said, "I 
would tell them but it would have to be done very carefully indeed. You can give little 
directional bits that would help them to achieve maximum recovery and you have to 
pick the time and the right person to do it. " 
Dealing with emotional difficulties required another perspective from the participants. 
As mentioned above, participants felt that people with brain injuries did not find 
emotional difficulties to be problematic. Their experience pointed to the normalcy of 
the behaviour for the brain injured. Participants felt that because of this, people with 
brain injuries, on the whole, did not talk about these difficulties. Not talking made it 
difficult to assess if brain injured people knew about these difficulties. Some 
participants felt that they knew. Lisa said, "some of them do know, others I don't 
think so" and what they did not know was that they had lost control of their 
behaviour. "On the whole I don't think that they know that they can't control 
themselves". Some participants remarked on the use people with brain injuries made 
of emotional difficulties to get attention. Lisa said, "I think some play on it, they 
rather like to be shocking, to get attention". 
With emotional difficulties all participants felt that the only way to deal with them 
was through confrontation. Zoe explained why: 
With behavioural problems we must make them aware of the fact that what they are 
doing is inappropriate. The thing is, if you namby-pamby around and try to be subtle 
with them, they don't get it, they don't understand. No point in being subtle with 
someone. You have to actually say to them: "OK, you've disinhibition" and they will 
probably answer "Oh I like to have a shag". But you have to tell them, you have to 
say "That, what you have just said to me is very inappropriate and I feel that you 
should not say that, here to me and you should not say it to other people, you would 
not normally say that to anybody if you had not had your head injury. I don't want 
you saying that". I actually try to tell them straight away. 
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This way of dealing with emotional difficulties was seen by the participants as 
appropriate and as a duty to the individual. Participants felt that if they did not act in 
this way there would be no one who would let the brain injured person know that 
their behaviour is inappropriate and thus, with untimely consequences for the self 
If they have this type of behaviour they become isolated, because other people don't 
know about it, are embarrassed by it, don't know how to deal with it, don't know 
where the behaviour is coming from. So the person with the head injury who exhibits 
this type of behaviour can become isolated. 
Thus, communication plays an important part in how cognitive and emotional 
difficulties are dealt with by these participants. Most importantly, the way this 
communication takes place points to participants actually seeing these two challenges 
as different. Cognitive difficulties were accepted by participants as consequences of 
brain injury and therefore, organic in their aetiology and out of the control of people 
with brain injuries. People with brain injuries then required external sources of help: 
With cognitive problems, they need professional help and helping themselves at the 
same time. And then some do and some don't. They need supporting. 
Emotional difficulties were also understood as consequences of brain injury but these 
were viewed as being more of a psychological nature and therefore, under the control 
of people with brain injuries. For instance, Lisa commented after giving a set of 
behavioural guidelines to the members of the centre: 
It is up to them, whether they want to do anything about them. Many of them do not 
think about it, it is not important to them. 
Limiting progress 
Caring has been described as an interpersonal process that connects those who care 
and those cared for (Jeon & Madjar, 1998). Thus the efforts of those caring for 
people with brain injuries are characterised by trying to see the person behind the 
injury. In this study, seeing people with brain injuries as individuals not only included 
the relation between the care givers and the cared for, it also involved the relation 
between the cared for and the world. All participants remarked on the role of the 
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family in limiting the progress made by their brain injured relatives. Zoe describes the 
experience- 
I think the family find it difficult because for some of them, particularly those with 
youngsters, you know, those in their twenties, that they have come back to live at 
home because of their head injury, the family sees them as their little boy or their 
little girl. We do not see them like that, we can stand back and see them as a twenty 
year old man with a head injury. It is very difficult. I have one family I have great 
difficulty with because they expect to know everything that happens here with their 
son. And although I am happy to work with the individual and help him with his 
diary, it is very difficult, the family can be very unhelpful. 
For these participants, therefore, the family of the brain injured was more often a 
hindrance to their efforts than a help. While participants saw themselves as promoters 
of progress, the family members were seen as protectors of the individuals. Ana said, 
"I think it is so to the point that relatives for example, stop the progress of the patient. 
The families tend to do things to protect them". Other reasons were also given for 
limiting the progress of the individual. One was lack of information within the family: 
Dealing with the family is problematic because they often feel sorry for the brain 
injured patient, they are nervous about telling them what is right and what is wrong, 
that certain things are socially inappropriate. They do not recognise that most of the 
time they have to deal with someone that often has childlike reactions and that they 
have to re-educate the person. 
Another is the family's erroneous assumptions, as Ana, talking about her experiences 
with her own son explained, "In my case, when my son had his, it did not enter my 
head to tell him what he had. How did he know that he had a brain injury then? I 
assumed that he did know. " 
Medical professionals were also seen as partly responsible for limiting the progress of 
people with brain injuries. Ana said, "I blame the medical profession because they do 
not train the families to deal with the brain injury. They should inform the families to 
the best of their abilities and if they do not know how, they should give proper 
training. Its a major problem". One participant also explained that doctors were 
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responsible for misleading the family and people with brain injuries with 
overdiagnosis. Tom commented: 
The doctors are unable to explain to the relatives just what is going to happen in the 
future and my experience is that they are often much more pessimistic that they need 
be. Some give out too much hope but a lot of them, just say that the patient is going 
to be a cabbage or will never walk again and so on. And if you survive, the recovery 
is usually better than expected. 
Two participants expressed feelings of anger and frustration in relation to the general 
public. Ana said, "you know, Joe public out there does not understand head injury. 
Most of the brain injured people look totally normal, so they expect normal 
reactions", while Tom explained how gaining employment with a brain injury could be 
made easier if the understanding of brain injury was wider amongst the general public: 
Some of them could hold down small jobs but it would depend on the boss or 
manager that would give them the job and the understanding of this person of the 
problems of head injury. 
However, external influences were seen as only one part of the problem. All the 
participants felt that internal causes played an important role in the progress made by 
people with brain injuries. One participant felt that the pre-morbid personality of the 
individual had to be taken into consideration. For instance, if the individual had been a 
motivated individual previously, this personality trait would still be activated after the 
injury and would contribute to the individual's progress after the injury. When the 
opposite was the case the same traits were seen as impediments to the rehabilitation 
progress. Laura explained: 
what makes things difficult for us is that some people were not achievers or had 
learning difficulties before the injury. We sit down and work with them but what 
works with one will not work for another. It is a matter of finding out at what level 
each person is at or be happy at. 
Another participant expressed that the level of education reached pre-morbidly also 
influenced the progress made post-morbidly. Ana said, "When I talk to them I talk 
considering their education. If the brain injured person used to be a cleaner or a 
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dustman and I say: "You have problems with your information processing" then that 
will mean nothing to them. They will not understand what it means to have problems 
with information processing because they did not know what information processing 
is before they had suffered the brain injury. When I explain things to them, I try to put 
it in terms that they may understand". 
7.3. DISCUSSION 
The findings in this study offer support for research pointing at lack of awareness of 
cognitive and emotional difficulties following a brain injury as problematic. However, 
while most research explains lack of awareness as denial of difficulties, participants in 
this study offered additional explanations for this phenomenon. Uncertainty of 
knowledge, severity of injury, refusal of confirmation, denial and normality, amongst 
others, were reasons given by non-expert health professionals for the difficulties 
experienced by people with brain injuries. These results also revealed that non-expert 
health professionals did not refer to difficulties using medical terminology, with the 
exception of memory and concentration, when they were with the person they 
supported. Non-expert health professionals referred to difficulties using the brain 
injured own descriptions of cognitive difficulties and in terms of what is appropriate 
or inappropriate for emotional difficulties. Rehabilitation progress in people with 
brain injuries was seen as externally limited and self limited. Family, medical 
professionals and general public were seen as imposing different demarcations on the 
brain injured. Pre-morbid personality characteristics worked as self-imposed 
limitations. 
Overall, and in contrast to neurological and psychological theories of lack of 
awareness of difficulties following brain injury, participants' narratives implied an 
alternative theory to the subject under investigation. Participants in this study 
understood lack of awareness of difficulties as a combination of lack of knowledge of 
difficulties on the part of the brain injured plus something more, like "insight, 
awareness or feeling". This insight or awareness was then understood to be composed 
of many levels one of which, an "emotional depth" was found lacking in the people 
with brain injuries they supported. This lack of depth was then perceived as a natural 
protection for the brain injured so as "not be totally devastated" from the reality of 
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their injuries - something mother nature had given people with brain injuries to 
protect them from the truth. 
Participants described this lack of awareness as malleable, changing with the passing 
of time, different in intensity depending on the type of injury and different according 
to the type of difficulty. Physical difficulties were perceived as the first difficulties 
people with brain injuries became aware of. This idea, which is congruent with 
academic and clinical theories of awareness of difficulties, was mentioned but not 
pursued by participants or researcher. Cognitive difficulties were described as the 
most amenable to bring into awareness as by the time people with brain injuries 
attended the day care centre, they were described as being "half way" to knowing that 
all was not well. According to these participants awareness of cognitive difficulties 
was affected by the brain injured self-characteristics (i. e self observation, denial) or 
through the influence of factors external to the patient (i. e living alone or severity of 
injury). People with brain injuries were then perceived as talking through their 
cognitive difficulties or trying to deny them. This perception, again is congruent with 
behaviours of the brain injured described in the literature. 
Emotional difficulties were described by participants as different in nature to 
cognitive difficulties and as the most difficult for people with brain injuries to become 
aware of. The difference was described thus: that while people with brain injuries 
were perceived as having some knowledge of their cognitive difficulties, participants 
in this study described people with brain injuries as having no knowledge of their 
emotional difficulties. In other words, most people with brain injuries talked through 
their cognitive challenges but acted out their emotional difficulties. Similarly, while 
most people with brain injuries were perceived as having cognitive difficulties, all 
brain injured individuals were described as having emotional difficulties. The problem 
for people with brain injuries in becoming aware of this type of difficulty was that the 
brain injured themselves had not identified emotional difficulties as difficulties. People 
with brain injuries acted their normal selves. Thus, while the perception of awareness 
of emotional difficulties as being one of the most difficult to develop for the brain 
injured is not new, the carers in the present study explained this difficulty in terms of 
the self only. 
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Further, developing awareness of difficulties in people with brain injuries, for these 
participants, lead to two possible outcomes. Brain injured people either came to 
accept their difficulties or the incipient awareness led the brain injured to depression. 
This understanding of the development of awareness of difficulties in people with 
brain injuries is congruent with the model of development of awareness of difficulties 
illustrated in the psychological literature in Chapter Two. 
Nevertheless, understanding lack awareness of difficulties after brain injury as a 
natural protection for the brain injured led participants in this study to describe two 
different perceptions of lack of awareness of specific difficulties and therefore, to 
address them differently. That is, while participants understood all difficulties to be a 
direct consequence of the brain injury, only cognitive difficulties were perceived to be 
outside the control of the individual affected by the brain injury. Emotional difficulties 
were perceived as psychological in nature and therefore, still under the control of the 
brain injured individual, even in cases where loss of control was obvious to them. In 
addition, when difficulties were perceived as outside the control of the individual 
efforts were made to empower the individual by talking about difficulties and offering 
strategies to help the individual gain control. When difficulties were perceived as 
under the control of the individual confrontation was selected to deal with what was 
perceived by the carers as problematic behaviour. 
This finding helps answer the question why difficulties were perceived by people with 
brain injuries as different in nature. In Study Two participants described certain 
behaviours in terms of their brain injuries. Other behaviours were described in terms 
of personal characteristics or in terms of specific difficulties, mainly cognitive, which 
people with brain injuries were striving to manage. In the present study, participants' 
accounts constructed awareness of difficulties in terms of what could be controlled 
and what was appropriate. Their narratives pointed at two different ways of 
perceiving the difficulties of people with brain injuries, and therefore, at two ways of 
addressing them in the brain injured. One way was to help empower the brain injured 
individual so as to manage his or her difficulties and a second way was to confront 
people with brain injuries as to appropriate or inappropriate behaviours. In this way, 
the findings in Study Two correspond to the ways these particular difficulties are 
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addressed by these carers and this correspondence is evidence of how social 
interaction influences self-perception. 
In addition, the findings of Tesser and Rosen (1975) that people avoid 
communicating negative evaluations of other people were only partly supported in 
this study. Participants felt that although it was important to talk about the challenges 
the people they supported had to face, this communication had to be done carefully 
so as not to "knock people further". However, this communication focused on 
particular difficulties, cognitive mainly, rather than emotional difficulties or global 
explanations in most cases. This finding then, also contributes partially to explaining 
why participants in the first study talked about specific difficulties as independent 
from their brain injury. Participants in this study managed and cared for people with 
brain injuries on a day to day basis, so referring to specific difficulties in this context 
makes more sense since it allows pragmatic solutions to everyday problems. 
Nevertheless, in this study participants placed emphasis on how this communication 
took place. Careful communication was considered by carers when referring to 
cognitive difficulties. When dealing with emotional difficulties of people with brain 
injuries confrontation was chosen over other ways of communication. According to 
Shaugger and Schoeneman, (1979) people differ in their interpretation of others' 
feedback, particularly if the feedback is not explicit. This study revealed that non- 
explicit feedback was given to people with brain injuries when talking about some 
cognitive disorders. Participants used people with brain injuries' own terminology 
rather than medical terms to refer to afflictions (other than memory and 
concentration) which, arguably, could be arduous for people with brain injuries to 
interpret. Emotional challenges were dealt with more explicitly in that the 
communication entailed the appropriateness or inappropriateness of behaviour. This 
did not, however, entail explanations as to the cause of such behaviour. Therefore, it 
may not be clear for the brain injured how emotional difficulties can be a consequence 
of the injury. 
In either case, the responsibility for the communication was seen as placed on the 
participant's shoulders. Garcia, et al., (2001) emphasised that the responsibility for 
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communication between the neurologically impaired and a healthy speaker relies on 
the healthy conversational partner. Sperber and Wilson (1986) added that a speaker is 
interested in communicating only what the hearer needs to know to make his or her 
message relevant. In this study, participants showed an interest in communicating 
information on cognitive difficulties with utmost care so as not to damage the self- 
esteem of people with brain injuries further. However, when the communication 
involved emotional difficulties, this consideration did not seem to be taken into 
account. This marked difference contradicts research on communication of negative 
information. 
Participants in this study found it necessary to confront people with brain injuries 
because they were perceived as lacking in the skills necessary to understand subtle 
information. This contradicts the findings of Tesser and Rosen (1975) that people 
avoid passing on negative information when they think others may not understand this 
information, but supports the findings of Garcia, Metthe, Paradis and Joanette, 
(2001). These authors argue that when communication lacks coherence, as in many 
cases after neurological impairment, the responsibility of determining relevance lies 
entirely on the healthy conversational partner. That is, when "the partner with a 
neurological impairment is unable to identify the healthy speaker's intentions due to an 
incapacity to use contextual information" (p. 18). However, Swann, Stein-Seroussi 
and McNulty (1992) found that when people were negatively evaluated people failed 
to realise that appraisals of them were indeed negative. Even when confronted, people 
perceive confrontation as either reflecting on the dispositions of others, or the 
context, rather than a reaction to particular attributes of themselves (Darley and 
Fazio, 1980) or they attend to such information selectively in order to maintain 
established self-conceptions (Swan, 1987). In addition, confronting a brain injured 
person with memory difficulties may mean that the confrontation may never be 
internalised, partly internalised or may be forgotten soon after. 
Furthermore, the status of the participants may not be completely clear to the brain 
injured individuals who attend the day care centres. According to Holtgraves, Srull 
and Socall (1989) speakers' status affects memory of assertiveness. The authors found 
in three different experiments that under certain conditions the remarks of a perceived 
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high status speaker were remembered as more assertive than those made by a 
perceived lower status speaker. Participants in this study were managers of day care 
centres; they did not have medical training or expertise in the scientific fields of brain 
injury. How the members attending the centre perceive these managers could have an 
influence on how much of the communication that goes on between the participants 
and the people they support is attended to. 
Thus, the knowledge people with brain injuries have of their cognitive difficulties at 
the time of attending day care centres may be maintained, if not advanced, as a result 
of the daily interactions to which they are exposed while attending the centre. 
Maintaining and advancing may be understood here as the ability to incorporate these 
difficulties into people with brain injuries vocabularies, whether or not the difficulties 
are understood per se. In addition, talking about this kind of disorder may carry 
overtones of helpful behaviour from non-expert health professionals, which may make 
negative communication less threatening to the self. On the other hand, knowledge of 
emotional difficulties cannot be seen in the same light. People with brain injuries do 
not perceive themselves as having these kind of difficulties and a one off 
confrontation may not lead the individual to see them as such. The overtone of a 
confrontation may provoke in the brain injured an emotional reaction and furthermore 
may only lead to an understanding that certain behaviours are not socially accepted, 
but without knowing why. 
Indeed, carers in this study believed that the people with brain injuries they supported 
did not really understand the character of their difficulties. In most cases, carers 
thought that these individuals were "verbalising" their difficulties. However, they saw 
this as no obstacle for rehabilitation. On the contrary, being able to verbalise 
difficulties was seen as a starting-point in rehabilitation. This finding, which is in 
accordance with the learning without awareness literature, is also part of the 
framework of the carer. Participants in this study perceived themselves as promoters 
of progress. This role, was described by these carers as a continuous struggle 
between external and internal factors limiting the progress of people with brain 
injuries under their care. Getting to understand the person behind the brain injury 
demanded that carers work with what people with brain injuries communicate as a 
227 
Chapter Seven - Study Three - The other in awareness of brain injury: non-expert health 
professionals talking to people with brain injuries 
difficulty. Carers did not expect to have to wait until the people they supported 
showed understanding of their difficulties. 
7.4. REFLECTION 
The method of IPA entails the explicit use of the researcher frame of reference to 
arrive at interpretations and conclusions. This is due to the fact that different 
researchers can bring to the fore different aspects of a data set. The interpretative 
framework of the researcher is then important to the research enterprise. In the 
present investigation, my interpretative framework was formed by factors such as 
knowledge of and practice in working with people with brain injuries. This framework 
could have influenced what was attended to in the interviews. In the analysis it may 
also have favoured a tendency to identify and prioritise certain themes over others 
through the extent to which they became familiar to me and hence, seemed true or 
important. Such bias could also have affected the way in which a critical approach 
was taken to different concepts. However, awareness of these difficulties meant that 
there was an attempt to engage in what is call bracketing (Giorgi, 1985) of these 
preconceived ideas and attributions. In addition, my efforts were directed into 
ensuring that the emerging themes and interpretations were solidly grounded in and 
supported by the data. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SUMMARY AND GENERAL DISCUSSION 
8.1. SUMMARY 
This thesis has investigated the link between awareness of difficulties following a 
brain injury and social interaction. The research examined the extent to which 
difficulties were salient for these individuals, and some of the sources of information 
available to these individuals. Explanations for the patterns found were sought at an 
intrapsychic level and social level. Interpretation of the findings was based on a 
concept of self-knowledge derived from an integration of a social interactionist 
approach to the self and a social constructivist model of consciousness. This concept 
recognises that self-knowledge is constructed during social interaction and that the 
information exchanged during these interactions is assimilated, internalised, and used 
in self reflection. In addition, the concept also recognises that self-knowledge involves 
selection from multiple sources of information used to form a united sense of self 
The indicators of this selection process and the ones this investigation focused on 
were self-presentation and social environmental factors. 
The major findings and interpretations are then summarised below: 
  The narratives of participants with brain injuries mainly described brain injury and 
physical difficulties. Cognitive and emotional difficulties were found to be of low 
salience. 
  People with brain injuries gave little indication that they could understand their 
difficulties. Instead, participants tended to present themselves as healthy and "normal" 
individuals. 
  These findings were explained by various phenomena which did not include assuming 
that participants were reacting to knowledge of their difficulties. Explanations for the 
low salience of cognitive and emotional difficulties were given in terms of confusion, 
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memory loss and self-presentation amongst others, and lack of communication 
between people with brain injuries and significant others. 
  Lack of communication between significant others and people with brain injuries was 
explained in terms of the physicality of the difficulties, in favour of protecting the 
individual affected by the brain injury and as a caring practice. 
  Participants' narratives described gaining knowledge of their difficulties as a process 
of discovery, which was the product of actor, social and physical environment. 
  Redefining the self after brain injury was described by people with brain injuries as a 
combination of behaviours they could control and information they could remember. 
Behaviours that could not be controlled were attributed to brain pathology. These 
narratives introduced a "second agent" to the sense of self 
  Narratives from non-expert health professionals in Study Three mirrored the findings 
in Study Two in terms of attributing behaviours to the brain injury and in terms of 
what people with brain injuries could control and remember. Thus, self-knowledge in 
people with brain injuries can be explained, partly, by the local discourses of this 
particular social environment. 
8.2. PAST RESEARCH 
It was seen in Chapter Two and Chapter Four that the existing literature concerning 
awareness of difficulties following brain injury assumes these difficulties to be 
problematic for people with brain injuries. It has often been claimed that people with 
brain injuries try to disassociate themselves from the negative implications of being 
affected by a brain injury (Prigatano, 1999). That people with brain injury battle to 
maintain their self-esteem. However, when these assumptions are not validated people 
with brain injuries are perceived as denying their difficulties. Their behaviour is also 
interpreted in this way and it is judged problematic for rehabilitation purposes. It was 
also seen then that denial was not a consistent coping mechanism. It did not extend to 
all difficulties that can be experienced following a brain injury. The label of denial was 
applied by researchers to only a few difficulties, and then only in the cases where 
people with brain injuries had failed to fit into the categories that have been designed 
for them by researchers. 
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The idea of denial, usually found in health and social psychology and stigma 
literature, has been put forward by writers trying to identify the way members of a 
low status group respond to the threat of belonging to it (Goffman, 1963; Tajfel, 
1978). These responses have been described as denial, withdrawal and self- 
stereotyping, amongst others. The descriptions, which are convenient at the time of 
explaining the behaviour of individuals belonging to low status groups, can help 
rehabilitation, social and health workers in comprehending reactions to particular 
situations and in designing interventions. However, and although these descriptions 
are valuable, they are usually "over-emphasised" (Finlay, 1999). That is, any 
behaviour which coincides with these responses tends to be interpreted as being the 
result of belonging to the low status group or to a minority group. Thus while a low 
salience of certain difficulties was found in this thesis, it was also found that this could 
be explained by lack of information about those difficulties, lack of understanding of 
them and severity of memory loss. Responses like lack of information and lack of 
understanding of difficulties are not found in the health, social psychology and stigma 
literature on membership of low status groups. 
For these reasons, it is important not to assume that because something has been 
found not to be problematic for someone, the person is in denial. If people with brain 
injuries are found to want to return to work it does not meant that the person affected 
by the brain injury is trying to disassociate from the injury. If people with brain 
injuries have unrealistic plans for the future, it does not mean that these individuals 
did not have these plans before the injury. If the person affected with a brain injury 
exhibits disinhibition it does not mean that these behaviours were fully under control 
previously to the injury. This prominence is partly the result of using experimental 
paradigms that investigate cause and effect and exclude the complexities of the 
situations of real life people with brain injuries. In this investigation, the ways 
participants constructed their knowledge of their difficulties resulted in a struggle 
involving an understanding and a remembering of their difficulties rather than in 
attempts to disassociate themselves from these difficulties. 
Research on the implications of lack of awareness of difficulties needs to approach 
this subject from different perspectives which do not assume that what is important 
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for the researcher is applicable to the participants in such research. The cause of the 
problems found in the research literature is the failure to recognise that interpretations 
of this kind of research are made according to the framework of reference of the 
researcher not that of the participants. For example, if a researcher sets out to find 
how much awareness of difficulties a person with a brain injury has, then this is 
assumed to be important. In this context, it is the researcher who is moving the 
goalposts deciding how much awareness of difficulties people with brain injuries 
should have. However, people with brain injuries may be more concerned with 
specific difficulties that affect their everyday living rather than their measured amount 
of awareness of these difficulties. Differences between the frame of reference of the 
researcher and participants need then be taken into consideration and only then can 
the effects of lack of awareness of difficulties in people with brain injuries be better 
analysed. 
To accomplish this researchers may need to take as a point of departure a self- 
knowledge model of awareness, not simply a definition of awareness (as seen in 
Chapter Two). Since self-knowledge involves multiple sources of information, this 
entitles phenomena to be interpreted in different ways and not simply categorised in 
one way. Thus, awareness should be understood in the context of other aspects of 
self-knowledge and the way this context is construed. 
8.3. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
The studies in this thesis have explored how awareness of difficulties can be a product 
of social interaction. Some points can be made concerning the application of a social 
constructionist theory of consciousness to the study of awareness of difficulties 
following a brain injury. 
The findings in Study One and Two point to the all embracing physical reality of the 
brain injury and the physical difficulties that in some cases follow a brain injury. Social 
constructionism with its foci on agency and structure drives attention away from the 
body. Nevertheless, the importance of the body for the self and social life can be seen 
in this study and in a number of areas. For example, a central prerequisite for the 
development of a human being is the control of the physical body and its capacities. 
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Such control and the knowledge it brings provide a sense of constancy of the 
embodied self. Bodily sensations provide the initial way of knowing and learning 
about the world and provide the first experiences from which self-awareness 
develops. Arguably, and although this control was described as interrupted by the 
brain injury by some participants, what the narratives of people with brain injuries 
pointed at was a divergence between body and self That is the bodily demands were 
conflicted with self demands. This point can be problematic from a social 
constructionist perspective because it does not clearly account for the occasional 
primacy of the body over self More fundamentally, the body is central to the social 
process because the biological bases of experience as perceived by self have important 
effects in the construction of self and identity (as discussed in Chapter Three). The 
relation between self and identity in brain injury is a social process, which can alter 
through time, as the bodily contingencies change. These bodily contingencies may be 
cyclical, intermittent and unpredictable. It is necessary to remember at this stage that 
living organisms are not static. Neither are their manifestations, nor the sensations and 
experiences of these manifestations. These experiences are not only socially 
constructed, they are contingencies exercising varying degrees of salience for self and 
others through time and space. 
For example, visible physical difficulties, like being in a wheelchair, may be difficult to 
hide and whatever the salience of the difficulty may be for the self, the public identity 
of the individual will always be constrained by the wheelchair. Less visible difficulties, 
like epilepsy, at the other extreme may not be salient for the public identity of the 
person with a brain injury but they may be salient to the private identity of the person 
due to his or her management of these less visible difficulties. Thus, and in this way, 
the body and whatever happens to it is central to the experience of brain injury and in 
the social processes involved in its management. Any social constructivist theory 
applied to the study of brain injury must then consider this occasional primacy over 
other processes. 
In Study One it was also found that the correspondence of complaints between 
people with brain injuries and their significant others was evidence that people with 
brain injuries benefit from a discursive environment. However, the finding that there 
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was little understanding of difficulties was not. Explanations for the absence of this 
discursive environment were given in terms of lack of information, memory loss and 
perceptions of significant others of "invisible" difficulties. In this respect, the 
theoretical constructionist background fails to account for the consequences of a 
social interaction that does not carry a content relevant to self-knowledge. It could be 
assumed then that individuals engage in an active search of relevant information from 
other sources as the findings in Study Two indicate. 
In Study Two it was found that people with brain injuries overall equated the process 
of acquiring knowledge of their difficulties to a process of discovery in which 
information obtained during social interaction played only a part. Knowledge acquired 
while interacting with the physical environment and observations of the self were also 
sources of information. In this sense, the social interactionist perspective that was 
taken as a base for this research was found too narrow for the study of awareness of 
difficulties in people with brain injuries. Widening the social interactionist perspective 
with a social constructivist theory of consciousness thus allowed a wider 
interpretation of the results. However, the process of discovery or the "sorting of the 
puzzle" described by the participants in this research was found to be obstructed by 
the severity of memory loss in many cases. Whilst Burns & Engdahl (1998) suggest 
that individuals vary on the amount of information which they attend to, assimilate 
and interpret, it is argued here that differences in memory capability is a determinant 
of this variability. 
In addition, it was found that memory loss was described by many participants as a 
loss of phenomenological experience. People with brain injuries could name some of 
their conditions and explain their difficulties. In other words, they could verbalise 
their difficulties without having the phenomenological experience of their knowledge. 
These differences in memory, which were not accounted for by Burns & Engdahl but 
are congruent with the cognitive studies of Tulving (1985) discussed in Chapter 
Three, arguably pose a serious threat to the understanding of awareness and 
consciousness as a continuum. Burns and Engdahl (1998) and philosophers like 
Zahavi and Parnas (1998) theorise awareness as a part or level of the conscious 
experience. To be conscious is to "illuminate" the contents of awareness (Zahavi and 
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Parnas, 1998) or to reflect on the contents of awareness (Burns and Engdahl, 1998). 
For Burns and Engdahl the contents of awareness are made up of "experiences, 
images, representation of objects, concepts" and so on, which are recorded in 
memory. Arguably, when the neural or physiological mechanisms that record these 
data malfunction, or stop recording data or only record certain types of data, the 
contents of awareness are incomplete. By implication then, consciousness illuminates 
or reflects empty parts of awareness; or in the words on one participant "the holes of 
life". By further implication, consciousness cannot illuminate anything. Therefore, it 
cannot be conscious of nothing. However, the participants in this investigation were 
conscious of this emptiness. Thus, memory impairment maybe an example of empty 
or disrupted awareness which may cast doubts over the theory proposed by Burns 
and Engdahl. 
Study Two also found that people with brain injuries attributed some behaviours to 
brain pathology. This narrative, which sounds sensible and beneficial for self- 
understanding, and may be used by people with brain injuries to protect self-esteem, 
was used in this context to explain unintentional behaviour. People with brain injuries 
were then describing themselves as not responsible for the consequences of the brain 
injury. That is, brain injury was defined as something, a disorder or disease, which 
possessed the person, not the other way round. In Part One of Study One the 
narratives of people with brain injuries also gave an early indication of this sense of 
possession. Participants in the study presented themselves as healthy individuals, the 
brain injury was not then considered a part of the self. Furthermore, it should also be 
noted that these kinds of attributional explanation were also found among the non- 
expert health professionals in Study Three. 
The attributional relationship between brain and behaviour corresponds to a 
contemporary, scientific view of human beings. According to Martin (1998), for 
example, neuropsychologists assume that human behaviour and experiences are 
governed by the physiological, mechanical or neural activities of the brain. Studies on 
the social conceptions of brain injury have also indicated that the attributional 
relationship is also a common belief amongst the general population (Willer, Johnson 
and Rempel, 1993) and health professionals (Swift and Wilson, 2001). Thus relying 
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on this idea, individuals can easily accept the explanations of behaviour of people with 
brain injuries. 
However, and as discussed in Chapter Three, agency is a defining property of the self 
in a person's narrative. The individual is likely to incorporate into the self image a link 
between his or her intentions and actions. This sense of agency forms the basis of the 
belief in one's power to be effective in the environment. The narrative of causal 
relationship from brain injury to behaviour can threaten the apparently natural link 
that represents the person's agency. That is, when one assumes that damage to the 
brain can influence one's mind and self, one holds a second agent within one self. It is 
beyond one's control, although it exists inside one's body. The individual then carries 
something unfamiliar in his or her sense of self Furthermore, when the individual 
explains intentional behaviours in terms of own abilities these explanations can serve 
to reconstruct self-esteem. In this sense having a brain injury is a struggle of the self 
for people with such injuries. 
Overall, the application of a social constructivist theory of consciousness has been 
found beneficial to the study of awareness of difficulties in people with brain injuries. 
It may be remembered (Chapter One) that social constructionism asserts that the 
apparent scientific basis on which most neurological, neuropsychological and 
psychological practice (amongst others) is founded is only one way of interpreting the 
world. The application of a social constructivist perspective, with its emphasis on 
many realities, has allowed this research to draw from various and, in some cases, 
very different interpretations of brain injury. The study has invited interpretations 
from social psychology, cognitive psychology, physiology, neurology and philosophy 
to complement the interpretation of the data. For example, when participants' 
narratives included descriptions of memory loss, knowledge of cognitive psychology 
theory and research guided the interpretation of memory loss as autobiographical 
memory or semantic memory or episodic memory. If participants' narratives included 
descriptions of loss of feeling on the left side of their bodies, lessons from physiology 
and neurology were applied to understanding these descriptions as outcomes of right 
hemisphere lesions. In this way, the application of a social constructivist theory of 
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consciousness to the subject of awareness of difficulties after a brain injury is an 
example on how different disciplines can inform each other. 
A final point concerning the application of a social constructivist theory of 
consciousness to something as tangible as brain injury, addresses the accusation of 
relativism often made towards social construction theories in general (Burr, 1998; 
Raskin, 2001). As seen in Chapter Three and Chapter Four, social constructivism 
shifts the focus away from independent realities (i. e., discovered truths) and towards 
socially constructed realities (Burr, 1995). If notions of selfhood, one of the foci of 
psychology, are constructed rather than pre-existing entities open to scientific 
enquiry, then who is to say which constructions of selfhood are the best? (Raskin, 
2001). In relativising knowledge, it is often argued that social constructionism stands 
for epistemological and ethical nihilism, reducing any real world basis for knowledge 
claims and social intervention. 
For example, Matthews (1998) critiques social constructivism as relativism. The 
author argues that the social constructionist position is that truth is only relative and 
has no general applications given that such truth is a mere construction developed in a 
given social context. For Matthews social constructivism as relativism is an attack on 
science because it makes no distinction between objective knowledge and 
superstition. Held (1998) also believes this position to be problematic. From Held's 
perspective social constructionism fails to explain why social constructionism is better 
than more traditional approaches to science. Why would the social constructivist ask 
us to accept their reality claims when they themselves admit that all reality claims are 
equivalent? She also criticises the idea that people can choose to believe in those 
social constructions of reality that they prefer. 
However, and based on the preceding arguments which are not going to be addressed 
at length at this point, it is argued here that relativism, at its worse, is of no 
importance because it has never led to the disastrous consequences its opponents 
claim it does (Rorty, 1979). At its best, relativism can be advantageous (Gergen, 
1994a). For example, Rorty (1979) argues that understanding human perception as a 
mirror that reflects nature produces a philosophy that demands a preoccupation with 
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grand theories of truth. His goal is to change the rules of the intellectual playing field, 
altering the standards by which knowledge schemes are judged. Rorty claims that the 
point of his philosophy is to keep the conversation going rather than to find an 
objective truth. 
In a similar way, Edwards, Ashmore and Potter (1995) reject what the authors call 
"death and furniture" arguments, which claim that relativism cannot account for the 
real nature of human suffering, pain, misery and (death) or the materiality of concrete 
objects such as rocks, chairs, pens and so on (furniture). Edwards et al. (1995), reject 
the death and furniture arguments by claiming that relativism does not paralyse 
scientists. 
With regards to "furniture", and coming back to the subject of this thesis, even the 
seemingly physicality of a brain injury can be seen as a "perceptual category": a 
matter of what a brain injury seems to be like to people. In other words, people know 
about tables, chairs, pens, brain injuries only indirectly through our construction of 
them. That is, there may be alternative ways to construe any given object. A brain 
injury, which can be very physical and visible to one and others, is likely to be 
construed differently by a person living in a western society to that of a person living 
in as eastern society. The multicultural research into awareness of difficulties 
following a brain injury carried out by Prigatano and colleagues reviewed in Chapter 
Two is evidence for this point (also work by Simpson, Mohr & Redman, 2000). 
Furthermore, even when people are familiar with particular types of ontological 
"furniture" their precise boundaries can be called into question and reconstituted 
using alternative constructions. Does the brain injury finish with the physical signs of 
the injury? Does the brain injury mean that a person affected by it is no longer fit as a 
member of society? This does not mean that people have to stop trying to understand 
brain injuries in all possible ways possibly human. It simply means that the social 
constructions of a brain injury are not final or perfect. In this way, social 
constructionism can see relativism as advantageous, because it encourages creativity. 
In other words, the approach may lead to new ways of looking at something (in the 
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present case, brain injury) or thinking about something and new ways, as in the 
present case, of designing interventions. 
8.4. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
The sample of people with brain injuries participating in the research represents a 
cross section of the brain injured population attending day care centres in the South 
of England. The findings identified in this research require further validation in other 
brain injured populations attending similar centres. The relevance of the findings for 
people with recent injuries, people with more severe injuries or for those who do not 
attend such centres cannot be assumed but further research with such populations 
may prove useful. However, the qualitative design throughout the research arguably 
may compensate for the small sample sizes (N=30 in Part One of Study One and 
N=24 in Study Two). 
The methods adopted in Study One and Two were constrained by the difficulties 
described in Chapter Four concerning the use of semi-structured interviews and 
where it was seen that the this type of interview was the most appropriate for the 
purposes of the research. The interviews designed for people with brain injuries were 
found to be too directive in both studies. Although every effort was made to let the 
participants talk extensively, the precise nature of the questions could have resulted in 
poorer quality of data. 
The validity of the data for Study One was checked at various points. These included 
the use of code-re-code and inter-rater reliability checks for the content analysis. 
Studies Two and Three contain the reflection section prescribed by the 
phenomenological method. The use of two different methods under the same 
paradigm was found to be advantageous for the analysis and interpretation of the 
data. The method used in the first study provided data, which in turn was used for the 
design of the semi-structured interview in Study Two. However, the combination of 
methods from different paradigms may also be beneficial in the research of awareness 
of difficulties following a brain injury. 
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8.5. IMPLICATIONS FOR REHABILITATION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
A number of implications for clinical practice are suggested from the findings. Some 
researchers have suggested that it is important for rehabilitation efforts to focus on 
developing awareness of difficulties (Kay and Silver, 1989). Other researchers have 
argued that a prerequisite level of awareness is not necessary to utilise compensatory 
strategies following a brain injury (Sohlberg, Mateer, Penkman, Glang and Todis, 
1998). These authors suggest that people with brain injuries can be trained to use 
compensatory strategies even in cases where patients do not understand why or 
believe that they need them. The authors explained that for people affected by a brain 
injury it might be more productive to tap into implicit learning that into declarative 
knowledge as to why these strategies are important. The findings in this thesis 
however, point to the ability of people with brain injuries to learn about their 
difficulties even if the understanding of those difficulties is not there in some cases. 
Therefore, while accepting that implicit learning may be productive for the 
rehabilitation of people with brain injuries, teaching them to verbalise these difficulties 
may also prove productive. 
Learning to verbalise difficulties, through repetition for example, may be useful to the 
person with a brain injury as these expressions can be used to "position" the person 
with a brain injury during social interaction in the way already described in Chapter 
Six. However, what may prove more useful, and perhaps more difficult, would be to 
help the patient or client change the narrative of the causal relationship brain- 
behaviour. Although health professionals may believe that there is a causal 
relationship between brain injury and the behaviour of people with brain injuries, this 
is only one perspective. For instance, it is difficult to find the cause of mood swings 
after a stroke. They may be a direct consequence of the trauma or they may be a 
secondary reaction to the experience. Even if there is much scientific evidence 
connecting behaviour with brain injury, it is still very difficult to find the true causes 
of behaviour. 
Thus, rehabilitation and health professionals may help people with brain injuries to 
construct alternative explanations of behaviour that are more empowering for the 
individual. How this may be achieved, can be the object of further research, but 
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rehabilitation staff and carers of people with brain injuries need to first take into 
consideration the contextual and personal characteristics of the person with a brain 
injury. It is a well illustrated point in the brain injury literature that patients or clients 
with brain injuries may experience depressive states upon learning about the incurable 
nature of their difficulties (Prigatano, 1991; Malec and Moessner, 2000). 
Attributional theories often remark that locus of causality of difficulties in life makes a 
difference in interpersonal relations and not just a cognitive difference but also an 
affective difference, a difference in feelings (Brown, 1986). When a person attributes 
difficulties in life to stable characteristics of the self, the person becomes more easily 
depressed. Conversely, an attribution of difficulties to situations the person can 
change can empower the individual. 
Rehabilitation staff, health workers and carers of people with brain injuries may help 
change the narratives of these individuals by offering new narratives or helping 
construct alternative narratives with their patients or clients. Further research may 
then inquire into the usefulness of the new narratives for the sense of self in people 
with brain injuries. Alternatively, or as well as, rehabilitation staff, health workers and 
carers of people with brain injuries may invite their patients or clients to compare pre- 
injury-post-injury attributional narratives. Temporal comparisons may help dispel the 
persistence of inaccurate beliefs about the self. Further research may then inquire into 
the usefulness of temporal comparisons for the sense of self in people with brain 
injuries. 
8.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Traditionally, social and health psychological research into adjustment and adaptation 
to brain injury has revealed "unrealistic" self-appraisal as problematic for people with 
brain injuries and the people in their social environments. This unrealistic self- 
appraisal has been described as reduced awareness of physical, cognitive and/or 
emotional difficulties, which occur following neurological damage. The development 
of a realistic self-appraisal, under this perspective, is seen as important if people with 
brain injuries are to engage in rehabilitation and live fulfilling and meaningful lives. 
In this thesis, this point of view has been challenged. Instead, the research has 
explored the link between awareness of difficulties following a brain injury and social 
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interaction. Brain injury happens in society and when the difficulties that are 
experienced after this brain injury appear beyond the self-control of the individual 
affected by the trauma, they are a challenge to society in general. The social and 
health psychology literature illustrated in Chapters Two and Three is witness to this. 
The thesis, while not trying to minimise the problem of brain injury for the people 
affected by it, their families and carers, has introduced another perspective to the 
study of lack of awareness after brain injury: that of the social interactionist- 
constructivist thesis. It is hoped that this framework will provide a corrective balance 
to the interpretation of behaviour, which ascribes neurological, neuropsychological or 
psychological causes to phenomena, which thus shift them from the individual domain 
to the public. For example, certain characteristics experienced after brain injury 
become "syndromes" of the brain injury, with the result that specific episodes in a 
person's life come to be constructed as "symptoms". Instances when people with brain 
injuries appear to disassociate from their brain injuries are synthesised as denial of 
difficulties and adopted by researchers and reconstituted as lack of awareness of 
difficulties. Furthermore., it is also hoped that the introduction of this framework to 
the study of brain injury will help understand people with brain injuries needing to see 
themselves as a solution waiting to happen rather than a burdensome problem difficult 
to solve. 
Finally, and as Fleck (1935) argued many years ago, it is necessary to remember that 
scientific facts are socially constructed by distinct thought collectives, each composed 
of individuals who share a specific thought style incommensurable with others. 
Training in one style hampers the ability to look at the same object from a different 
perspective, therefore neurologists, neuropsychologists or psychologists tend to 
observe the same phenomena. Only a combination of historical, sociological, 
psychological and philosophical points of view into a multi-disciplinary approach, 
called by Fleck "comparative epistemology", could allow for a proper study of 
complex phenomena. 
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APPENDIX I- Interview schedule for people with brain injuries (Part One of 
Study One) 
Sex Status 
Age Occupation (now or/and in the past) 
Education Interview n.: 
Type of injury Duration of coma 
1) What is this place called? 
2) How far is this place from your home? 
3) Why do you come to ... 
? 
4) Any other reasons? 
5) How long have you been coming here? 
6) What made you decide to come here? 
7) Do you enjoy coming here? 
8) Why? 
9) What sort of activities do you do here? 
10) What do you enjoy the most? 
11) What do you enjoy the least? 
12) Do you live on your own? 
13) What other activities do you do when you are not here? 
14) Do you do these activities on your own/friends/family? 
15) Are you employed at the moment? 
16) Have you always had the same job? 
17) Are you seeking employment at the moment? 
18) What do you think you are good at? 
19) Could you improve? 
20) In the past, what do you think you used to be good at? 
21) About your health, how are you feeling today? 
22) Do you consider yourself healthy? 
23) Would you say that you have always been healthy? 
24) How do you keep in good health? 
25) Do you. think about your health? 
26) In general, would you like to tell me about you and your life? 
27) Do you think your life has changed for you? 
28) When did it change? 
29) Would you like to talk about it? 
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30) Is life for you better now or in the past? 
31) What makes you happy? 
32) What makes you sad? 
33) Do you think life for you will be different in the ftiture from what it is now? 
34) Have you got any plans for the future? 
35) Given the chance, what would you like to do? 
36) How do you feel you cope with life at the moment? 
37) Do you worry about yourselP 
38) Do you feel people respect you? 
39) Do people upset you? 
40) Would you say that you upset others? 
41) Who would you say is the most important person in your life? 
42) Why? 
43) Who do you dislike the most? 
44) Why? 
45) How do you think others see you? 
46) Do you think you get on with people? 
47) Do you think about what you do and what you can do? 
48) Before we finish, would you like to tell me the time and the date? 
49) What did you do before you came here? 
50) What will you do tomorrow? 
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APPENDIX II - Interview schedule for significant others (Part Two of Study 
One) 
Sex: Status: 
Age: Occupation 
Education: Interview n.: 
Knowledge of duration of coma/anmesia: Relation to the Patient: 
1) Would you say that used to be an active person? 
2) Do you think 
_ 
is as capable now as before the injury? 
3) Would you say that there is room for improvement? 
4) How do you explain to this shortcomings? 
5) What do you think used to be good at? 
6) What do you think 
_ 
is good at now? 
7) In you opinion, is there room for improvement? 
8) Do you try to encourage 
_? 
9) How do you do that? 
10) In general, do you think that 
- 
knows what happens from day to day? 
11) How do you think gets on with other people? 
12) In your opinion, do thinks about what he/she does and what he/she can do? 
13 ) In the past, did use to worry about the things he/she did or could do? 
14) How do you explain to this shortcomings? 
15) To what degree do you think 
_ 
knows/ understands about his/her injury? 
16) After the event, how much do you think knew/understood about the injury? 
17) Do you think knows/ understands the implications of the injury? 
18) To your knowledge, does worry about the physical consequences of the injury? 
19) Do you talk about them? 
20) How do you talk about them? 
21) In the past, did used to worry about health? 
22) Do you think has changed since the injury? 
23) How has changed? 
24) Could you tell me a bit about - 
before the injury? 
25) Do you think _ 
has noticed any changes (if any) in himself/herself 
26) How do you explain these changes to _? 
27) In your opinion, is _ 
motivated in his/her daily activities? 
28) What motivates - 
now? 
29) What used to motivate -? 
30) To your knowledge, does has any plans for the future? 
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3 1) Do you think worries about himself/herself? 
32) Did use to worry about himself/herself? 
33) How do you think people, in general, treat ? 
34) How would you say 
- 
feels about other people? 
35) Would you say _ 
has changed his/her social habits? 
36) Does worry about how others see him/her? 
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APPENDIX III - Interview schedule for people with brain injuries (Study Two) 
AF Familiarity with brain injury. 
Have you known brain injured people in the past? 
What are your experiences of brain injury, apart from your own? 
AF Knowledge of own problem in hospitallrehabilitationlat home. 
What happened to you? 
Did you know in hospital what was happening to you? 
Did you know during rehabilitation? 
Did you know when you got back home? 
AF Reasonsfor not knowing. 
Who told you what had happened to you? 
What did you think at the time? 
Who told you about the problems that you were likely to have after the injury? 
Did anybody explain to you what you could do to help yourselP 
Did you follow the advice? / Why? 
Aff Emergence of knowledge. 
When do you think you realised that you had a problem? 
Are there any particular instances when your problems maybe clear to you? 
AF Reaction to problems. 
What was your reaction to knowing what was happening to you? 
AF Situation now. 
Do you know about your problems now? 
What do you do about them? 
AV Remember1know. (Explain both termsfirst) 
Would you say that you remember about your problems or would you say that you 
just know about them? 
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Has it always been this way? 
JIF Who explains what. 
With whom do you talk about the problems you have? 
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APPENDIX IV - Interview with non-expert health professionals (Study Three) 
-Familiarity with brain injury 
How long have you been working with people with brain injuries? 
Have you known any brain injured person previously to you working here? 
Have you received any training previously to working with people with brain injuries? 
-Knowledge of the problem (finding how the staff at the centres refer to the problem 
and experiences of it) 
Have you ever come across a brain injured person that did not know about his/her 
physical deficits? (ifyes, proceed, if not, go to questions about cognitive difficulties) 
Did you think that he/she knew what was happening to him/her? 
What makes you think that a member/client knows about his/her physical deficits? 
What makes you think that a member/client does not know about his/her physical 
deficits? 
How common do you think this problem is? In your experience, is this problematic 
for the brain injured person? 
In your experience, is this problematic for other people? 
Do you think that People that do not know about this problem can come to know this 
or know this better? 
In your experience, people that know about this problem, what do you think they do 
about it? 
In your experience, are there any situations that are a direct consequence of the 
problem? 
If by cognitive deficits, we understand memory, perception and reasoning problems, 
then: 
Have you ever come across a brain injured person that did not know about his/her 
cognitive deficits? 
Do you think that they know about them? 
What makes you think that a member/client knows about his/her cognitive deficits? 
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What makes you think that a member/client does not know about his/her cognitive 
deficits? 
How common do you think this problem is? 
In your experience, is this problematic for the brain injured person? 
In your experience, is this problematic for other people? 
Do you think that people that do not know about this problem can come to know this 
or know this better? 
In your experience, people that know about this problem, what do you think they do 
about it? 
In your experience, are there any situations that are a direct consequence of the 
problem? 
If by emotional deficits, we understand excessive aggression, excessive cursing, 
excessive sexual talk, frequent and inexplicable change of mood, misreading social 
situations, then: 
Have you ever come across a brain injured person that did not know about his/her 
emotional deficits? 
Do you think that they know about them? 
What makes you think that a member/client knows about his/her emotional deficits? 
What makes you think that a member/client does not know about his/her emotional 
deficits? 
How common do you think this problem is? 
In your experience, is this problematic for the brain injured person? 
Has it been you experience that it is problematic for other people? 
Do you think that people that do not know about this problem can come to know this 
or know this better? 
In your experience, people that know about this problem, what do you think they do 
about it? 
in your experience, are there any particular situations that are a direct consequence of 
the problem? 
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-Dealing with problems 
If you suspect a member/client to not know about a deficit, what do you do about it? 
How would you explain this problem to the member/client? 
If a member/client gets into trouble because of not knowing about a particular deficit, 
what do you do about it? 
If they do not say specifically, ask if they talk about the problems with the relatives of 
the member/client? / Do you find this effective? 
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APPENDIX V- Vignette 1 (Study Three) 
Sylvia is 56 and has had two strokes. The first stroke happened five years ago and 
was very mild. Sylvia recuperated from it with hardly any consequences. She went 
back to work after a recommended period of rest. 
A year ago Sylvia was affected by a second stroke. Since, she attends a day care 
centre where she continuously approaches the staff with questions like, why is she 
attending the centre, when will she be allowed to go back to work, how many 
children has she got and is she still married. Her husband collects her at the end of 
each day from the centre. Sylvia does not seem to have any problems recognising him 
and greets him warn-fly. On the way home, Sylvia proceeds to ask her husband 
questions like, why is she attending the centre, when will she be allowed to go back 
to work, how many children have they got and if they are still married. 
Do you think that Sylvia's behaviour is unusual/inappropriate? / Why? 
Do you think that Sylvia knows about this behaviour? 
Why do you think that Sylvia wants to go back to work? 
What do you think is in Silvia's mind? 
In your opinion, is Sylvia ready to going back to her old job? Any job? 
Do you think that she can go back to work? / Why? 
What would you recommend she does? / Why? 
What would you call Sylvia's condition? 
(Probing wherever necessary) 
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APPENDIX VI - Vignette 2 (Study Three) 
John is a young adult who has suffered a brain injury. During rehabilitation and while 
attending a day care centre, he was observed once ordering a meal from the centre's 
canteen. While queuing up, he was standing next to an attractive therapist and begun 
to engage her in conversation. As the woman walked in line, John stood next to her 
staring at her in a rather inappropriate manner. He began to walk next to her and 
began to comment about her attractiveness. The woman was obviously 
uncomfortable. John continued to make comments and the woman acknowledged 
those in a brief manner. It was obvious to all around her that she was not interested in 
further dialogue. John persisted in making more comments until she walked away 
from the line indignant and angry. John was left standing and wondering what he had 
done to cause such negative reaction. 
Do you think that John's behaviour is unusual/inappropriate? / Why? 
Do you think John knows what has caused the therapist to walk away? / Why? 
If the woman had not walked away, would you think that John would have persisted 
in his efforts? / Why? 
What do you think is in John's mind? 
Would you say that John has a problem? 
What would that problem be? 
(Probing wherever necessary) 
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